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In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considera-
tions; it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents.  In a small one,
the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses are
less extensive there and consequently less protected.
—Montesquieu
1
INTRODUCTION
Many constitutional principles apply to more than one level of
government.  For example, virtually all Bill of Rights guarantees,
which long were understood to limit only the federal government,
have been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
under the doctrine of incorporation.2  Similarly, the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause, which by its terms applies only
to states, has been “reverse-incorporated” against the federal govern-
ment.3  “Multilevel” constitutional principles can be found outside the
contexts of incorporation and reverse incorporation, as well.  For ex-
ample, the Court has held that a constitutional principle of represen-
tative democracy that prohibits the federal government from aug-
menting Article I’s qualifications for Congress also applies to the
states.4
1
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 124 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).  As should become clear during the
course of the Article, I do not believe that constitutional protections should always be
less searching in relation to smaller polities.  The quotation from Montesquieu is nota-
ble insofar as it suggests that the appropriate scope of constitutional protections might
be related to the size of the polity.
2
Compare Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848
(1992) (“We have held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates most of the Bill of Rights against the States.”), with Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment was intended solely to bind the federal government and was not ap-
plicable to legislation passed by individual states).  The only exceptions are the Fifth
Amendment grand jury requirement, the Seventh Amendment civil jury requirement,
the Second Amendment, and the Third Amendment.  See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446-47 (14th ed. 2001).
3
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (“In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government.”).
4
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995).  For further
discussion of this case, see infra notes 16-25, 429-36 and accompanying text.
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The conventional wisdom is that such multilevel constitutional
principles apply identically to all levels of government.  Thus, the
Court has held that incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees apply “with
full force to the States.”5  Similarly, when reverse incorporating, the
Court has articulated the doctrine of “congruence,” under which
equal protection applies identically to the federal and subfederal poli-
ties,6  and has applied the principle of representative democracy that
limits Congress identically to the states.7  In short, today’s doctrine vir-
tually always utilizes what might be called a categorical “One-Size-Fits-
All” approach to those constitutional principles that apply to more
than one level of government.
This Article’s thesis is that this categorical One-Size-Fits-All ap-
proach is problematic because the different levels of government—
federal, state, and local—sometimes are sufficiently different that a
given constitutional principle may apply differently to each level.  This
Article critically examines an alternative approach to One-Size-Fits-All
that I dub “Tailoring.”  Tailoring refers to the possibility, though not
the requirement, that a constitutional principle may apply differently
to different levels of government.  Tailoring thus would permit a situa-
tion where the federal government could regulate in ways unavailable
to the subfederal polities as a matter of constitutional law.  Conversely,
states or localities might at other times be permitted to regulate in
ways that the federal government could not.  Finally, Tailoring holds
out the prospect that states and municipalities might be sufficiently
different that constitutional principles also should be Tailored as be-
tween them.  For example, states may be more similar to the federal
government than to municipalities in some respects such that a consti-
tutional limitation might forbid the federal and state governments,
but not municipalities, from regulating in a particular instance.
This Article does not ask whether any particular constitutional
principle should be Tailored.  It instead considers the antecedent
question of whether Tailoring is a plausible technique to consider.
An affirmative answer does not commit a person to the conclusion
that any particular constitutional principle should be Tailored, but
5
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992); see also infra Part I.B.3 (discussing se-
lective incorporation).
6
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995) (announcing
the principle of “congruence between the standards applicable to federal and state ra-
cial classifications”).
7
See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 820 (“The egalitarian ideal, so valued by the Framers, is
thus compromised to the same degree by additional qualifications imposed by the
States as by those imposed by Congress.”).
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uncovers a new set of doctrinal options for consideration.  In the end,
the Article concludes that the One-Size-Fits-All approach should be
softened from a categorical requirement to a rebuttable presumption.
Although Tailoring at first might sound completely outlandish, it
is not wholly unfamiliar to American constitutional jurisprudence.  As
the Article shows, numerous Justices—including Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Holmes, Cardozo, Jackson, Harlan, Fortas,
Powell, Stewart, Stevens, Blackmun, Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas—
have argued that particular constitutional principles apply differently
to different levels of government.  Consider, for example, Justice Stev-
ens’s dissent in the case of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.8  Prior to
Adarand, state affirmative action programs were subject to strict scru-
tiny,9 whereas federal programs only had to satisfy intermediate scru-
tiny under the rule announced in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.10  The
Adarand majority announced the principle of “congruence”—the re-
quirement that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment
area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment”11—to re-
verse Metro Broadcasting.12  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
argued in dissent as follows:
The Court’s concept of “congruence” assumes that there is no significant
difference between a decision by the Congress of the United States to
adopt an affirmative-action program and such a decision by a State or a
municipality.  In my opinion that assumption is untenable.  It ignores
important practical and legal differences between federal and state or
local decisionmakers.
13
In short, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg contended that the constitu-
tional principle of equal protection should be Tailored, and criticized
the doctrine of “congruence” for adopting what this Article terms a
One-Size-Fits-All approach.
Moreover, though not conceptualized as instances of Tailoring,
several contemporary doctrines in fact vary in their application de-
8
515 U.S. at 242.
9
This was the rule announced in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
494 (1989).
10
497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (“We hold that benign race-conscious measures
mandated by Congress . . . are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially
related to achievement of those objectives.” (internal citations omitted)).
11
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
12
Id. at 227.
13
Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See infra Part III.B.1 for further discussion of
Tailoring as it relates to Adarand and federal affirmative action programs.
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pending on the level of government to which they apply.  For in-
stance, although equal protection proscribes the federal and state
governments from conditioning the right to vote on property owner-
ship, certain local governments are allowed to utilize such voting re-
quirements.14  Similarly, although the Dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits states from adopting protectionist measures that discrimi-
nate against sister states, no such antiprotectionism principle has been
reverse-incorporated against the federal government.  Consequently,
Congress can authorize protectionist regulations that states cannot.15
As this Article explains, such variances are best understood as in-
stances of Tailoring, not as simply odd and discrete exceptions to or-
dinary constitutional law.
Although Tailoring’s sensitivity to the differences among different
levels of government is not unknown to American constitutional law,
the Court ignores such considerations most of the time.  This inatten-
tiveness has led to troubling legal analysis.  Consider the majority
opinion in the case of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.16  At issue was
the constitutionality of an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution
that provided term limits for Arkansas’ federal representatives.  The
amendment was passed by a ballot initiative “that won nearly 60% of
the votes cast in a direct election and that carried every congressional
district in the State.”17  The majority nevertheless struck it down on the
ground that the amendment violated the “fundamental principle of
our representative democracy” that “the people should choose whom
they please to govern them.”18
This reasoning is paradoxical:  how can it be that fundamental
democratic principles required that the Court strike down an
amendment that had been adopted by the direct vote of a majority of
Arkansas’ citizens?  The majority arrived at this puzzling rationale by
reflexively invoking a One-Size-Fits-All jurisprudence that disregarded
the differences between the levels of government (federal or state)
that were acting.
The “fundamental principle of our representative democracy”
that “the people should choose whom they please to govern them” was
a thoroughly sensible principle for the Court to rely upon in Powell v.
14
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing property-based franchise).
15
See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the Dormant Commerce Clause).
16
514 U.S. 779 (1995).
17
Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
18
Id. at 819 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)).  The Court
noted that this was the “most important[]” consideration in its rationale.  Id. at 806.
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McCormack, where a majority of citizens in New York’s Eighteenth
Congressional District had voted for Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., and
members of Congress sought to keep Powell from taking his seat.19  Af-
ter all, the additional qualifications for representatives that Congress
sought to impose in Powell interfered with the choice that had been
made by those who lived in Powell’s congressional district—the peo-
ple whose preferences mattered in respect of selecting their represen-
tative for Congress.  The majority in Thornton gave no real thought to
the significance of which level of government was imposing the limit
on who could sit for Congress, asserting simply that “the source of the
qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification’s restric-
tive impact.”20  This was the majority’s predicate for concluding that
“state-imposed qualifications, as much as congressionally imposed
qualifications, would undermine . . . the right of the people to vote for
whom they wish.”21
This reasoning is specious.  That “the source of the qualification is
of little moment in assessing the qualification’s restrictive impact”22 bears
no relation to the question the Court was considering:  the relevance
of Powell’s democratic principle to Thornton.  Qualifications for mem-
bers of Congress are not per se unconstitutionally undemocratic—in-
deed, the Constitution itself sets qualifications.23  The pertinent con-
sideration for purposes of basic democratic principles is who imposes
them.  In Powell, additional qualifications were imposed by people who
were not part of the political community democratically entitled to se-
lect its representative to Congress; the Congressmen who sought to
bar Powell from sitting did not reside in New York’s Eighteenth Con-
gressional District.  That is why the additional qualifications interfered
with the fundamental democratic principle that the choice of the
relevant political community must be respected.  In Thornton, by con-
trast, a majority of voters in every congressional district in Arkansas
had voted for additional qualifications—term limits—that applied
only to them.  Because term limits reflected the choice of the relevant
political community, overturning the amendment cannot legitimately
be justified on the basis of fundamental democratic principles.24
19
395 U.S. 486, 489 (1969).
20
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 820.
21
Id.
22
Id. (emphasis added).
23
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (describing qualifications for representatives); id.
art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (describing qualifications for senators).
24
The dissent made this point.  Thornton, 514 U.S. at 877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thus, “the source of the qualification” is of decisive moment in assess-
ing whether it is violative of, or instead consistent with, fundamental
democratic principles.  The majority’s fatally flawed rationale is part
and parcel of a One-Size-Fits-All approach, which, by definition, ig-
nores differences between the federal and state governments.
The problematic reasoning in Thornton helps illustrate a crucial
larger point:  the greater openness to Tailoring that this Article advo-
cates is not important simply because many Justices over the past
hundred years have called for Tailoring (which they have) or because
several constitutional doctrines already reflect the logic of Tailoring
(which they do).  Although these two observations should help
smooth feathers ruffled by the mere notion of Tailoring by showing
that Tailoring is by no means foreign to contemporary doctrine, they
do not on their own explain why Tailoring should figure more promi-
nently in our constitutional analysis.  Rather, as an analysis of Thornton
suggests, and as this Article will try to demonstrate, the legal commu-
nity should be more open to Tailoring because systematically ignoring
the differences among the different levels of government, as current
doctrine does, leads to troubling consequences.25
Sensitivity to what level of government is acting—the conceptual
core of Tailoring—is critical because the different levels of govern-
ment are sufficiently dissimilar that a particular limitation as applied
to one may have very different repercussions when applied to another.
It turns out that, among other things, a categorical One-Size-Fits-All
approach thwarts many of federalism’s potential benefits.  Sometimes
One-Size-Fits-All hamstrings the federal government, subjecting it to
constraints that are sensible for states or municipalities but not for our
country’s central government.  Other times, One-Size-Fits-All chokes
off the benefits of federalism by unnecessarily subjecting subfederal
I do not mean to suggest that there are no other plausible grounds for overturning the
Arkansas amendment, but only that the majority’s self-described “most important[]”
argument, id. at 806, is fundamentally flawed.
25
As this Article shows, virtually no legal scholars have given attention to Tailoring
either.  After this Article was written, I learned of an excellent piece, since published,
that considers what I call “Tailoring” in the particular context of religious liberty.  See
Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1811 (2004).  I have also published a short piece that exam-
ines Tailoring in the context of the Establishment Clause.  Mark D. Rosen, Establish-
ment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 (2003).  A forthcoming
piece of mine examines Tailoring in three doctrinal contexts:  term limits, judicial
conduct codes, and antipornography ordinances.  Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context
in Constitutional Law:  Three Applications of the Jurisprudence of Tailoring, 21 J.L. & POL.
(forthcoming 2005).
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polities to strict and uniform limitations that make sense only in re-
spect of the federal government.
In short, constitutional analysis ignores at its own peril what level
of government is acting because the different levels of government
systematically vary in important ways.  Ignoring these differences sim-
plifies constitutional analysis, to be sure, but at a cost.  There is no
reason to believe as an a priori matter that this cost is smaller than the
administrative costs of developing more complex doctrine that takes
account of systemic cross-polity differences.  The desirability of Tailor-
ing constitutional doctrines to each polity requires an understanding
of the opportunity costs of refusing to do so, as well as the administra-
tive costs of Tailoring.  This Article aims to identify both types of costs.
The Article is in five Parts.  Part I begins by formally defining One-
Size-Fits-All and Tailoring.  It shows that both within and outside of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court virtually always
adopts One-Size-Fits-All.  Part I’s analysis also clarifies Tailoring’s pre-
cise relationship to the incorporation controversy and to contempo-
rary black-letter doctrine.  Although Tailoring has important applica-
tions outside the contexts of incorporation and reverse incorporation
(as shown by Thornton, for instance), Tailoring’s significant implica-
tions in respect of incorporation and reverse incorporation merit such
a clarification.  Among other things, Part I shows that deciding the
merits of Tailoring does not simply replay the incorporation debate of
the 1950s and 1960s.  Indeed, Tailoring is fully consistent with selec-
tive incorporation, which emerged as the doctrinal winner of that de-
bate.
Part II shows that although today most multilevel constitutional
principles are doctrinally treated as One-Size-Fits-All, the Supreme
Court has not made much of an effort to justify such an approach.
Part II argues that the Court’s arguments for a categorical One-Size-
Fits-All doctrine are unconvincing.  Part II then surveys several schol-
ars’ attempts to justify the contemporary One-Size-Fits-All approach.
Part II concludes that there are two reasonably strong defenses for the
status quo, but that they are pragmatic rather than theoretical justifi-
cations.  As such, they do not support a categorical One-Size-Fits-All
doctrine.  Pragmatism invites consideration of the benefits and costs
of alternatives to a One-Size-Fits-All approach and holds out the pros-
pect that deviations from One-Size-Fits-All might sometimes be legiti-
mate.
The Article’s next two Parts explain why Tailoring is a plausible
doctrinal option that should be forthrightly considered, not dismissed
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out-of-hand by a categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach.  Part III pro-
vides a quasi-precedential argument that is designed to show that Tai-
loring is not as foreign to American jurisprudence as it may first ap-
pear.  Part III’s analysis is not (and cannot be) fully precedential, of
course, because contemporary doctrine is overwhelmingly One-Size-
Fits-All, as shown in Part II.  Nonetheless, it is instructive to under-
stand that Tailoring has been propounded by a line of distinguished
Supreme Court Justices for more than seventy-five years; that Tailor-
ing already is found in several constitutional doctrines; and that some
nonconstitutional federal law reflects the logic of Tailoring as it dis-
tinguishes among the federal, state, and substate governments.  This
“precedent” collectively suggests that doctrinal sensitivity to what level
of government is acting—Tailoring’s conceptual core—already can be
found in American law.  Tailoring thus is not as novel as it might first
appear.
Part IV identifies five respects in which the different levels of gov-
ernment might be sufficiently different to justify Tailoring.  First, each
level is susceptible to distinctive political malfunctions.  Second, as a
result of each level’s particular geographical scope, identical restric-
tions may have systematically different consequences across the differ-
ent levels of government.  Third, because there are divergent exit
costs across the different levels of government, there might be system-
atic variations with regard to whether and to what extent competition
among polities can generate efficient and diverse public goods.
Fourth, identical restrictions can have very different consequences vis-
à-vis democracy since each level of government requires a different
number of people to garner a majority and thereby translate its pref-
erences into law.  Fifth, and finally, each level of government may
have certain distinctive responsibilities.
Part IV explains that whether any or all of these differences justify
Tailoring a given constitutional principle ultimately turns on what are
best characterized as preconstitutional, political commitments.  Inter-
estingly, however, a broad array of competing approaches to ordering
social life that often generate conflicting policy prescriptions—includ-
ing public choice theory, law and economics, Robert Nozick’s political
philosophy, Ely’s process theory, multiculturalist theorists Will Kym-
licka and Charles Taylor, and Rawlsian political thought—finds one or
more of these distinctions sufficient to support Tailoring.  While Part
IV does not take a position on the ultimate merits of these contested
approaches to ordering social life, it does make the following point:
the fact that many competing methodologies converge on the conclu-
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sion that Tailoring sometimes might be desirable counsels that consti-
tutional doctrine should be responsive to potential differences among
the various levels of government.  This is the predicate for concluding
that today’s categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach is unwise.
Part V completes the Article’s pragmatic analysis of Tailoring by
considering Tailoring’s potential costs.  Although none gives rise to
the conclusion that Tailoring is per se undesirable, several are very
real countervailing considerations that are relevant to determining
whether a particular constitutional principle should be Tailored.  In
conjunction with the conclusions of Parts III and IV, these potential
costs to Tailoring suggest that contemporary doctrine should be
modified, but not totally abandoned:  One-Size-Fits-All should be
downgraded from a categorical requirement to a rebuttable presump-
tion.  The recognition that Tailoring generates costs also heightens
awareness of the subjectivity that invariably is involved in the choice
between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring; trading off between Tailor-
ing’s potential benefits and costs is a determination that is not suscep-
tible to purely rational decision making on account of the fact that
Tailoring’s potential benefits and costs are incommensurable.
I.  ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL AND TAILORING IDENTIFIED
This Part introduces a simple jurisprudential model that permits a
precise definition of Tailoring, and shows that the contemporary doc-
trine, within Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and more gener-
ally, is overwhelmingly of the One-Size-Fits-All character.
Importantly, Part I’s model also precisely clarifies Tailoring’s rela-
tionship to the doctrines of selective and reverse incorporation.  Elu-
cidating this relationship is important for three reasons.  First, al-
though Tailoring has significant applications throughout
constitutional law, it has extensive relevance to Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence.  Second, the clarification rebuts the pos-
sible misconception that advocacy of Tailoring is an invitation to re-
visit the incorporation controversy of the 1950s and 1960s, a hard-
fought battle in which a clear victor has emerged.26  It is not, for Tai-
loring is consistent with selective incorporation.  Third, putting Tai-
26
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 968
(2002) (declaring incorporation “one of the few great success stories of modern consti-
tutional law” and observing that “[j]udges and constitutional scholars almost univer-
sally agree that, whatever else it does or does not do, the Fourteenth Amendment
makes most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states and their
subdivisions”).
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loring into jurisprudential and historical perspective shows that Tai-
loring is less radical than it may sound at first.  Tailoring is best under-
stood as an alternative mode of selective incorporation that can real-
ize many of the pragmatic benefits of the contemporary doctrine
while shedding the doctrine’s theoretically unjustifiable and unneces-
sarily cramping aspects.
A.  A Simple Jurisprudential Model
Tailoring and One-Size-Fits-All are best understood in relation to
a simple jurisprudential model that identifies the character of consti-
tutional doctrine at any given point in time.27  The model builds on
the commonly appreciated distinction between “rules” and “stan-
dards.”28  Standards are legal edicts that describe the trigger of legal
consequences in “abstract terms that refer to the ultimate policy or
goal animating the law.”29  Rules, by contrast, are legal edicts that “de-
scribe the triggering event with factual particulars or other language
that is determinate within a community.”30
Now to the model.  Let the term “constitutional principles” refer
to constitutional propositions that derive directly from the Constitu-
tion’s text (e.g., “free exercise”), constitutional concepts that are
traceable to constitutional text (e.g., “standing”), and constitutional
concepts that are not connected to constitutional text at all (e.g., “an-
ticommandeering,” the “right to travel”).  Constitutional principles
typically take the form of standards that require active interpretation
to identify concretely the actions that are required, permitted, or pro-
scribed in particular circumstances.  The interpretive process can be
usefully conceptualized as involving three steps.  Although the steps
do not necessarily correspond to the chronology of the constitutional
27
The discussion in notes 28-40 and accompanying text, as well as Figure 1, infra,
for the most part appear in Mark D. Rosen, The Radical Possibility of Limited Community-
Based Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 927, 980-82 & 983 fig.
(2002).
28
See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:  A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 102-04 (1991)
(describing the rule/standard distinction as separate from issues of specificity); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557 (1992)
(analyzing the relative economic implications of promulgating legal commands as
rules or standards).
29
Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 622, 623
(1999).
30
Id.
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principle’s doctrinal development,31 identifying the steps is useful be-
cause they provide a means for comparing legal doctrine.32
First, the constitutional principle can be identified with a general
“Goal,” by which I mean a broad-stroke description of what the prin-
ciple attempts to accomplish.  The Goal sets the parameters within
which subsequent doctrinal development occurs.33  For example, the
Goal of the Fourth Amendment has been identified as protecting
various “personal and societal values,” including a “right to privacy.”34
The second step in the process is the creation of a “Legal Test” to 
determine whether the identified Goal is met.35  This second step oc-
curs because the Goal inevitably is too abstract, and consequently, un-
workable for the judiciary’s institutional need of having a shorthand
method for decision making that identifies as legally relevant only a
subset of the infinite facts that characterize any given circumstance.36
The test almost always includes one or more “Standards.”  For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has translated the previously mentioned
Fourth Amendment Goal into a Legal Test composed of several Stan-
dards that ask whether “the individual manifested a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the object of the challenged search” and whether so-
ciety is “willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”37  This
31
Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal
Law:  Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 490
(2000).
32
The Model for charting constitutional doctrine identified here is illuminating
in many other ways.  See Mark D. Rosen, Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS
L.J. (forthcoming Summer 2005) (manuscript at 6, on file with author).
33
Rosen, supra note 31, at 490-91 & nn.42-50.  Perhaps counterintuitively, identifi-
cation of the Goal frequently is not what happens first in time during the interpretive
process.  Once the Goal is identified, however, it affects subsequent doctrinal devel-
opment.  Id. at 490 n.43.
34
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 182-83 (1984).  Although people typi-
cally view the contemporarily understood Goal as inevitable, the Goal almost always is a
nonaxiomatic translation of the constitutional principle.  That is to say, a different
Goal (or Goals) plausibly can be ascribed to the constitutional principle (and fre-
quently have been, as an historical matter).  Rosen, supra note 31, at 490 & n.45.
35
See Rosen, supra note 31, at 490 & n.46 (noting that the Legal Test’s application
often reflects the chosen Goal).
36
Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword:  Implementing
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56-57 (1997) (“Even when general agreement
exists that the Constitution reflects a particular value or protective purpose . . . the
norms reflecting purposes such as these are too vague to serve as rules of law; their ef-
fective implementation requires the crafting of doctrine by courts.”).
37
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (emphasis added) (reiterating
part of the inquiry set forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
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Legal Test helps to particularize the Goal, but by deploying Standards
such as “expectation of privacy” and “reasonable,” it still leaves ample
uncertainty as to what concretely satisfies it.
Step 3 describes what occurs to the Legal Test’s Standard over
time.  As the Standard is applied over a series of cases, it almost always
becomes increasingly rule-like.  This occurs because cases, by their na-
ture, are disputes that involve particular facts.  As the cases are de-
cided, they become showcases of what, as a concrete matter, the Stan-
dard requires.38  Step 3’s product is best identified as a “Rulified
Standard.”  For example, do people have a “subjective expectation of
privacy” in open fields?  The Court has said no.39  Is curtilage sur-
rounded by a high double fence protected?  Not from a naked-eye ob-
servation made from an aircraft, according to the Court.40
This simple model of interpretation can be graphically depicted as
follows in Figure 1:
38
This process of utilizing case law to make standards more concrete is not logi-
cally necessary; some say, for instance, that it does not occur in French law.  See Barry
Nicholas, Introduction to the French Law of Contract, in CONTRACT LAW TODAY:  ANGLO-
FRENCH COMPARISONS 7, 9-11 (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989) (“That the
courts do not play a similar part in France is attributable, on the one hand, to the
standing in the scale of authority which has been attributed to them since the Revolu-
tion and, on the other hand, to the form in which their judgments are cast.”).  It is,
however, an accurate depiction of what happens under the United States’s common
law method of constitutional adjudication.  See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877-906 (1996) (outlining a common law
approach to constitutional interpretation).
39
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984) (concluding that gov-
ernment intrusion upon open fields is not proscribed by the Fourth Amendment).
40
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
2005] TAILORING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 1527
Figure 1
As we shall see, this simple model provides clarity with regard to
the multifarious approaches to understanding the constitutional limi-
tations applicable to states that the Justices have advocated since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.  Four Approaches to Constitutionally Limiting
the Different Levels of Government
The jurisprudential model introduced above helps to distinguish
four plausible approaches to constitutionally limiting the different
levels (e.g., federal and state) of government.  Clarity as to these four
approaches illuminates Tailoring.  The Section that follows explains
each of these four approaches by means of illustrations from Bill of
Rights provisions that have been incorporated against the states, but
the same range of approaches is available in respect of other constitu-
tional principles.  All four approaches, we shall see, have been advo-
cated by Justices at different points in time.  Two have commanded
majorities at different points in time, one of which still is the current
black-letter law.
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1.  Different Levels, Different Constitutional Principles:
The Example of “Fundamental Fairness”
The first possibility is that the different levels of government are
governed by distinctive constitutional principles.  The plausibility of
this approach is underscored by careful study of the text of the Consti-
tution.  Virtually no constitutional provisions explicitly apply to more
than one level of government.  The bulk of the United States Consti-
tution applies by its terms only to the federal government.  For exam-
ple, many provisions of the Bill of Rights by their terms address only
the federal government,41 and the landmark case of Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore42 famously held in 1833 that the proscriptions delineated in
the Bill of Rights did not apply to the subfederal polities.43  Con-
versely, the provisions at the end of Article I apply by their terms to
the states, but not to the federal government.44
Barron’s rule unquestionably continued to be the law up to the
adoption of the Civil Rights Amendments.  The new amendments by
their terms contained many new limitations on states.  But what pre-
cisely was the requirement of “due process” and the curb that states
not impinge on the “privileges or immunities” of their citizens?45  And
what relationship did these new limitations bear to the constitutional
constraints that applied to the federal government?
Even after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court adopted an approach under which the federal and state gov-
41
For example, the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  U.S.
CONST. amend. I, § 1 (emphasis added).  The Seventh Amendment also explicitly ad-
dresses only the federal government.
42
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
43
Id. at 250-51.  Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the states each had estab-
lished constitutions that defined and limited their state governments, whereas the
United States Constitution was designed to define and limit the powers of the federal
government, except where it explicitly applied to the states (as in Article I, Section 10).
The Chief Justice wrote that “[h]ad congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation
of improving the constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional
protection from the exercise of power by their own governments, in matters which
concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intel-
ligible language.”  Id. at 250; see also id. at 247 (stating that the Constitution’s “limita-
tions on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily,
applicable to the government created by the instrument,” and not to “distinct [state]
governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes”).
44
See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10 (reserving certain powers to the states).
45
See id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
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ernments were subject to different constitutional provisions.  This can
be seen by examining the well-known case of Palko v. Connecticut.46  At
issue was the constitutionality of a state statute that gave the govern-
ment the same right of appeal as the criminal defendant.47  The Palko
Court recognized that an earlier Supreme Court decision48 had held
that the protection against double jeopardy “was not confined to
jeopardy in a new and independent case” but “forbade jeopardy in the
same case if the new trial was at the instance [sic] of the government
and not upon defendant’s motion.”49  This principle meant that a fed-
eral statute allowing the government a right of appeal from a convic-
tion would violate double jeopardy.50
The question presented in Palko was whether there is such a guar-
antee in state courts.  Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo consid-
ered the appellant’s argument that “[w]hatever would be a violation
of the original bill of rights (Amendments I to VIII) if done by the
federal government is now equally unlawful by force of the Four-
teenth Amendment if done by a state.”51  Justice Cardozo’s answer was
short and simple:  “There is no such general rule.”52  The Court in-
stead asked what was required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
46
302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
47
Id. at 320.
48
That decision was Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).  In fact, Kepner
involved a construction of federal legislation specific to the Philippine Islands that in-
corporated virtually all of the Bill of Rights’ guarantees.  Id. at 123-24.  The Kepner
Court chose to construe this statutory language in the same manner that it would have
interpreted the constitutional language.  Id. at 124-30.  Palko accordingly treated the
constitutional question as though it had been settled in Kepner.  See Palko, 302 U.S. at
322-23 (declining to consider the subject which was “much considered” in Kepner).
Though Palko’s approach in this regard is beyond reproach, Kepner could have resolved
the question before it differently.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a twenti-
eth century statute applicable in Indian country that incorporates language of the Bill
of Rights can be construed differently than the Bill of Rights.  See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978) (recognizing that standards of analysis developed
under the Fourteenth Amendment are “not necessarily controlling” in tribal courts);
cf. Rosen, supra note 31, at 487 (discussing the “well established doctrine” that tribal
courts have independent authority to construe the federal constitution).
49
Palko, 302 U.S. at 322-23.
50
Id. at 323.
51
Id.
52
Id.  Justice Cardozo’s choice of the word “general” is significant, for he noted
later in the Palko opinion that certain constitutional rights were treated differently.  See
id. at 324-25 (listing certain rights that had been incorporated); infra Part I.B.3; see also
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 85 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Implicit in this
statement . . . is the understanding that some of the eight amendments do apply by
their very terms.”), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Process Clause, and that was answered by asking whether the chal-
lenged practice “violate[d] those fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions.”53  (The Court answered “no.”)54  The Palko Court’s method has
been dubbed the “Fundamental Fairness” approach,55 and it com-
manded a majority of the Supreme Court for nearly the first hundred
years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment.56
The chart that appears below illustrates this interpretive ap-
proach.  Let the numbers (1, 2, 3, 4) represent each step in the juris-
prudential model’s representation of doctrinal development.  “F” sig-
nifies “federal” doctrine, and “S” signifies “state.”
Figure 2:  Illustration of “Fundamental Fairness”
Model of
Constitutional
Doctrine
Doctrine applicable to the
federal government
Doctrine applicable to the
state government, Approach 1
(Fundamental Fairness)
1.  Constitutional
     Principle
        ↓
1.F:  Fifth Amendment’s
double jeopardy guarantee
1.S:  Due Process
2.  Goal
        ↓
2.F:  “[A] man shall not be
brought into danger of his
life for one and the same
offence more than once.”
57
2.S:  Makes certain that state
procedures do not violate
those fundamental principles
of liberty and justice.
3.  Standard
        ↓
3.F:  No person can be
“again tried for the same
offense.”
58
3.S:  Is the policy “so acute
and shocking that our polity
will not endure it?”
59
  
4.  Rulified Standard 4.F:  Government cannot
appeal an acquittal.
4.S:  State can appeal from an
acquittal.
53
Palko, 302 U.S. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54
Id.
55
See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation:  Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 283,
291 (1982) (tracing and analyzing the Fundamental Fairness approach).  Under the
Fundamental Fairness approach, state action that violates those rights of the individual
that are deemed to be “fundamental” is prohibited, and there is no “necessary correla-
tion” between the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights and the requirements of
due process.  Id. at 273.
56 Id.
57
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
58
Id. at 130.
59
Palko, 302 U.S. at 328.
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Under the first approach, the constitutional language applicable
to the states is “due process,” not “double jeopardy.”60  In the model’s
representation:
1.S ≠ 1.F,
2.S does not (necessarily)61 = 2.F,
3.S does not (necessarily) = 3.F, and
4.S does not (necessarily) = 4.F.
The different levels of government are governed by different con-
stitutional language, and the Legal Tests need not converge at any of
the steps of the development of the two doctrines.
In short, under the Fundamental Fairness approach, there neces-
sarily is incongruity at the first step of analysis, and there can be com-
plete incongruity at all steps (as was the case in Palko).  For this rea-
son, Fundamental Fairness was a legal regime in which the federal and
subfederal governments frequently were subject to different constitu-
tional limitations.62  Under Palko, for example, state prosecutors could
appeal acquittals whereas federal prosecutors could not.  States were
subject to a host of constitutional limitations under the Fundamental
60
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was not a doc-
trinal option due to the Court’s ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1873).  See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
61
I include the term “necessarily” because it is always possible that the identical
Goal, Standard, or Rulified Standard could be imputed to two different constitutional
principles.  The Court identified this possibility in the 1908 case of Twining v. New Jer-
sey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).  The
Court stated that “it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first
eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state ac-
tion.”  Id. at 99.  The Court continued, reasoning that this was “not because those
rights are enumerated in the first eight amendments, but because they are of such a
nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law.”  Id.  The
Court’s language can be represented by the model as follows:  although 1.S ≠ 1.F, it is
possible that 2.S = 2.F.  For a modern example of this phenomenon, see infra Part
III.B.3 (discussing the case of Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001)).
62
See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (holding that due process did
not require the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence),
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62
(1942) (holding that the Due Process Clause was “less rigid and more fluid” than the
Sixth Amendment), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Twining,
211 U.S. at 113-14 (assuming that a jury instruction allowing juries to draw negative
inference from a failure to testify would have violated the Fifth Amendment if adminis-
tered in federal court, but holding that such an instruction did not violate the due
process limitation that applied to the states); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604-05
(1900) (holding that a state statute providing for an eight- rather than a twelve-person
jury was not unconstitutional, despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment required
twelve-person juries in federal court).
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Fairness regime, but the touchstone was what Fundamental Fairness
required, not what limitations applied to the federal government.63
2.  Total Incorporation
A second plausible approach is the polar opposite of Fundamental
Fairness:  to conclude that the language of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment makes applicable to the states all doctrines that were developed
in the federal context.  In the model’s representation, this would
mean as follows:
1.S = 1.F
2.S = 2.F
3.S = 3.F, and
4.S = 4.F.
This is an example of what this Article identifies as a “One-Size-
Fits-All” approach.  This was the method famously advocated by Justice
Black in the 1947 case of Adamson v. California.64  In the Fourteenth
Amendment context, the Court and commentators have dubbed this
63
For example, it was held that due process prevented states from taking private
property for public use without payment of just compensation, Chi., Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897), protected against “arbitrary in-
trusion by the police,” Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27, and sometimes required representation by
counsel, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).  For a full discussion, see Israel,
supra note 55, at 284-86.
64
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  Though not completely free from
doubt, Justice Black’s dissent appeared to adopt the position that all doctrinal details
developed in the federal context applied equally to the states.
Nothing in the Palko opinion requires that when the Court decides that a Bill
of Rights’ provision is to be applied to the States, it is to be applied piecemeal.
Nothing in the Palko opinion recommends that the Court apply part of an
amendment’s established meaning and discard that part which does not suit
the current style of fundamentals.
Id. at 86.  Justice Murphy’s dissent in Adamson attributed this position to Justice Black,
when he stated that he was “in substantial agreement with the views of” Justice Black
with only “one reservation and one addition,” addressed to the question of doctrinal
details.  Id. at 123 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  His first sentence, which purported to
specify the aspects of the Black dissent with which he concurred, states:  “I agree that
the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 124 (emphasis added).  The word “in-
tact” is best understood as referring to doctrinal details.  Commentators have under-
stood Black’s dissent to encompass absorption of all Bill of Rights guarantees as well as
all doctrinal details.  See, e.g., Israel, supra note 55, at 257 (“The total incorporation po-
sition holds that the fourteenth amendment incorporates all of the Bill of Rights guar-
antees and thereby applies those guarantees to state action in the same manner that they
are applied to the actions of the federal government.” (emphasis added)).
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position “total incorporation.”65  Although four Justices embraced this
approach in Adamson, total incorporation  never commanded a major-
ity of the Court.66  The functionally identical approach was advocated
by Justice Bradley in the Slaughter-House Cases, where he appeared to
argue that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause made the Bill of Rights provisions applicable against the
states.67  However, the Slaughter-House majority famously narrowed the
scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in such a way that it
could not serve this role,68 and Slaughter-House is still good law.  In
short, neither the Privileges or Immunities Clause nor due process has
ever been interpreted to effectuate total incorporation.
65 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“I therefore fundamentally disagree with the total incorporation view of the Four-
teenth Amendment . . . .”); Israel, supra note 55, at 257-58 (defining and discussing the
“total incorporation” doctrine).
66
See Israel, supra note 55, at 286-90 (tracing the judicial history of total incorpora-
tion).
67
See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118-19 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).  Justice Bradley argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment included “the right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury,
of free exercise of religious worship, the right of free speech and a free press, the right
peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures, [and] the right to be se-
cure against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Id.  A subsequent opinion authored
by Justice Bradley raises questions as to whether he believed that the Fourteenth
Amendment applied all Bill of Rights protections against the states.  See Missouri v.
Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879) (stating that “there is nothing in the Constitution” that
would prevent a state from “adopt[ing] the civil law and its method of procedure for
[one county] and the common law and its method of procedure for [others]”).  For
further discussion, see Israel, supra note 55, at 257 & n.20.
68
Interestingly, notwithstanding the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, in five
subsequent cases the Court was presented with arguments that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause made various Bill of Rights protections
applicable against the states.  See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (Fifth
Amendment); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 582 (1900) (Sixth Amendment); O’Neil
v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 363 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (Eighth Amendment);
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 159 (1891) (Eighth Amendment); In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890) (Eighth Amendment).  The Court reaffirmed Slaughter-House
in all these cases, though Justices Field, Harlan, and Brewer wrote dissenting opinions
in several of them, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment made the rights “enu-
merated in the earlier Amendments” applicable against the states.  See, e.g., O’Neil, 144
U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Justice Field and the first Justice Harlan both
penned dissents in O’Neil.  See id. at 363 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 370 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting, joined by Brewer, J.).  Justice Harlan also wrote dissents in Maxwell, 176 U.S. at
605-17, and in Twining, 211 U.S. at 114-27.  In the 1908 case of Twining, the Court ac-
knowledged that several Justices long had espoused the view that the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause made the Bill of Rights applicable against the states, but declared that
it was “not profitable to examine the weighty arguments in its favor, for the question is
no longer open in the Court.”  Twining, 211 U.S. at 98.
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3.  Selective Incorporation
The third approach is illustrated by the contemporary doctrine
widely known as “selective incorporation” (though I suggest below
that this terminology should be slightly altered).  Whereas total incor-
poration contemplates that the Fourteenth Amendment makes all Bill
of Rights guarantees applicable against the states, not all Bill of Rights
provisions necessarily apply under selective incorporation.69  For in-
stance, advocates of selective incorporation have not campaigned for
overturning long-established precedent holding that neither the Fifth
Amendment’s grand jury requirement70 nor the Seventh Amend-
ment’s civil jury guarantee apply to the states.71  Virtually all other Bill
of Rights guarantees, however, have been held to be applicable
against the states under selective incorporation.72  And where a guar-
antee applies, so do all doctrinal details that were developed in the
federal context.
In practice, selective incorporation is not very different from total
incorporation.  Although the selective incorporation decisions typi-
cally continued to ask whether a particular constitutional guarantee
was required under “Fundamental Fairness,” they applied the test far
more liberally than the Court had done during the “Fundamental
Fairness” era.  Justices embracing selective incorporation have con-
cluded that the Constitution’s specific enumeration of a guarantee is
virtually conclusive evidence that the guarantee is “fundamental.”73
Moreover, where a guarantee is incorporated against the states, the
selective incorporation approach makes all doctrinal details that have
been developed in the federal context also applicable against the
states.  For these reasons, the contemporary doctrine of selective in-
69
See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274 (1960) (per curiam) (Brennan,
J., joining) (advancing the position that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause does not rise to the level of protection guaranteed to to an individual against
the federal government by the Fourth Amendment), aff’g by an equally divided Court 151
N.E.2d 523 (Ohio 1958).
70
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that the grand jury
requirement does not apply against the states).
71
See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916)
(holding that the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury trial right does not apply against the
states).
72
See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 431-33 (6th
ed. 2000) (listing cases and cataloguing the incorporation status of each of the first
eight amendments).
73
See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) (positing that a guarantee’s specific inclusion in the Bill of Rights
virtually necessitates a finding that it is fundamental).
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corporation is almost indistinguishable in practice from total incorpo-
ration.
The case of Benton v. Maryland,74 which reversed the Palko decision
analyzed above,75 illustrates the contemporary doctrine of selective in-
corporation.  Benton revisited the question of whether and to what ex-
tent the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy ap-
plied to the states.  The majority wrote that “this Court has
increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights to
determine whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due pro-
cess of law”76 and quickly concluded that “[t]he fundamental nature of
the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted”77—in
effect, that 1.S equals 1.F.  The Court also asserted that “[o]nce it is
decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to
the American scheme of justice, the same constitutional standards apply
against both the State and Federal Governments.”78  The analysis proceeds
as follows for those constitutional guarantees that are deemed to apply
against the states under today’s doctrine of selective incorporation:
1.S = 1.F
2.S = 2.F
3.S = 3.F, and
4.S = 4.F.
Selective incorporation thus utilizes a One-Size-Fits-All approach
for every constitutional guarantee that is deemed to apply to the
states.79  One-Size-Fits-All is the current black letter doctrine in both
selective incorporation and reverse incorporation.
74
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
75
See supra Part I.B.1.
76
Benton, 395 U.S. at 794 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
77
Id. at 795.
78
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
79
Even before the Court’s adoption of selective incorporation’s in the 1960s, the
Court employed a One-Size-Fits-All approach in its interpretation of many First
Amendment guarantees beginning in the 1940s.  In 1943, for instance, the Court
noted
the special relationship of the Fourteenth Amendment to the rights of free-
dom of speech, press, and religion guaranteed by the First.  We have repeat-
edly held that the Fourteenth Amendment has made applicable to the states
the guaranties of the First.  Allegations of fact sufficient to show deprivation of
the right of free speech under the First Amendment are sufficient to establish
deprivation of a constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth . . . .
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943) (citations omitted).
This One-Size-Fits-All approach consistently drew dissents.  See, e.g., W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“I can-
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4.  Tailoring:  A Variant of Selective Incorporation
The fourth and final doctrinal approach is a variant of selective
incorporation.  Like selective incorporation, the fourth approach ac-
knowledges that a guarantee’s specific enumeration in the Bill of
Rights is strong evidence that the guarantee is sufficiently fundamen-
tal to be applied against the states.  Unlike the contemporary doc-
trine, however, the fourth approach contemplates that the doctrinal
details developed in the federal context might not all transfer over to
the states.  In short, under this final approach:
not bring my mind to believe that the ‘liberty’ secured by the Due Process Clause gives
this Court authority to deny to the State of West Virginia the attainment of that which
we all recognize as a legitimate legislative end . . . .”); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 152 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[N]either the First nor the Four-
teenth Amendment is to be treated by judges as though it were a mathematical abstrac-
tion, an absolute having no relation to the lives of men.”).  The dissents had the better
of the argument.
The majority that embraced One-Size-Fits-All with respect to the First Amendment
rested its position on precedent.  See, e.g., Douglas, 319 U.S. at 162 (“We have repeat-
edly held that the Fourteenth Amendment has made applicable to the states the guar-
anties of the First.”).  The case law, however, hardly constituted precedent for a One-
Size-Fits-All approach.  The One-Size-Fits-All Justices relied heavily on Justice Cardozo’s
opinion in Palko, which stated that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it unlawful
for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which the First
Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the Congress, or the like
freedom of the press, or the free exercise of religion, or the right of peaceable
assembly . . . .
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937) (citations omitted), overruled by Benton,
395 U.S. at 784.  Justice Cardozo came to this conclusion, however, by means of a Fun-
damental Fairness methodology, not a One-Size-Fits-All rationale that willy-nilly re-
sulted in the adoption of all doctrinal details.  He wrote in Palko that the First Amend-
ment guarantees “that are valid as against the federal government by force of the
specific pledges of particular amendments” were “valid as against the states” not be-
cause they were enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but because they “have been found
to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  Id. at 324-25 (citations omitted); see
also id. at 326-27 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment “absorbed” the freedoms of
“thought and speech” due to the “belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed,” not because such freedoms were specified in the Bill of Rights).
This rationale means that the general principles cross over to the state context, but it
does not speak to doctrinal details.  Notwithstanding its tenuous grounding in prece-
dent, a One-Size-Fits-All approach vis-à-vis many First Amendment guarantees was se-
curely in place during Fundamental Fairness’s heyday, twenty years before the incor-
poration revolution.
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1.S = 1.F,
2.S = 2.F, but
3.S does not necessarily = 3.F, and
4.S does not necessarily = 4.F.
This is an example of what this Article dubs “Tailoring.”
Many Justices have advocated this fourth doctrinal approach, in-
cluding Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Fortas, Powell, Stevens,
Thomas, and Ginsburg.80  In so doing, however, the Justices have not
clearly distinguished their method from the contemporary doctrine of
selective incorporation.  Understanding this fourth possibility suggests
that it is useful to distinguish between two types of “selective incorpo-
ration”:  (1) selective and undifferentiated incorporation and (2) se-
lective and differentiated incorporation.  Consistent with ordinary us-
age, “selective” refers to the fact that not all Bill of Rights principles
carry over to the states.  “Undifferentiated” means that where a given
principle is imported, all doctrinal details come along with it.  “Differ-
entiated” incorporation refers to a methodology that rejects the unre-
flective importation of all doctrinal details, though it does not mean
that the doctrinal details necessarily differ across the different levels of
government.
To summarize, selective and undifferentiated incorporation is a
One-Size-Fits-All doctrine that reflects contemporary black letter law.
Selective and differentiated incorporation, by contrast, is an example
of Tailoring, and it has not been adopted by a majority of the Court.
It is useful to graphically compare the four approaches.  Figure 3
arranges them, from left to right, on the basis of increasingly equiva-
lent treatment of the different levels of government:
80
See infra Part II.A (discussing the Court’s justifications for employing a One-Size-
Fits-All approach).  Justices Holmes, Jackson, and Harlan advocated a similar ap-
proach, as will be discussed below.
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Figure 3:  Four Approaches to Construing
the Fourteenth Amendment
                                                      1                 2                 3                   4
Model of
Constitutional
Doctrine
Doctrine
applicable to
the Federal
Government
Fundamental
Fairness:  black
letter law for
90+ years
Selective and
differentiated
Incorporation:
this Article’s
innovation
Selective and
undifferentiated
Incorporation:
black letter law
since the 1960s
Total
Incorporation:
Justices
Black in
Adamson and
Bradley in
Slaughter-
House
1.  Constitutional
Principle
1.F 1.S ≠ 1.F 1.S = 1.F 1.S = 1.F
(whenever a
Bill of Rights
provision is
incorporated)
1.S = 1.F for
all Bill of
Rights
provisions
2.  Goal 2.F 2.S does not
(necessarily)
= 2.F
2.S = 2.F 2.S = 2.F
(whenever a
Bill of Rights
provision is
incorporated)
2.S = 2.F for
all Bill of
Rights
provisions
3.  Standard 3.F 3.S does not
(necessarily)
= 3.F
3.S does not
(necessarily)
= 3.F
3.S = 3.F
(whenever a
Bill of Rights
provision is
incorporated)
3.S = 3.F for
all Bill of
Rights
provisions
4.  Rulified
Standard
4.F 4.S does not
(necessarily)
= 4.F
4.S does not
(necessarily)
= 4.F
4.S = 4.F
(whenever a
Bill of Rights
provision is
incorporated)
4.S = 4.F for
all Bill of
Rights
provisions
C.  One-Size-Fits-All Outside of the Fourteenth Amendment
Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is the
most frequently used doctrinal conduit for exporting constitutional
principles developed in the federal context to the states, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that not all multilevel constitutional principles
spring from the Due Process Clause.  For instance, the principle iden-
tified by the Supreme Court in the Thornton decision—that additional
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qualifications for Congress violate a fundamental democratic princi-
ple—was not tied to the Fourteenth Amendment.81
Whether a multilevel constitutional principle should be One-Size-
Fits-All or Tailored accordingly arises outside the context of incorpo-
ration.  As is the case with incorporation, the Court virtually always
opts for One-Size-Fits-All.  This is true of exports that originate from
the federal side as well as the state side.  To illustrate the former, it
was held in Thornton that additional qualifications created by states are
equally as problematic as those created by Congress.82  With regard to
state exports, the Court in Saenz v. Roe83 held that the right to travel,
which until then had been applied only against the states, applied in
identical measure to the federal government.84
The Spending Clause is another doctrinal context where the
Court has chosen One-Size-Fits-All over Tailoring.  Though “Congress
has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assis-
tance in order to further its policy objectives,” it “may not induce the
recipient to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitu-
tional.”85  The question for present purposes is whether the measure
of what is unconstitutional potentially varies depending upon what
level of government decides upon the regulation.  The answer would
be “no” under One-Size-Fits-All, and “yes” under Tailoring.
To illustrate, consider the recently decided case of United States v.
American Library Ass’n, Inc.86  The Child Internet Protection Act (CIPA)
required public libraries to use Internet filters as a condition for the
receipt of federal subsidies.  Filters were to prevent minors from ob-
taining access to harmful materials.  Due to technological limitations,
however, the filters blocked access to materials that were harmful nei-
ther to children nor to adults.87  Moreover, there were alternatives to
81
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995) (holding
that the “framework” or “structure” envisioned by the framers would be eroded by such
limitations).
82
Id. at 838.
83
526 U.S. 489 (1999).
84
See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (criticizing the Saenz Court’s justi-
fications for rejecting Tailoring).
85
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (internal quo-
tation marks and citations omitted).
86
Id. at 194.
87
See id. at 201 (“[A] filter set to block pornography may sometimes block other
sites that present neither obscene nor pornographic material, but that nevertheless
trigger the filter.”).
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the filters that could accomplish CIPA’s goal of protecting minors
without blocking access to the nonharmful materials.88  
Six Justices analyzed the statute with a One-Size-Fits-All jurispru-
dence.  The question for them was whether a local public library
could have constitutionally decided to install the filters.89  Justice Stev-
ens expressly rejected the methodology embraced by the plurality and
the Souter and Ginsburg dissents and instead adopted what this Arti-
cle dubs “Tailoring.”  He “agree[d] with the plurality that it is neither
inappropriate nor unconstitutional for a local library to experiment
with filtering software as a means of curtailing children’s access to
Internet Web sites displaying sexually explicit images.”90  Justice Stev-
ens accordingly “agree[d] with the plurality that the 7% of public li-
braries that decided to use such software on all of their Internet ter-
minals in 2000 did not act unlawfully.”91  But, continued Justice
Stevens:  “Whether it is constitutional for the Congress of the United States to
impose that requirement on the other 93%, however, raises a vastly different
question.”92  That is to say, a local library’s decision to install an Inter-
net filter implicates the Constitution differently than the federal gov-
ernment’s requirement that local libraries install such filters.  Whereas
a federal act “operates as a blunt nationwide restraint,”93 an individual
library’s decision is a decision by the locality that can be tailored to fit
88
See id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he District Court expressly found that
a variety of alternatives less restrictive are available at the local level.”).
89
See id. at 203 n.2 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (“[W]e must ask whether the con-
dition that Congress requires would be unconstitutional if performed by the library
itself.” (internal quotation, alteration, and citation omitted)); id. at 234 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (“The question for me, then, is whether a local library could itself constitu-
tionally impose these restrictions . . . .”).  The major difference between these Justices’
analyses was as follows:  while the plurality concluded that using the filters was analo-
gous to a library’s collection decision, which is subject only to rational basis scrutiny, see
id. at 208 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.), Justice Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg) be-
lieved the filters more akin to a library’s decision to refuse certain patrons access to
materials it already had in its collection, a censorship decision triggering strict scrutiny
that filtering technology could not satisfy.  See id. at 237 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The
proper analogy therefore is not to passing up a book that might have been bought; it is
either to buying a book and then keeping it from adults lacking an acceptable ‘pur-
pose,’ or to buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything thought
to be unsuitable . . . .”).
90
Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91
Id.  Justices Souter and Ginsburg, by contrast, believed these libraries’ activities
to have been unconstitutional.  See id. at 2324-25 (Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)
(“[T]he Act’s blocking requirement in its current breadth calls for unconstitutional
action by a library recipient . . . .”).
92
Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
93
Id.
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local circumstances.94  Thus, whereas Justice Stevens agreed that a lo-
cal library’s decision to install filters is constitutional, he concluded
that Congress’s indirect imposition of a nationwide requirement was
not.95
Justice Stevens’s dissent thus spotlights the choice between One-
Size-Fits-All and Tailoring that inheres in Spending Clause doctrine.
Neither the plurality nor Justice Souter explained their selection of
One-Size-Fits-All.96  Nor did they explain why Justice Stevens’s ap-
proach was mistaken.  It is not important for present purposes to de-
cide which approach is correct, but only to see that the contemporary
doctrine reflects a One-Size-Fits-All approach.  As will be shown in the
next Part, the Court’s failure to provide a justification for One-Size-
Fits-All in the Spending Clause context is characteristic of the Court’s
tendency to reflexively adopt One-Size-Fits-All as if there were no al-
ternative.
II.  THE (ULTIMATELY) PRAGMATIC GROUNDS FOR
ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL
This Part shows that the few justifications that the Supreme Court
has offered for One-Size-Fits-All are inadequate. When the Court
shifted from Fundamental Fairness to selective incorporation, it did
not appear to appreciate that a choice had to be made about whether
the imported principles were going to be One-Size-Fits-All or Tailored.
The factors that led to the rejection of Fundamental Fairness in favor
of selective incorporation did not likewise counsel the adoption of
One-Size-Fits-All over Tailoring.  Outside the context of incorpora-
94
See id. at 224 n.3 (extolling the benefits of allowing each community to address
the issue in light of its own unique circumstances).
95
See id. at 231 (expressing the belief that CIPA is unconstitutional).
96
The plurality quoted language from South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987),
that was intended by the plurality to suggest that the question already had been de-
cided.  See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 203 & n.2 (stating that “under the Court’s well-
established Spending Clause precedent,” the “proper inquiry” was whether “the condi-
tion that Congress requires would be unconstitutional if performed by the library it-
self” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).  However, the choice be-
tween One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring was not an issue that was decided in that case.
Although the linguistic formulation of Dole’s unconstitutionality prong more readily
lends itself to One-Size-Fits-All than to Tailoring, that alone is not appropriately treated
as having decided the question, in view of the strong functionalist reasons Justice Stev-
ens offers as to why an identical regulatory decision made by different levels of gov-
ernment might have very different constitutional implications and in view of the fact
that the Dole Court did not have to choose between Tailoring and One-Size-Fits-All to
decide the case.
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tion, the Court also has neglected to provide adequate justifications
for its selection of One-Size-Fits-All over Tailoring.  As this Part ex-
plains, the Court’s unreflective adoption of One-Size-Fits-All probably
is the outgrowth of a highly intuitive, but largely inaccurate, concep-
tion of constitutional rights.  In the end, there are several strong justi-
fications for One-Size-Fits-All, but they are pragmatic considerations
rather than categorical imperatives.  They accordingly do not justify a
categorical One-Size-Fits-All doctrine.
A.  The Disappointing Search for a Justification
Outside of incorporation, the Court’s justifications for treating
multilevel constitutional principles as One-Size-Fits-All have amounted
to no more than ipse dixit.  In Thornton, the case concerning the con-
stitutionality of term limits, the Court merely asserted that “the source
of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification’s
restrictive impact.”97  In Saenz v. Roe, the Court answered the United
States government’s argument that the right to travel should be Tai-
lored as between the federal and state governments98 with the unre-
sponsive rejoinder that “the protection afforded to the citizen by the
Citizenship Clause of [the Fourteenth] Amendment is a limitation on
the powers of the National Government as well as the States.”99  This is
unresponsive because the U.S. government conceded that the right to
travel limited the federal government, arguing only that the doctrinal
details might vary as between the federal and state governments be-
cause “Congress stands in a different relation to individual citizens
than do the legislatures of the several States,”100 and the Court’s ex-
planation constitutes absolutely no justification whatsoever for reject-
ing Tailoring in favor of One-Size-Fits-All.  Only by failing to appreci-
ate the distinction between selective and undifferentiated
incorporation, on the one hand, and selective and differentiated in-
97
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 820 (1995).  For more discus-
sion of Thornton, see infra Part IV.D.1.
98
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in Part
and Respondents in Part at 9, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (No. 98-97) (noting
that Congress’s action concerned “the freedom of interstate migration—a freedom
that has special structural characteristics and is in important respects a right of na-
tional citizenship, as to which Congress stands in a different relation to individual citizens
than do the legislatures of the several States” and arguing that federal regulations accord-
ingly should be subjected to lower-level scrutiny) (emphasis added).
99
526 U.S. 489, 507-08 (1999).
100
Brief for the United States at 9, Saenz (No. 98-97).
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corporation, on the other, can the Court’s response in Saenz be mis-
construed as a justification for the doctrine that the Court embraced.
Although the question of whether a multilevel constitutional prin-
ciple should be One-Size-Fits-All or Tailored clearly arises outside the
context of incorporation—as seen, for instance, in Thornton and in
Saenz—outside the Fourteenth Amendment this question arises only
on a right-by-right basis that readily can escape scrutiny.  Incorpora-
tion, by contrast, is a high-profile, trans-substantive doctrine where the
question of whether multilevel principles should be Tailored repeat-
edly occurs.  For these reasons, it may be thought that solid justifica-
tions for One-Size-Fits-All can be found in the incorporation case law,
and that the case law outside of incorporation implicitly relies on
those justifications when it reflexively selects One-Size-Fits-All.
Case law in the incorporation context, however, has not been
more illuminating.  When the Supreme Court recently replaced a Tai-
lored equal protection doctrine with the One-Size-Fits-All doctrine of
“congruence” in the Adarand case over Justices Stevens’s dissent that
urged continuation of Tailoring, the majority simply asserted that
“[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same
as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”101
The paucity of recent justifications cannot be explained by the
presence of a definitive justification for One-Size-Fits-All that was de-
livered in an earlier incorporation decision.  The justifications the
Court offered for rejecting Fundamental Fairness and adopting selec-
tive incorporation do not go to the question of whether the Bill of
Rights principles that are imported through the portal of the Four-
teenth Amendment are One-Size-Fits-All or Tailored.102  Consider
three possible justifications:  text, history, and precedent.  Textually,
neither “due process” nor “privileges or immunities” answers the ques-
101
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (quoting Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).  For further discussion of Adarand, see infra Part
III.B.1.
102
This is not surprising, for it is widely appreciated that the Court has offered
scant justification for selective incorporation itself, much less for having chosen one
form of selective incorporation over another.  See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as
a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 934 (1965) (“[I]t does seem extraor-
dinary that a theory going to the very nature of our Constitution and having such pro-
found effects for all of us should be carrying the day without ever having been expli-
cated in a majority opinion of the Court.”); Israel, supra note 55, at 301 (“[T]he Court
has yet to offer a full-fledged exposition of the doctrine’s underlying justifications.”);
see also Dorf, supra note 26, at 969 (“As a matter of principle, there is much that is
wrong with the argument that the enumeration of a right in one of the first eight
amendment requires its application against the states.”).
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tion:  “due process” is a phrase that hardly appears to refer to the no-
tion that Bill of Rights principles apply to the states,103 and even
though the Privileges or Immunities Clause may be a more plausible
candidate than the Due Process Clause for incorporating the Bill of
Rights,104 the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s language does not
speak to whether the doctrinal details developed in the federal con-
text (Steps 3.F and 4.F) should be applied to the states.  Historically,
even if there is evidence to support the view that the Framers in-
tended the Privileges or Immunities Clause to incorporate the Bill of
Rights105—what is an issue of enduring dispute106—the evidence is si-
lent as regards the question of whether Steps 3.F and 4.F were in-
tended to transfer to the states.  (The absence of textual and historical
guidance in resolving the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailor-
ing is not surprising.  The doctrinal details found at Steps 3 and 4
constitute the implementation of constitutional norms, which typically
103
To quickly summarize several of the major textual critiques:  (1) substantive
due process is “oxymoronic,” Dorf, supra note 26, at 969; (2) attributing such substan-
tive meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause makes the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause redundant (insofar as such substantive protections
already apply to the federal government via the Bill of Rights), id.; and (3) “[i]t would
be extraordinarily strange for a Constitution to convey such specific commands in such
a roundabout and inexplicit way as through the Due Process Clause.”  Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
104
See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the adop-
tion of both the Due Process and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment resulted in incorporation); see also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE:  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70-71 (1986)
(noting that historical evidence suggests that some of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
framers intended that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would authorize Congress to
compel the states to abide by the Bill of Rights).
105 To the extent the historical evidence supports the view that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, the
evidence supports total incorporation, not selective incorporation.  See Israel, supra
note 55, at 260 (“Supporters of total incorporation suggest that any deficiencies in the
textual support for their position are more than offset by a historical record that
clearly shows the framers’ intent to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.”).
106 Compare sources cited supra note 104, with DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:  THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 347 (1985)
(noting that “[t]he dominant theme in the debates” regarding enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment “was to provide a constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act of
1866”), and John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.
J. 1385, 1387-88 (1992) (“The main point of the [Privileges or Immunities C]lause is to
require that every state give the same privileges and immunities of state citizenship—
the same positive law rights of property, contract, and so forth—to all of its citizens.”).
In any event, the scholarly understandings of the Privileges or Immunities Clause refer-
enced here and in footnotes 104 and 105, supra, remain mere theoretical inquiry for so
long as the Court’s early holding in the Slaughter-House Cases remains good law.
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falls to courts, not legislatures.107  Most of the time, therefore, textual
and historical understandings are unlikely to shed light on the doc-
trinal details of Steps 3 and 4.)108  Finally, as regards precedent, the
champions of selective incorporation could hardly have grounded
their position on the earlier decided case law, which created the Fun-
damental Fairness regime that selective incorporation disassembled.109
Precedent accordingly could not have been the basis for selecting
One-Size-Fits-All instead of Tailoring.
B.  The “Watering-Down” Thesis and the Structure of Rights
The Court has offered one justification in the incorporation con-
text specifically aimed at defending One-Size-Fits-All:  that doing oth-
erwise would lead to “watered-down” constitutional rights.110  Although
the Court never went beyond this assertion to explain the theory be-
hind it, I suspect that these words resonate with the intuitions of
many.  I shall dub this the “watering-down” thesis.  This Section un-
107
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is a rare exception.  Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb (2000)) (providing for the Court’s application of a specific constitutional test),
overturned by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Fallon, supra note 36,
at 66 (“The Court can share responsibility for implementing the Constitution with
other institutions.”).
108
History is most likely to be illuminating vis-à-vis Steps 3 and 4 in respect of cate-
gorical Legal Rules.  Consider the rule that the federal government is categorically
prohibited from requiring state executive officials to apply federal law.  See Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The federal government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”).  A show-
ing that the federal government actually did exercise such powers vis-à-vis states in the
past would be relevant to determining whether a categorical rule comports with origi-
nal understanding.
109
See Israel, supra note 55, at 302-03 (“It may seem strange that a doctrine that
resulted in the overruling of so many decisions has been justified by reference to prior
precedent, but several Justices have offered precisely that justification for the selective
incorporation doctrine.” (citations omitted)).  Once selective incorporation was estab-
lished, the Court openly acknowledged that its adoption had necessitated the aban-
donment of precedent.  See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Palko’s
roots had thus been cut away years ago.  We today only recognize the inevitable.”).
110
See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (holding that the Court had
“rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a ‘wa-
tered-down,’ subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights”);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describ-
ing the Fundamental Fairness approach as the “view that a guarantee of the Bill of
Rights that is made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment is
a lesser version of that same guarantee as applied to the Federal Government” (emphasis
added)).
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packs the thesis’s unanalyzed assumption that the scope of a right de-
fined in relation to limiting the federal government automatically car-
ries over to other levels of government.  It suggests that the watering-
down thesis is premised on a conception of constitutional rights that is
widely held but largely inaccurate as a purely descriptive matter.  A
more sophisticated conception that more accurately explains constitu-
tional rights in this country undermines the assumption on which the
watering-down thesis rests.
One influential conception of rights, frequently associated with
Ronald Dworkin, views rights as categorical trumps enjoyed by indi-
viduals as against majoritarian preferences.111  On this view, rights
carve out spheres of immunity from governmental regulation so that
individuals may engage in the activities that rights protect.112  A similar
conception is present in those who speak of constitutional rights as
being “rights, simpliciter” that guarantee that certain privileged con-
duct can occur.113  Much language in the Court’s opinions is consis-
tent with this conception of rights, and this conception is widely
held.114
111
See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 727-28 (1998) [hereinafter Pildes,
Why Rights Are Not Trumps] (“Dworkin argued that rights protect individual interests by
excluding appeals to the common good (majoritarian preferences) as a justification
for limiting rights.”); see also Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exception-
alism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1809-19 (1999) (discussing compet-
ing conceptions of rights, including Dworkin’s trumps theory).  Jeremy Waldron has
responded that although many people hold the view that rights are categorical trumps
and attribute that notion to Dworkin, Dworkin himself does not hold such a view.  See
Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301, 306 & n.22
(2000) (arguing that by “misrepresenting Dworkin’s account, Pildes fails to enlist a
powerful ally for his more sophisticated understanding of rights”).  But see Richard H.
Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 310 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions] (responding that such a categorical trump con-
ception is reflected in Dworkin’s early writings).  Regardless of what Dworkin’s precise
conception of rights might be, Waldron does not dispute Pildes’s claim that Dworkin’s
work has “played an important role in fueling” the widespread view in contemporary
political culture that constitutional rights are categorical trumps.  Pildes, Dworkin’s Two
Conceptions, supra, at 311; see also Waldron, supra, at 306 & n.22 (“Dworkin’s work is as-
sociated so tightly in the literature with the image of ‘rights as trumps.’”).
112
See supra note 111.
113
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY 269, 270-71
(2000) (defining a “right, simpliciter” R as meaning that “R provides a shield against
all interferences with any conduct C that constitutes an exercise of R.”).
114
See Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 111, at 727-28 (showing that
this categorical understanding of rights as trumps is held by Michael Sandel, Allan
Hutchinson, Charles Taylor, and Seymour Martin Lipset).
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It quite naturally follows from this conception that the sphere of
immunity a right creates should be equally impregnable by all levels of
government.  After all, if rights created spheres of immunity from
regulation, it would contradict the very concept of a right to allow any
level of government to regulate matters within this realm.  Such con-
ceptions of rights thus readily lead to One-Size-Fits-All.  I suspect that
this understanding of rights underlies the watering-down thesis,
though I admittedly cannot prove it since the Court has done nothing
more than to assert the thesis.  I also imagine that such a view,
whether explicit or unstated, undergirds the intuition held by many
that One-Size-Fits-All is the only intelligible approach to incorpora-
tion.
A competing conception of constitutional rights views rights as
“shields against particular [governmental] rules.”115  Such “rights-
against-rules” do not guarantee that particular conduct can occur, but
guarantee only that conduct cannot be regulated by certain forms of
governmental action.  For instance, while the government may not
proscribe the “[d]esecration of . . . a state or national flag,”116 the
identical flag-burning activity can be prohibited “pursuant to a rule
against arson, assault, the destruction of government property, pollu-
tion, or some other such rule that was not targeted at speech.”117  The
Constitution thus does not guarantee a state of the world in which a
person can burn an American flag.  It only guarantees that the pro-
scription will not assume a form that singles out the expressive activity
of flag burning.  Burning a flag hence is not a “right, simpliciter,” but a
“right-against-rule.”
115
Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules:  The Moral Structure of American Constitu-
tional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998) (emphasis omitted).  Richard Pildes has ad-
vanced a similar conception of rights.  See Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note
111, at 729 (“Rights are not general trumps against appeals to the common good or
anything else; instead, they are better understood as channeling the kinds of reasons
government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas.”).  I do not mean to suggest that
the categories of “rights, simpliciter” and “rights-against-rules” exhaust the universe of
rights.  Professor Rick Hills has persuasively argued that some rights function to allo-
cate primary decision-making authority to nongovernmental institutions.  See Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Government, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144 (2003).
The highly deferential review that courts give to decisions made by such nongovern-
mental institutions, see id. at 191-93, is not well captured by either of the two above-
mentioned categories of rights.
116
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 n.1, 420 (1989) (holding that a state
statute prohibiting flag desecration was unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
117
Matthew D. Adler, Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence: Can the Two Coexist?, 6
LEGAL THEORY 337, 344 (2000) (citation omitted).
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Jurisprudential scholars who analyze the structure of rights concur
that both types of rights—rights, simpliciter and rights-against-rules—
are found in American law.  For example, the Constitution’s ban on
slavery is a “right[] . . . not to have certain states of the world exist,
rather than [a] right[] not to be judged by certain kinds of rules”118
and accordingly creates a right, simpliciter.119  The flag-burning case, by
contrast, creates a right-against-rule.120  The jurisprudential dispute be-
tween those who conceptualize constitutional rights as rights, simplici-
ter and advocates of rights-against-rules thus is one of degree rather
than kind.
As a purely descriptive matter, it seems that most constitutional
rights in the United States fit the structure of rights-against-rules.
“[G]overnments can infringe even the most fundamental rights if its
justifications are sufficiently ‘compelling’ and the means used are the
least restrictive available.”121  As such, “[r]ights are not general trumps
against appeals to the common good” or creators of spheres of immu-
nity from government regulation that guarantee a certain state in the
world, but instead are “better understood as channeling the kinds of
reasons government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas.”122  This
structure of rights explains the widespread reality that Congress and
the states can regulate such constitutionally protected matters as
speech and abortion.123  Constitutional rights of the rights-against-
rules form do not categorically remove matters from majoritarian
politics, but simply condition regulation on the presence of better-
than-ordinary reasons for regulating and better-than-ordinary line
drawing when actually undertaking the regulation.  Constitutionally
permissible regulations of speech and abortion are difficult to recon-
cile, by contrast, with the conception of rights as creating spheres of
immunity from regulation.
118
Dorf, supra note 113, at 272.
119
Matthew Adler, the strongest proponent of the rights as “rights-against-rules”
thesis, acknowledges this.  See Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Consti-
tutional Adjudication:  A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1374-75
(2000).
120
See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 113, at 271 (agreeing that “rights as rights against
rules is a plausible first-order approximation of much Supreme Court doctrine”);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1325 (2000) (accepting that “many (but not all) constitutional
rights are rights against rules”).
121
Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 111, at 729.
122
Id. (emphasis omitted).
123
Id. (discussing the right of free speech as an example of governmental regula-
tion of a constitutionally protected area).
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Importantly, the rights-against-rules conception does not ineluc-
tably lead to the watering-down thesis in the way that the rights, sim-
pliciter conception does.  To the contrary, the rights-against-rules struc-
ture provides prima facie support for Tailoring.  Here is how:  once it
is understood that rights invite special types of justifications, the ques-
tion arises as to what types of justifications suffice to justify regulation.
It has been argued that “context” plays a “crucial role” in determining
what justifications suffice.124  Government creates different “institu-
tional space[s],”125 and arguments that are sufficient to justify regula-
tion in one context might not be satisfactory in another.
This seems right.  Such an approach helps explain pockets of con-
stitutional doctrine that are difficult to understand under a categori-
cal rights-as-trumps approach.  For example, military officials are part
of the federal government, and they are governed by the First
Amendment.126  Yet they are permitted to proscribe speech that is
merely “intemperate, . . . disloyal, contemptuous, and disrespectful,”127
enact prior restraints,128 and to ban private citizens’ political
speech129—regulations that would not be permissible for other gov-
ernmental actors.  How is it possible that identical constitutional lan-
guage—in this case, free speech—can mean different things in respect
of different governmental actors?  Virtually indefensible under a cate-
gorical rights-as-trumps account, such regulations are comprehensible
under a rights-against-rules conception:  context matters, and the in-
stitutional space known as the military has institutional characteristics
very different from general society that accordingly may permit justifi-
cations for regulation that are impermissible elsewhere.130  This in fact
is the precise rationale that the Supreme Court has provided for the
unusual constitutional doctrines that apply to the military:  the Court
has explained that “the different character of the military community
124
Id. at 739; see also Schauer & Pildes, supra note 111, at 1814-19 (illustrating the
role of context by looking at First Amendment rights in an electoral context).
125
Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 111, at 739.
126
See Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution:  Geographical Variations of Consti-
tutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1152-56 (1999)
(looking at the applicability of constitutional protections to the military).
127
See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 739, 758-61 (1974).
128
See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 349, 361 (1980) (upholding Air Force regula-
tions requiring “members of the service to obtain approval from their commanders
before circulating petitions on Air Force bases”).
129
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976) (holding that private citizens
have no constitutional right to use military installations as forums for political speech).
130
For more on this, see Rosen, supra note 126, at 1152-56.
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and of the military mission requires a different application of [consti-
tutional] protections”131 and that “fundamental necessit[ies]” of the
military “may render permissible within the military that which would
be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”132
The understanding that many constitutional rights are rights
against rules whose justifications for regulation frequently are context
sensitive explains several other pockets of oddly performing constitu-
tional doctrine found in American law that are instructive to Tailor-
ing.  Like the military, public school officials are permitted to regulate
speech and to conduct searches in ways that mill run government em-
ployees cannot.133  The same is true of prison officials.134
In all these contexts, identical constitutional language requires
different things of different government officials.  For example, al-
though military officials are members of the federal government, the
doctrines that apply to the military differ at levels 3.F and 4.F.135
Sometimes, that is,
3.F(mill run federal actors) ≠ 3.F(military), and/or
4.F(mill run federal actors) ≠ 4.F(military).
136
131
Parker, 417 U.S. at 758 (1974); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
507 (1986) (“Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment
grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations
designed for civilian society.”).
132 Parker, 417 U.S. at 758.
133
See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding pub-
lic school drug testing of student athletes as a reasonable search); Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding public school regulation of student
speech); see also Rosen, supra note 126, at 1159-61 (discussing the cases mentioned
above).
134
See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) (adopting prison-specific
First Amendment doctrine); see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-14 (1989)
(analyzing First Amendment rights in a prison context).
135
See Rosen, supra note 126, at 1142-47, 1152-56 (dubbing variations at 3.F “Re-
standardizing” and variations at 4.F “Tailoring”).
136
For example, at a time when government regulations interfering with the free
exercise of religion were analyzed under heightened scrutiny, the Court adopted a far
more deferential reasonableness test when analyzing military regulations—a variation
at the level of 3.F and thereafter at 4.F.  In Goldman, 475 U.S. at 503, the Court ruled
that instead of requiring restrictions affecting religious practice to be justified by a
compelling governmental interest (as was required by the then-applicable test of Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)), the military only had to show that its regula-
tions were “reasonabl[e] and evenhanded[].”  Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10.  The Court
forthrightly acknowledged that the military was being subjected to a different legal test
than applied to other levels of government, stating that “[o]ur review of military regu-
lations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitu-
tional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.”  Id. at 507.
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Public schools are a form of local government, to which the Four-
teenth Amendment applies, and the doctrines that apply to school of-
ficials also sometimes differ at the third and fourth levels of doctrine.
Sometimes, that is,
3.F(mill run federal actors) ≠ 3.S(public school officials), and/or
4.F(mill run federal actors) ≠ 4.S(public school officials).
137
In short, the constitutional doctrines that apply to the military,
public schools, and prisons demonstrate that the doctrinal details of
levels 3 and 4 do not invariably apply to all forms of government.
Such variations are readily explainable as the natural consequence of
the fact that these are all idiosyncratic institutional contexts.  Insofar
as the doctrines associated with constitutional rights determine the
types of reasons that provide a predicate for governmental regulation
of the protected rights, it is not surprising that what constitutes a justi-
fiable reason for regulation will vary from institutional context to insti-
tutional context.  Consequently, what is constitutionally permissible
may vary from institutional context to institutional context as well.
The role of institutional context in determining what justifications
suffice to support regulation is not limited to the unusual doctrines
that govern the military and public schools.  Frederick Schauer and
Richard Pildes have argued at length, for example, that mainstream
First Amendment jurisprudence comprises multiple highly context-
specific doctrines.  Looking first to the political institution of elec-
tions, they note:
[E]lections are already highly structured spheres, including regulations
that would be impermissible in the general domain of public discourse.
There are limits on what voters are permitted to express at the ballot
box; mandatory disclosure obligations on the identity of political speak-
137
For example, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), the
Court applied a far more deferential legal test to school administrators than applies to
virtually all other government officials.  Unlike the strict standard of review ordinarily
applied to the censorship of “potentially sensitive topics” and unacceptable viewpoints,
the Hazelwood Court determined that school officials were “entitled to regulate the
contents” of school newspapers “in any reasonable manner.”  Id. at 270, 272.  In the
language of this Article’s model, 3.S ≠ 3.F and 4.S ≠ 4.F.  As with military law, the Court
has justified these variations on the basis of the unique institutional characteristics of
public schools.  The Court wrote that public schools must have the power to “refuse to
sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alco-
hol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared values of
a civilized social order’” or that “[o]therwise, the schools would be unduly constrained
from fulfilling their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values.’”  Id. at 272 (citations omitted).  See Rosen, supra note 126, at 1159-61 (discuss-
ing public schools as “another context in which location-specific constitutional non-
uniformity in the aid of community has been adopted”).
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ers; content-based regulations of electoral speech, ranging from mun-
dane constraints like electioneering near polling places to more dra-
matic ones, like selective bans on contributions from some speak-
ers . . . .
138
They then argue that such doctrinal “exceptionalism” is not unique to
elections, but in fact is generally characteristic of the First Amend-
ment’s political speech doctrine.  They conclude that “[a]ll regula-
tions of political speech are thus already measured by domain-specific,
institution-specific, sometimes media-specific, and generally context-
specific First Amendment principles—rather than some undifferenti-
ated, ‘general’ First Amendment rule.”139  All this has critical conse-
quences for Tailoring.  
Tailoring is just another example of the context-sensitive applica-
tion of those constitutional principles that are best characterized as
rights against rules.  The predicate for Tailoring constitutional guar-
antees to the different levels of government is that each level may con-
stitute a sufficiently different institutional context such that doctrinal
variations at the levels of 3 and/or 4 are legitimate.  Whether any par-
ticular doctrine is appropriately Tailored vis-à-vis any particular level
of government is inevitably highly context-specific, and accordingly
falls outside of this Article’s scope.  As Part IV discusses, however, sev-
eral generic considerations suggest that the federal, state, and local
levels of government are sufficiently different such that the possibility
of doctrinal variations at the levels of 3 and 4 as among these different
levels of governments deserves serious consideration.
This analysis thus demonstrates the weakness of the watering-
down thesis with respect to constitutional rights best characterized as
rights against rules.  The possibility that different levels of government
are sufficiently different to require different justifications for regulat-
ing rights is what makes the unstated assumption that doctrinal details
need apply equally across all institutional contexts wrong vis-à-vis such
constitutional rights.  On the other hand, the watering-down thesis is
valid as against constitutional rights that fit the pattern of a right, sim-
pliciter.
Consequently, it is important to distinguish constitutional rights
that fit the structure of a right, simpliciter from those that constitute a
right-against-rules.  Commentators concur that both forms of rights
are found in American constitutional law.  There also is considerable
138
Schauer & Pildes, supra note 111, at 1816 (citations omitted).
139
Id. at 1824.
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agreement as to the rights that comprise each structure; for instance,
that the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery creates a right, sim-
pliciter.  Several commentators have suggested that torture is an-
other.140  Given the fact that there is not a unity structure to constitu-
tional rights, but that they can assume two different forms,141 it seems
likely that in most cases “whether a right should be conceptualized as
a right-against-rules or as a right, simpliciter, turns principally on sub-
stantive considerations about the particular right, rather than any
deep fact about the structure of rights.”142  If this is correct, as I think
it is, the unreflective watering-down thesis is fatally undermined.  De-
termining whether a constitutional right is a right, simpliciter, whose
content necessarily is uniform vis-à-vis all polities, or a right-against-
rules, for which a sufficient justification for regulation might vary
across different institutional contexts, requires a highly particularized
right-by-right analysis.  The claim that variations across contexts ipso
facto constitute a watering-down of constitutional rights is not persua-
sive.
C.  Plausible Justifications for Selective Incorporation
and Their Relation to One-Size-Fits-All
Having surveyed in the last Section several rationales for selective
incorporation that do not justify the adoption of One-Size-Fits-All in-
stead of Tailoring, this Section identifies two justifications for selective
incorporation that have been identified by the Court and commenta-
tors and are relevant to the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tai-
loring.  The justifications identify pragmatic benefits of One-Size-Fits-
All.  Pragmatic justifications, however, by their nature invite the taking
account of competing considerations and hence typically give rise to
140
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 119, at 1375 (giving torture as an example of such a
right); Dorf, supra note 113, at 272 & n.14 (referring to the torture example).
141
Professor Fallon has suggested that “not all rights fit this framework at all,” Fal-
lon, supra note 120, at 1366, though he seems to concede that most rights are either
rights, simpliciter or rights-against-rules.
142
Dorf, supra note 113, at 272 (emphasis added).  It accordingly is not surprising
that there are disagreements on both positive and normative grounds as to which pat-
tern particular rights fit.  See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 120, at 1366 (citing as an example
of “rights that do not fit the rights-against rules paradigm” that “a criminal or civil de-
fendant always has a right to procedural due process” and noting that “although this
right could possibly be represented as a series of rights against particular rules that vio-
late due process, or as a right against putative general rules authorizing criminal and
civil proceedings insofar as they fail to preclude due process violations, more would be
lost than gained by so attenuated an account”).
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noncategorical rules.  So too here:  the justifications examined below
give rise to a defeasible presumption of One-Size-Fits-All, but they do
not support a categorical One-Size-Fits-All mode of selective incorpo-
ration.  These justifications fully carry over to those contexts outside
the Fourteenth Amendment when courts must determine whether a
multilevel constitutional principle is to be Tailored or One-Size-Fits-
All.
1.  Limiting Judicial Discretion
Much of selective incorporation’s success was due to justifiable
dissatisfaction with the Fundamental Fairness regime that preceded it.
Many decisions under Fundamental Fairness were criticized as subjec-
tive and unpredictable.143  Justices sought a method for cabining judi-
cial discretion,144 and incorporation held out promise in this regard
because the Bill of Rights terms of “freedom of speech” and “searches
and seizures” are unquestionably more specific than “Fundamental
Fairness.”
Limiting judicial discretion in this fashion is sensible.  Selective
incorporation in effect means that guarantees specified in the Bill of
Rights are presumptively assumed to apply against the states (in con-
trast to being categorically presumed to apply, as under total incorpo-
ration).  “Fundamentality” still is the touchstone under selective in-
corporation for determining whether a given Bill of Rights guarantee
applies to the states, and surely there is good sense in concluding that
“what is important enough to have been included within the Bill of
Rights has good claim to being an element of ‘fundamental fair-
ness.’”145
Is it the case, however, that the doctrinal details developed vis-à-vis
the federal government invariably have good claim to being an ele-
ment of Fundamental Fairness as well?  The answer depends upon the
143
See Israel, supra note 55, at 286-90 (discussing criticism of the fundamental fair-
ness doctrine as subjective).
144
See id. at 286 (“A major argument advanced in favor of selective incorporation
was that it would offer far less potential for a subjective application of the ordered lib-
erty standard than did the fundamental fairness doctrine.”); see also Dorf, supra note
26, at 968-70 (“[I]ncorporation’s ability to constrain judicial discretion . . . was what
attracted incorporation’s chief proponent, Justice Hugo Black, to the theory in the first
place.”).
145
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring);
see also Dorf, supra note 26, at 971 (noting that “those values that find their way into the
constitutional text are likely to be the ones most fundamentally embraced by the
American people”).
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structure of the constitutional right that is at issue:  “yes” with regard
to a right, simpliciter, but “not necessarily” with regard to a right-
against-rule.  With regard to the latter, the particular legal rule that is
utilized to implement a constitutional principle is a function of a host
of contingent factors,146 many of which conceivably could vary across
different levels of government.  There is no good reason for categori-
cally presuming that the specific Legal Test that was developed in the
context of limiting the federal government itself is “fundamental.”
One might respond that even if the doctrinal details at Steps 3
and 4 are not themselves “fundamental,” One-Size-Fits-All still has the
great virtue of limiting judicial discretion.  This is true, but the impor-
tant question is “at what cost?”  Judicial discretion would be curtailed
if all constitutional doctrine were replaced by a single, simple legal
rule.  No one would advocate such a position because the costs of lim-
iting judicial discretion in this fashion would be too great; doctrinal
complexity is necessitated by the complex competing interests among
which constitutional doctrine must mediate.  Selective incorporation’s
check on judicial discretion is justifiable only because it is sensible to
conclude that general principles constraining federal powers found in
the Bill of Rights are (presumptively) fundamental and, accordingly,
(presumptively)147 applicable to the states.  If the same cannot be said
about the doctrinal details that were developed in the federal context,
then we cannot be so certain that the benefits of limiting judicial dis-
cretion in this regard are worth the costs, identified in Part IV, of
categorically foregoing the option of Tailoring.
In short, though limiting judicial discretion is a very real benefit, it
is a pragmatic consideration that is not a categorical trump.  The in-
terest in limiting judicial discretion may well justify a presumption of
One-Size-Fits-All, but it cannot justify a categorical rule of One-Size-
Fits-All.
2.  Judicial Administration
A second justification for selective incorporation is that it facili-
tates judicial administration.148  It was very difficult for states to know
146
See Fallon, supra note 36, at 77 (discussing how the Court engages in a “multi-
part assessment” to determine what legal test to apply in a situation).
147
I say “presumptively” because under selective incorporation, in contrast to total
incorporation, it is not the case that all Bill of Rights principles apply to the states.
148 See Israel, supra note 55, at 310-11 (arguing that the move from the Fundamen-
tal Fairness doctrine to selective incorporation was partly justified by a need for more
guidance of state courts).
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what was constitutionally required of them under Fundamental Fair-
ness because the Court refused to generate broadly applicable legal
principles.149  Instead, the Court’s holdings were highly context-
specific.  For example, the Court held that whether disallowing a
criminal defendant in state court from having an attorney violated
Fundamental Fairness turned on such fact-specific variables as the se-
verity of the imposed sentence and the defendant’s capacity to defend
herself.150  This offered states precious little guidance.  The selective
incorporation adopted by the Court—that is, of the One-Size-Fits-All
variety—had the benefit of making an already developed and readily
ascertained body of doctrine applicable to the states.  State officials
accordingly had a ready body of constitutional doctrine to consult that
told them what the Fourteenth Amendment required.
Similar to the benefit of limiting judicial discretion, facilitating
judicial administration is a very real benefit, but is only one among
many considerations that informs constitutional doctrine.  A single
rule applicable to all governmental actions would be the simplest to
administer, but it would come at too great a cost to concerns of fair-
ness, democracy, and so forth.  For this reason, the pragmatic consid-
eration of judicial administration does not support a categorical rule
of One-Size-Fits-All.  On the other hand, it does strongly counsel
against wholly jettisoning the One-Size-Fits-All framework.
To conclude, except with regard to constitutional rights that qual-
ify as rights, simpliciter, neither courts nor commentators have identi-
fied any principled justifications for a categorical One-Size-Fits-All
rule.  There are, however, two powerful pragmatic justifications for
One-Size-Fits-All: limiting judicial discretion and improving judicial
administrability.  Parts III and IV will show, however, that there are
powerful countervailing considerations that may justify Tailoring in
some cases.  Taken together, this Article’s analysis suggests that con-
temporary doctrine should be modified as follows:  today’s One-Size-
Fits-All doctrine should be downgraded from a categorical require-
ment to a rebuttable presumption.
149
See id. at 310-13 (discussing the uncertainty implicit in the Fundamental Fair-
ness doctrine).
150
See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-73 (1942) (holding that due process re-
quired assistance of counsel only when “a serious disadvantage” indicated that counsel
was necessary to ensure a fair trial), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
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III.  A QUASI-PRECEDENTIAL ARGUMENT:  THAT TAILORING IS NOT
UNKNOWN TO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
Though One-Size-Fits-All is the near-universal doctrinal paradigm
today, Tailoring is not absent from American jurisprudence.  Tailor-
ing has been advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Holmes, Jackson, Harlan, Fortas, Powell, Scalia, Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Thomas.  Moreover, several contemporary constitutional doc-
trines reflect the logic of Tailoring, though they are not typically con-
ceptualized in that way.  Further, a very recent decision of the Court
was decided on a rationale that reflects the institution-sensitive logic
that underwrites Tailoring.  Finally, many statutory rules vary in their
application depending upon the level of government that is being
regulated.  The fact that Tailoring already is part of our juridical land-
scape should cushion concern about this Article’s argument:  the
quasi-precedent for Tailoring makes clear that the Article does not
seek to introduce a wholly foreign element of constitutional analysis,
but instead advocates a willingness to expand a methodology already
present in American law.
A.  Early Influential Support for Tailoring
Though the federal government and the states generally were sub-
ject to different constitutional limitations during the era of Funda-
mental Fairness, the opinions in those cases did not generate particu-
larly searching rationales for the differential treatment as between the
federal and state governments.  One-Size-Fits-All treatment was not
then deemed to be a serious option on account of the fact that the
federal and state governments were deemed to be governed by differ-
ent constitutional language.  Virtually all cases decided during the
fundamental fairness era, accordingly, are not examples of Tailoring.
However, even during the heyday of Fundamental Fairness, the
Court utilized an approach virtually indistinguishable from “selective
and undifferentiated” incorporation vis-à-vis many First Amendment
guarantees.151  One-Size-Fits-All was a serious doctrinal contender—in-
deed, it won the day in this context—sparking dissents that generated
the most sophisticated judicial expositions to date concerning the
logic of Tailoring.  Justice Holmes penned one of the first of these in
the 1925 case of Gitlow v. New York.152  The case concerned a free
151
See supra Part I.B.4.
152
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
1558 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1513
speech challenge to a state statute that criminalized the advocacy of
anarchy, and the majority applied the doctrines developed in the fed-
eral context without explanation or justification.  Justice Holmes criti-
cized this in his dissent, writing as follows:
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be
included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has
been given to the word “liberty” as there used, although perhaps it may
be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is al-
lowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to
govern the laws of the United States.
153
This text-based argument was all that Justice Holmes had to say on the
matter, but the message was clear:  the principle of free speech might
apply differently to the states than it applies to the federal govern-
ment.154
The next significant discussion of Tailoring appears in Justice
Jackson’s dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois,155 which famously upheld a
state group libel statute.  Justice Jackson’s analysis focused on the dif-
ferent institutional characteristics of the federal and state govern-
ments and hence works well with a rights-against-rules conception of
constitutional rights.  Justice Jackson argued that the state and federal
governments are meaningfully different in respect of determining
what activities are constitutionally permitted to each:  “The inappro-
priateness of a single standard for restricting State and Nation is indi-
cated by the disparity between their functions and duties in relation to
those freedoms.”156  He then proceeded to explain why the federal
and state governments are differently situated as regards the regula-
tion of libel:
153
Id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
154
Interestingly, in a takings case decided three years before Gitlow that was writ-
ten by Justice Holmes, he “drew no distinction between takings by state and federal
governments.”  Israel, supra note 55, at 286 n.264 (discussing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922)).  Nor did Holmes explain why he was willing to treat the state and
federal governments interchangeably in Mahon.  See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (explain-
ing the general rule of takings law without acknowledging any difference in treatment
between state and federal governments).  There are several possible explanations as to
why Justice Holmes took divergent approaches with takings and free speech.  Perhaps
he had a theory that justified different treatment of the two.  Perhaps the majority for
whom he was writing in Mahon demanded this approach.  Or perhaps it was not clear
to him in the earlier opinion of Mahon that case law from the federal context need not
necessarily seamlessly transfer over to the states.  I shall not pursue these possibilities
further here.
155
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
156
Id. at 294 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Criminality of defamation is predicated upon power either to protect the
private right to enjoy integrity of reputation or the public right to tran-
quility.  Neither of these are objects of federal cognizance except when
necessary to the accomplishment of some delegated power . . . . When
the Federal Government puts liberty of press on one scale, it has a very
limited duty to personal reputation or local tranquility to weigh against it
in the other.  But state action affecting speech or press can and should
be weighed against and reconciled with these conflicting social inter-
ests.
157
These differences led Jackson to conclude that the First Amendment’s
free speech guarantee should be Tailored to the federal and state
governments:
For these reasons I should not, unless clearly required, confirm to the
Federal Government such latitude as I think a State reasonably may re-
quire for orderly government of its manifold concerns.  The converse of the
proposition is that I would not limit the power of the State with the severity appro-
priately prescribed for federal power.
158
Justice Harlan was the next member of the Court to offer a full-
blown defense of Tailoring (or, as he called it, opposition to “jot-for-
jot” incorporation of the Bill of Rights).159  His position was developed
over numerous dissenting opinions.160  Roth v. United States161 contains
one of his clearest expositions of Tailoring, and has been relied upon
by subsequent Supreme Court Justices.162  The ideas developed there
are not appreciably different from Justice Jackson’s approach in
Beauharnais:  Harlan argued that the state and federal governments
have different substantive powers and interests, and therefore that
157
Id. at 294-95.
158
Id. at 295 (emphasis added).
159
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
160
For a sample of Justice Harlan’s Tailoring opinions in the criminal context, see
id. at 171-93 (1968) (arguing that it is unwise that states are compelled to conform to
the federal constitution); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615-17 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the apparent incongruity of having different standards in
the federal and state court actually is a central tenet of the federal justice system);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (relying on Jus-
tice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (1957)); Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14-33 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (same); Ker v. Califor-
nia, 374 U.S. 23, 44-46 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that states should not
be put in “constitutional straight jackets”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (same).
161
Roth, 354 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
162
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 293 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(relying on Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 171
(1968)).
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[w]hether a particular limitation on speech or press is to be upheld be-
cause it subserves a paramount governmental interest must, to a large
extent, I think, depend on whether that government has, under the
Constitution, a direct substantive interest, that is, the power to act, in the
particular area involved.163
Justice Harlan advanced two additional justifications for Tailoring
in his other dissenting and concurring opinions on the subject.  First,
in the spirit of Justice Brandeis’s New State Ice dissent,164 Justice Harlan
praised the fact that each state can serve as an independent “experi-
mental social laborator[y]” that can experiment with “novel tech-
niques of social control.”165  Harlan thought that there was an “im-
mense advantage” of having “separate centers for such
experimentation,” and argued that there was “no overwhelming dan-
ger to our freedom to experiment” so long as there was “no uniform
nation-wide” regulation.166  He argued that the possibility of experi-
mentation, in the absence of severe risk due to the fact that other
states could be expected to legislate differently, was a reason to treat
state legislation differently than federal legislation for purposes of
constitutional analysis.167
Conversely, Justice Harlan argued that there are far greater “dan-
gers to free thought and expression . . . if the Federal Government
imposes a blanket ban over the nation on such a book” than if a state
does, because a federal ban would bar all American citizens from ac-
cessing the proscribed publication.168  A federal ban also destroys
“[t]he prerogative of the States to differ on their ideas of morality.”169
The greater dangers inherent in federal regulation accordingly justify
a constitutional regime under which the federal government would be
subject to more stringent free speech limitations than states, meaning
that states could ban materials that the federal government could not
in Harlan’s view.
163
Roth, 354 U.S. at 504.  For Justice Harlan’s full quotation, see infra text accom-
panying note 474.
164
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280-311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
165
Roth, 354 U.S. at 505 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 493 (1954)).
166
Id. at 505-06 (arguing that states should have broader powers to prohibit distri-
bution of books than the federal government).
167
See id.
168
Id. at 506.
169
Id.
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These opinions of Justices Holmes, Jackson, and Harlan are the
most sophisticated treatments of Tailoring in the judicial corpus, and
numerous Justices have drawn upon them in their advocacy of Tailor-
ing particular constitutional doctrines.  For example, in a concurring
opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana,170 Justice Fortas cited to Justice
Harlan’s opinions when writing that “[n]either logic nor history nor
the intent of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment can possi-
bly be said to require that the Sixth Amendment or its jury trial provi-
sion be applied to the States together with the total gloss that this
Court’s decisions have supplied.”171  Justice Powell similarly relied
heavily on Justice Harlan’s arguments when he advocated Tailoring
the Double Jeopardy Clause and several Sixth Amendment protec-
tions.172  Justice Rehnquist relied on Holmes, Jackson, and Harlan
when he argued in a concurrence in Buckley v. Valeo173 that “not all of
the strictures which the First Amendment imposes upon Congress are
carried over against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, but
rather that it is only the ‘general principle’ of free speech . . . that the
latter incorporates.”174  Justice Thomas relied on the same set of Jus-
tices in his concurring opinion in the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris175 deci-
sion, where he wrote that “in the context of the Establishment Clause,
it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms
than similar action by the Federal Government.”176
170
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
171
Id. at 213 (Fortas, J., concurring).
172
See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52-53 (1978) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice Powell states:
Even if I were to conclude that the Fifth Amendment—merely by virtue of
long, unreasoned acceptance—required attachment of jeopardy at the swear-
ing of the jury, I would not hold that the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily
imposes that requirement upon the States.  This issue would turn on the an-
swer to the question whether jeopardy’s attachment at that point is fundamen-
tal to the guarantees of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Id.; see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (re-
jecting the premise “that the concept of jury trial, as applicable to the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment, must be identical in every detail to the concept required in
federal courts by the Sixth Amendment”); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 632
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (same); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in the judgment) (same).
173
424 U.S. 1, 290 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part).
174
Id. at 291.  Then-Justice Rehnquist quoted extensively from Justices Harlan,
Jackson, and Holmes to support this proposition.  Id. at 292-93.
175
536 U.S. 639, 676 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
176
Id. at 678.
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Neither Chief Justice Rehnquist nor Justices Fortas nor Powell nor
Thomas have advanced the theory behind Tailoring; their opinions
are wholly derivative of the arguments developed by Justices Holmes,
Jackson, and Harlan.  But these opinions demonstrate that Tailoring’s
logic is not foreign to modern Supreme Court Justices.
B.  Contemporary Constitutional Decisions that Reflect
the Logic of Tailoring
There are other recent cases in which Justices have accepted the
logic of Tailoring.  Some are majority decisions.  Several of these deci-
sions have won the support of liberal Justices.  This shows that Tailor-
ing is not just a tool of conservative jurisprudence, notwithstanding
the fact that to date Tailoring has been advocated primarily by right-
leaning Justices.
A tantalizingly simple lesson emerges from a study of the instances
where individual Justices or the Court have been willing to Tailor.
Tailoring is invoked when Justices believe that two levels of govern-
ment are sufficiently different to merit different constitutional treat-
ment.  To be sure, the Court has not identified a determinate set of
principles to identify when sufficient differences are present.  Never-
theless, the practical, functional analysis that leads to judicial willing-
ness to engage in Tailoring is black-letter predicate for Part IV’s ex-
amination of generic reasons for treating the different levels of
government differently.
1.  Federal Affirmative Action Programs
One of the most sustained recent defenses of Tailoring can be
found in Justice Stevens’s dissent in the case of Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena.177  The majority opinion in Adarand replaced a rare in-
stance of Tailoring with a One-Size-Fits-All approach.  Prior to Ada-
rand, state affirmative action programs were subject to strict scrutiny,178
whereas federal programs only had to satisfy intermediate scrutiny
under the rule announced in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.179  The
Adarand majority identified what it labeled the principle of “congru-
ence”—the requirement that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth
177
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
178
This was the rule announced in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989).
179
497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990).
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Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment”180—to reverse Metro Broadcasting.181  In its place, Adarand estab-
lished that federal and state affirmative action programs are to be ana-
lyzed under identical legal standards.182
The principle of “congruence” announced in Adarand, accord-
ingly, is an example of One-Size-Fits-All in the particular context of
equal protection doctrine.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
dissented with regard to the principle of congruence:
The Court’s concept of “congruence” assumes that there is no sig-
nificant difference between a decision by the Congress of the United
States to adopt an affirmative-action program and such a decision by a
State or a municipality.  In my opinion that assumption is untenable.  It
ignores important practical and legal differences between federal and
state or local decisionmakers.
183
The majority in Adarand relied exclusively on a quotation from the
1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo in support of its principle of congru-
ence,184 but Justice Stevens demonstrated that the majority ignored
many subsequent decisions in which the Court noted that there were
constitutionally relevant differences between the federal and subfed-
eral polities with regard to the application of equal protection princi-
ples.185  The Adarand majority was content to rely on what fairness sug-
gests was insufficient precedent—insufficient because there was more
recent countervailing precedent—and did not feel it necessary to en-
gage in a substantive exchange of views with Justice Stevens’s several
arguments as to why the federal and subfederal governments were suf-
ficiently different so as to justify subjecting them to different legal
tests.
Justice Stevens provided three arguments against the One-Size-
Fits-All approach of the “congruence” doctrine.  First, as a purely tex-
tual matter, the federal government’s “legislative powers concerning
180
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
181
Id. at 227 (explicitly overruling Metro Broadcasting).
182
Id. (“Accordingly, we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by what-
ever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.”).
183
Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93).
185
See id. at 249-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Croson is one such opinion.  See City of
Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 521-22 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (“We have in some contexts approved the use of racial classifications by the
Federal Government to remedy the effects of past discrimination.  I do not believe we
must or should extend those holdings to the States.”).
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matters of race were explicitly enhanced by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”186  Justice Stevens then provided two arguments as to why Con-
gress has a “special institutional competence” not enjoyed by the sub-
federal polities with regard to matters of race.187  Quoting in toto from
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in the Croson case, Justice Stevens
first explained Congress’s special capability by drawing on Madison’s
famous discussion of factions from Federalist No. 10:
[R]acial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression
at the state and local than at the federal level.  To the children of the
Founding Fathers, this should come as no surprise.  An acute awareness
of the heightened danger of oppression from political factions in small,
rather than large, political units dates to the very beginning of our na-
tional history.188
It is sensible to impose greater review on subfederal racial classifica-
tions than federal classifications, Justice Stevens argued, because of
the greater potential for discrimination that exists at the subfederal
level.189  Third, Stevens explained that
greater deference [should be given] to the National Legislature than to
a local lawmaking body [because] federal affirmative-action programs
represent the will of our entire Nation’s elected representatives, whereas
a state or local program may have an impact on nonresident entities who
played no part in the decision to enact it.
190
186
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 250 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at
521 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
187
Id. at 249-50 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
188
Id. at 251 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 499-506
(1969))).  Justice Scalia (and Justice Stevens) thereafter quoted from Federalist No. 10:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and in-
terests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more fre-
quently will a majority be found of the same party, and the smaller the num-
ber of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plan
of oppression.  Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and in-
terests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive
to invade the rights of other citizens . . . .
Id. at 251 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 523 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)) (emphasis added)).
189
Id. at 255.
190
Id. at 252.  This is a representation-reinforcement type justification of the sort
developed by Professor Ely.  See infra at Part IV.A.1.b for its discussion of JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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Justice Stevens provided one additional argument on behalf of
Tailoring in his Adarand dissent that did not have any application to
the issue in the case.  Stevens quoted dictum from the majority opin-
ion he authored in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong191 to the effect that “the
two protections [the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process
Clauses] are not always coextensive.  Not only does the language of
the two Amendments differ, but more importantly, there may be over-
riding national interests which justify selective federal legislation that
would be unacceptable for an individual State.”192  This rationale is
quite close to the justification for Tailoring that was offered by Justices
Jackson and Harlan.193
I do not mean to suggest that Justice Stevens’s conclusion neces-
sarily was correct in Adarand.  It does seem, however, that the prece-
dential and functional arguments he advanced for treating the state
and local governments differently from the federal government as re-
gards affirmative-action programs merited a response—something the
majority opinion neglected to provide.
2.  Property-Based Franchise
Continuing with this Article’s review of contemporary examples of
Tailoring, let us turn to the guarantee of equal protection that prohib-
191
426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
192
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 253 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hampton, 426
U.S. at 100).  The remainder of the quotation reads as follows:
On the other hand, when a federal rule is applicable to only a limited terri-
tory, such as the District of Columbia, or an insular possession, and when
there is no special national interest involved, the Due Process Clause has been
construed as having the same significance as the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.  While this generally is descriptively true, this Article suggests an alternative justifi-
cation for Tailoring that would support Tailoring in a broader range of circumstances.
To be completely clear, the point of Part II of this Article is to identify some instances
of Tailoring in contemporary constitutional law not for the purpose of suggesting that
Tailoring should be limited to like circumstances, but to show that Tailoring is not
completely unknown to our constitutional jurisprudence.
193 See supra Part III.A.  Justice Stevens, however, did not refer to those opinions,
nor that of Justice Holmes, in the course of his dissent in Adarand or his opinion for
the Court in Hampton.  Perhaps Justice Stevens did not believe that opinions concern-
ing incorporation were relevant to the reverse incorporation issues raised in Hampton
and Adarand.  The analysis provided in this Article, however, suggests that the incorpo-
ration issues addressed by Justices Holmes, Jackson, and Harlan and the reverse incor-
poration questions raise the same conceptual question:  are the different levels of gov-
ernment sufficiently different to justify Tailoring?  It stands to reason that the case law
found in one context may be illuminating to the other.  Part IV of this Article shows
this to be the case.
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its both the federal government and states from conditioning a citi-
zen’s right to vote on property ownership under the principle of one-
person, one-vote.194  The Court held in Ball v. James195 that there are
types of local government that are subject to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause196 but are not barred from utilizing a
property-based franchise.  This is true, for example, of water reclama-
tion districts197 and business improvement districts.198
In this circumstance, the Tailoring occurs as between “general”
state and federal governments, on the one hand, and “special-purpose
unit[s] of government,” on the other.199  With respect to our model of
constitutional doctrine, deviation occurs at levels 3 and 4, such that
although:
1.S(general government) = 1.S(special-purpose government) and
2.S(general government) = 2.S(special-purpose government),
it is the case that:
3.S(general government) ≠ 3.S(special-purpose government), and
4.S(general government) ≠ 4.S(special-purpose government).
This is an example of Tailoring:  although the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to both general and
special-purpose governments (1.S(general government) = 1.S(special-purpose government)), it
applies differently to each.  More specifically, 3.S(general government) is
heightened scrutiny,200 which under 4.S(general government) includes the re-
quirement of one-person, one-vote.  By contrast, 3.S(special-purpose government) is
the far more deferential requirement that the voting scheme “bear[] a
reasonable relationship to its statutory objectives.”201  The one-person,
one-vote requirement simply is not part of 4.S(special-purpose government).  All
that is necessary under 4.S(special-purpose government) is a showing that “the effect
194
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding apportionment of seats in a
state legislature must not violate the one-person, one-vote principle).
195
451 U.S. 355 (1981).  This was not the first time the Court had so held.  See
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
196
See Ball, 451 U.S. at 371.
197
See id. (holding that a state does not violate the one-person, one-vote principle
by giving landowners weighted votes in water reclamation districts).
198
See, e.g., Lane v. Town of Oyster Bay, 603 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 1993)
(holding constitutional the limitation of voting rights to property owners in the con-
text of an improvement district).
199
See Ball, 451 U.S. at 362-63 (quoting Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,
483-84, 485 (1968)).
200
See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975) (holding that “in an election of gen-
eral interest, restrictions on the franchise of any character must meet a stringent test of
justification”).
201
Ball, 451 U.S. at 371.
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of the entity’s operations on [those with the right to vote] was dispro-
portionately greater than the effect on those seeking the vote.”202
The Court justified its decision to Tailor equal protection on the
basis of the different institutional characters of the two types of gov-
ernments.  The Court concluded that “special-purpose units” of gov-
ernment are sufficiently different from “general” governments to
merit different constitutional treatment.  Because special-purpose
units of government “affect[] definable groups of constituents more
than other constituents,” it is permissible to allow only those primarily
affected to vote.203  To be sure, it can be exceedingly difficult to distin-
guish these two categories; Ball in fact is one such case.204  The impor-
tant point is that there is precedent supporting the principle that
identical constitutional language may apply differently to two levels of
state government when each level is sufficiently different to merit dif-
ferential treatment.
3.  Separation-of-Powers Tailoring
The Court recently adopted the same institutionally sensitive
analysis with regard to an analogous issue that might be dubbed
“separation-of-powers” Tailoring:  the question of whether constitu-
tional limitations on the legislature seamlessly transfer to the judiciary.
The defendant in the 2001 case of Rogers v. Tennessee,205 who had been
convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the basis that the
victim had died more than a year and a day after the defendant had
stabbed him.  At the time of the stabbing Tennessee unquestionably
had a common-law “year-and-a-day rule,” which precluded conviction
of murder unless a victim had died by the defendant’s act within a
year and a day of the act.206  The Supreme Court of Tennessee abol-
ished the “year-and-a-day rule” and applied a new rule to the defen-
dant,207 upholding the conviction despite the fact that 15 months had
202
Id.
203
Id. at 363 (quoting Avery, 390 U.S. at 483-84).
204
The dissent does a good job of explaining why.  See id. at 374, 377-85 (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the “Salt River District possesses significant governmental
authority and has a sufficiently wide effect on nonvoters to require application of the
strict scrutiny mandated by Kramer ”).
205
532 U.S. 451 (2001).
206
Id. at 453.
207
Id.
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elapsed between the infliction of stab wounds and the victim’s
death.208
The question in Rogers was whether such retroactivity was constitu-
tional.  The Ex Post Facto Clause by its terms applies only to state leg-
islatures,209 and the Rogers Court assumed that the Clause would have
been violated if the Tennessee legislature had abolished the year and a
day rule after the defendant had stabbed his victim.210  Language from
a 1964 Supreme Court decision declared that state legislatures and
state judiciaries should be treated no differently in this regard; the
Court in Bouie v. City of Columbia211 stated that “[i]f a state legislature is
barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing . . . a law, it must fol-
low that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause
from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.”212
Bouie thus adopted a One-Size-Fits-All approach to separation of pow-
ers as regards the retroactivity of criminal rules.
Notwithstanding Bouie, the majority in Rogers opted for a rule that
treated the state legislature and judiciary divergently.213  The Rogers
Court explicitly rejected the One-Size-Fits-All approach, referring to it
using Justice Harlan’s “jot-for-jot” terminology and stating that “no-
where in the [Bouie] opinion did we go so far as to incorporate jot-for-
jot the specific categories of Calder [the decision that created a legal
test for the Ex Post Facto Clause] into due process limitations on the
retroactive application of judicial decisions.”214  The jurisprudential
208
Id. at 454.
209
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“[N]o State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto
Law . . . .”).
210
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458; see also id. at 462 (restating, and not disputing, Justice
Scalia’s contention that “there is no doubt that the Ex Post Facto Clause would have
prohibited a legislative decision identical to the Tennessee court’s decision here” (cita-
tion omitted)).
211
378 U.S. 347 (1964).
212
Id. at 353-54.
213
There was a most unusual split in the Rogers decision.  Justice O’Connor’s ma-
jority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg,
and Souter.  Justice Scalia wrote a dissent that was joined by Justices Stevens and Tho-
mas and by Justice Breyer in part.  Justices Breyer and Stevens also penned separate
dissents.  See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 451.
214
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459 (referring to Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-95
(1798)).  The Rogers majority was technically correct to the extent that the Bouie
Court’s language was dictum, as the majority held.  Id.  On the other hand, one can
hardly imagine a clearer signal of the Court’s contemporary understanding of a related
issue than what can be found in Bouie.  Moreover, Justice Scalia’s dissent provides a
strong argument that this aspect of Bouie was part of the decision’s rationale.  See id. at
469 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In any event, how Bouie’s language is best characterized is
2005] TAILORING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 1569
model developed earlier in the Article facilitates an appreciation of
precisely where the doctrines deviate.  To begin, there were differ-
ences at Step 1; the Court noted that while the Ex Post Facto Clause
applied to state legislatures, the state judiciary was limited only by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirement.215  With regard to
Step 2, the Rogers Court expressly concluded that both the Ex Post
Facto Clause and Due Process Clause nevertheless shared the identical
Goal, stating that it was “undoubtedly correct” that “the Due Process
and Ex Post Facto Clauses safeguard common interests—in particular,
the interests in Fundamental Fairness (through notice and fair warn-
ing) and the prevention of the arbitrary and vindictive use of the
laws.”216  Deviation also occurred at Steps 3 and 4 in the doctrine, the
levels of Standard and Rulified Standard:  while the legislature is pre-
cluded from making any change in the criminal law subsequent to the
criminal act that works to the defendant’s disadvantage,217 the judici-
ary is prevented only from making unforeseeable changes.218  To graphi-
cally summarize,
1.S(legislature) ≠ 1.S(judiciary),
2.S(legislature) = 2.S(judiciary),
3.S(legislature) ≠ 3.S(judiciary), and
4.S(legislature) ≠ 4.S(judiciary).
The Rogers Court then held that because the year and a day rule was
“widely viewed as an outdated relic of the common law,” it “was not
unexpected and indefensible” for the Tennessee Supreme Court to
abolish it.219  The Court accordingly upheld the defendant’s convic-
tion.220
The Rogers majority elected to treat the legislature and judiciary
differently—what might be termed Tailoring along the dimension of
not relevant to the wisdom of the Court’s methodology in Rogers but instead deter-
mines whether the majority followed or overruled precedent—surely an important
question, but not one that will receive further attention here.
215 See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 460 (“The Ex Post Facto Clause, by its own terms, does
not apply to courts.  Extending the Clause to courts through the rubric of due process
thus would circumvent the clear constitutional text.”).
216
Id.
217
This is a fair summary of the rules articulated in Calder that the Rogers Court
quotes.  See id. at 456.
218
Id. at 462 (noting that the Bouie Court held that the judiciary can make changes
to common law unless it is “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which
had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue” (citation omitted)).
219
Id.
220
Id. at 467.
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separation of powers rather than federalism—due to the “important
institutional and contextual differences between legislating, on the
one hand, and common law decisionmaking, on the other.”221  The
Court provided two reasons why the two institutions were meaning-
fully different for constitutional purposes.  First, constitutional con-
straints on the judiciary could be less strict because courts are less sus-
ceptible to “political influences and pressures,” since they only
“constru[e] existing law in actual litigation.”222  Second, because the
judiciary is responsible for the case-by-case development of the law,
Calder’s absolute brake on retroactivity would “unduly impair the in-
cremental and reasoned development of precedent that is the founda-
tion of the common law system.”223
Whether or not one agrees with the Rogers Court’s ultimate dispo-
sition, the following methodological conclusion is incontestable:  the
Court justified its holding by carefully considering the institutional
character of each governmental entity.  The Court refused to reflex-
ively import doctrines developed in the legislative context to the judi-
ciary, notwithstanding dictum in the Bouie decision that said such a
One-Size-Fits-All approach was appropriate.
The Rogers Court analysis, and its treatment of Bouie, are prece-
dent for the methodology advocated in this Article.  Bouie was decided
in 1964, in the midst of the Court’s ongoing rejection of “Fundamen-
tal Fairness” and embrace of selective incorporation.  In that era, the
conclusion that a constitutional guarantee was incorporated invariably
was followed by the unexplained determination that all doctrines de-
veloped in the federal context naturally applied to the states in equal
measure.224  Bouie is part of that historical context.  Rogers is a more re-
flective analysis of what precisely is imported from one context to an-
other during the importation process.  The context-sensitive institu-
tional analysis utilized by the Rogers majority is precisely the sort of
approach that this Article suggests is appropriate in the more usual
situation of “federalism” incorporation.
To be sure, the Rogers Court’s institution-sensitive analysis runs up
against far less precedent than Tailoring in the federalism context
would, for there have been very few cases that have considered how
constitutional principles transfer across the different branches of gov-
221
Id. at 460.
222
Id. at 460-61 (quoting James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n.2 (1961)).
223
Id. at 452.
224
See supra Part I.B.3.
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ernment.  The policy reasons for engaging in institutional-sensitive
analysis, however, are identical in both “federalism” and “separation
of powers” incorporation:  two institutions might be sufficiently differ-
ent to justify differential treatment as a constitutional matter.  While
adopting the functional analysis of the Rogers variety in the context of
“federalism” incorporation certainly would require that the Court re-
visit a methodology of One-Size-Fits-All that it has applied and dis-
cussed in many decisions, this precedent should not foreclose the pos-
sibility of Tailoring.  The justifications for a categorical One-Size-Fits-
All approach are deficient (discussed in Part II), and there are strong
policy reasons to conclude that Tailoring may be advantageous (dis-
cussed in Part IV).  Under these circumstances, the Court’s recent
willingness to utilize institutionally sensitive analysis in Rogers is in-
structive to “federalism” incorporation.  Precedent can be honored
without ignoring Tailoring’s potential benefits by downgrading the
categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach that characterizes contempo-
rary doctrine to a rebuttable presumption that could take account of
the varying institutional characteristics of the different levels of gov-
ernment.
4.  Dormant Commerce Clause
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine also fits the Tailoring para-
digm.  Dormant Commerce Clause limitations apply only to the states,
not Congress.225  Consequently, Congress can enact protectionist legis-
lation, whereas states may not.226  This differential treatment of the
states and the federal government thus fits the Tailoring model.
It could be argued, however, that Dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine is not an example of Tailoring.  The Dormant Commerce
Clause does not illustrate a judicial determination to treat the states
and the federal government differently, some might say, because the
225
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“It is well established that Con-
gress may authorize the States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause
would otherwise forbid.”); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992)
(“While the Commerce Clause has long been understood to limit the States’ ability to
discriminate against interstate commerce . . . that limit may be lifted . . . by an expres-
sion of ‘unambiguous intent’ of Congress.” (citations omitted)).
226
This statement simplifies matters a bit.  There is a virtually per se rule against
protectionist state legislation, not an absolute prohibition.  See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137-
38 (finding that restricting interstate trade does not alone render a statute unconstitu-
tional).  There is no limitation whatsoever, however, on federal protectionist legisla-
tion.
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doctrine applies only where Congress has not acted.227  The Dormant
Commerce Clause only limits the states and accordingly does not fit
the Tailoring paradigm.
For some readers, this formal argument might definitively estab-
lish Tailoring’s irrelevance to the Dormant Commerce Clause.  I view
the matter differently.  The mere fact that constitutional language ad-
dresses only one level or branch of government has not prevented mi-
gration of the constitutional principle to other levels or branches of
government.  For instance, equal protection principles have been ap-
plied to the federal government despite the fact that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by its terms applies only to states,228 and retroactivity prin-
ciples have been applied to the state judiciary despite the fact that the
Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to state legislatures.229  If explicit
constitutional language addressing only a particular level or branch of
government does not prevent the export of constitutional principles
to other levels or branches, it follows a fortiori that constitutional
principles lacking an explicit textual basis in the Constitution, such as
those found in Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, in princi-
ple could be exported to other levels of government.  For instance,
many have identified the Dormant Commerce Clause with a principle
of nondiscrimination,230 and it is quite conceivable that some such
principle could be applied to acts of Congress.
If this is right, then formal grounds alone cannot explain why
Dormant Commerce Clause limitations have not been exported to the
federal government.  The Court and commentators indeed have pro-
vided an explanation that focuses on the different institutional char-
acteristics of federal and state governments.  Concerns that are pres-
227
See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federal-
ism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 921 (2002) (“The Dormant Commerce Clause is under-
stood to limit State activity in respect of matters about which Congress has not legis-
lated . . . .”).  This has been the case since the doctrine’s early days.  See Willson v.
Black-bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251-52 (1829) (Opinion of Marshall,
C.J.) (noting that the question of whether a state statute is “repugnant to the power to
regulate commerce in its dormant state” arises when “congress has passed no . . . act”).
228
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (applying equal protection to
the public schools of the District of Columbia).
229
See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456-57 (2001) (noting that although “the
text of the Clause makes clear[ that] it is a limitation on the powers of the Legisla-
ture . . . the limitations on ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the no-
tion of due process.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
230
See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:  Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1099 (1986) (referring to the “no-
discrimination-against-interstate-commerce principle” of the Dormant Commerce
Clause).
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ent when states legislate are absent, or at least are far less pronounced,
when the Congress acts.  The Dormant Commerce Clause “permits
Congress to legislate on certain matters of national importance while
denying power to the States in this area for fear of undue impact upon
out-of-state residents.”231  Congress is differently situated than state leg-
islatures vis-à-vis the imposition of costs on unrepresented outsiders
because Congress is composed of representatives from all states.232
Donald Regan, an influential commentator on the Dormant
Commerce Clause, has argued that the doctrine is primarily con-
cerned with guarding against “protectionist” legislation that is de-
signed to “improv[e] the competitive position of in-state economic ac-
tors at the expense of their out-of-state competitors.”233  “Such
behavior,” Regan argues, “has no place in a genuine political union of
any kind” because it is “inconsistent with the very idea of political un-
ion.”234  Such protectionist behavior, it has been argued, “expresses a
constitutionally impermissible attitude toward the interests of other
States in the political union.”235  To the extent that protectionism in
this sense is the problem addressed by the Dormant Commerce
Clause, an institutional analysis provides a cogent explanation as to
why the doctrine limits only the states.  The centrifugal, nation-
shattering impulse giving rise to protectionist legislation is far less
likely to be found in the halls of the national legislature than in state
houses insofar as national legislators are more likely than their state
counterparts to keep the national interest in mind.  Furthermore, pa-
rochial tendencies are less likely to prevail in the national legislature,
where the parties who would be injured by protectionism have repre-
sentatives to protect their interests.
In sum, that Dormant Commerce Clause limitations have not mi-
grated from the states to the federal government is best understood at
least partly in institutional terms.  The federal and state governments
231
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 252 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).  This understanding recalls John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcement
theory of judicial review, discussed infra Part IV.A.1.a, though Justice Stevens does not
cite to Ely.
232
See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) (not-
ing that the fact that much of the burden may fall outside the legislating state dimin-
ishes the effectiveness of political restraints).
233
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:  A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1553-54 (2000).  Anderson and Pildes fairly de-
scribe Professor Regan’s view that contemporary Dormant Commerce Clause case law
is best rationalized as seeking to counter protectionist legislation.
234
Regan, supra note 230, at 1113.
235
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 233, at 1554.
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are different in ways that make it unnecessary for there to be Dormant
Commerce Clause-type checks on Congress.  As a result, under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, the federal government is permitted to
do things that the states cannot—yet another contemporary instance
of Tailoring.
5.  Apportionment and Other Methods for Enhancing the
Political Power of Numerical Minorities
Many constitutional principles that relate to the weight of an indi-
vidual’s vote have not migrated from the states to the federal govern-
ment and vice versa.  Several doctrines treat the two levels of govern-
ment differently under the Constitution and thus qualify as additional
contemporary examples of Tailoring.
a.  Area-based apportionment
The most significant variation between the federal government
and the states concerns the permissibility of apportionment on the ba-
sis of criteria that generate voting districts of unequal populations.
The United States Senate is apportioned not on a population basis,
but on an area basis.236  The Court has held that every state, however,
must “structure its legislature so that all the members of each house
represent substantially the same number of people.”237  Indeed, the
Court struck down a state scheme that apportioned one of its legisla-
tive houses on an area basis akin to the United States Senate.238
Area-based apportionment, hence, is yet another instance in
which the federal and state governments are treated differently:  it is
permissible for the federal government, but not for the states.  In-
deed, the scope of the deviation is unusually large.  Variation occurs at
the first step in doctrinal development:  the Court in essence has held
that the “equal population” aspect of the equal protection principle
does not apply to the federal government, despite the fact that virtu-
ally all other components of equal protection are reverse-incorporated
against the federal government.
236
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (giving each state two senators, regardless of popula-
tion).  “[T]he ratio of over-representation of the least populated state, Wyoming, to
the most populous state, California, is just under 70 to 1.”  ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW
DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 50 (2d ed. 2003).
237
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
238
See id. at 571-76 (opinion of Warren, C.J.).
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One might be tempted to conclude that the fact that the federal
and state governments are regulated by different constitutional provi-
sions (the states by the Equal Protection Clause, the federal govern-
ment by Article I, Section 3, which creates the U.S. Senate) means that
area-based apportionment is not an example of Tailoring at all, inso-
far as there is no constitutional principle common to both levels of
government that is being Tailored.  As explained in relation to the
Dormant Commerce Clause,239 however, such formal differences alone
cannot explain the failure of the constitutional principles to mi-
grate:240  other constitutional principles, that by their terms applied to
only one level or branch of government, have migrated.  Other factors
accordingly must account for the different treatment of the federal
and state governments.  The Court repeatedly has rejected the so-
called “federal analogy” as being “inapposite and irrelevant to state
legislative districting schemes,”241 explaining that the federal system
was “conceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to
the establishment of our federal republic” and arose from “unique
historical circumstances.”242  It is an open question whether this is suf-
ficient to justify the differential treatment.243  In any event, what is
relevant for present purposes is not the wisdom of any particular ex-
239
See supra notes 225-35 and accompanying text.
240
Two patterns of migration could have occurred.  First, the fact that so central a
political institution as the Senate does not rely on population-based apportionment
could have been relied upon for the principle that American democracy, and equal
protection by extension, does not require the states to have population-based appor-
tionment.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 298-300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(making this argument).  Conversely, the equal protection principle of population-
based apportionment could have been applied to the federal government on the the-
ory that Article I, Section 3 was altered by the later enacted Fourteenth Amendment.
Cf. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996) (holding that Congress
can subject states to suit in federal courts for violation of federal laws enacted pursuant
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not those enacted pursuant to Article
I, because Section 5 altered the earlier-enacted Eleventh Amendment).  The former is
the more likely of the two, insofar as the latter would constitute an extraordinary al-
teration of our country’s political structure.  On the other hand, powerful normative
arguments have been formulated in opposition to area-based apportionment.  See, e.g.,
DAHL, supra note 236, at 46-50, 144-45 (arguing that area-based apportionment detri-
mentally promotes unequal representation).
241
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 573; see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963)
(finding no useful analogy in the electoral college or federal districting).
242
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 574.
243
See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 745-46 (1964) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (questioning the Court’s rationale for rejecting the federal analogy);
Baker, 369 U.S. at 298-300, 308 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (finding that equal
protection does not require proportional representation).
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ample of Tailoring, but the fact that Tailoring occurs in contemporary
constitutional law.
b.  State analogs to the Electoral College
The Electoral College is another system that deviates from popula-
tion-based voting.244  Under the Electoral College that selects the
President, each state has a number of electors equal to the total num-
ber of senators and representatives to which it is entitled in the Con-
gress.245  Because the Senate is not apportioned on a population basis,
the ratio of electors among the states is not equal to the ratio of the
populations among the states.246  For this reason, among others,247 the
results of voting in the Electoral College can diverge from the popular
vote.
The Court has held that states, however, may not use a voting sys-
tem analogous to the Electoral College for the election of state offi-
cials.248  Georgia had a “county unit system,” under which counties
were allotted units on the basis of their population.249  The majority in
each county determined which primary candidate would be allotted
the county’s units.250  Because the units were not allocated on a linear
population basis, the units were not proportional to population.  As a
result, rural votes were weighted more heavily than urban votes.251  A
three-judge United States district court panel upheld the Georgia sys-
tem to the extent that “the disparity against any county is not in excess
of the disparity that exists as against any state in the most recent elec-
244
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 376-77 (recognizing that the Electoral College does not
apportion voting strength in proportion to population).
245
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
246
The number of representatives also diverges from a strict population basis due,
among other reasons, to the constitutional requirements that all “States shall have at
least one Representative” and that no congressional district cross state lines.  U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 448 (1992).
247
Another crucial reason is that Electors are awarded on a winner-take-all basis in
almost every state.
248
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 378-81 (“[E]very voter is equal to every other voter in his
State . . . .”).
249
Id. at 370.
250
The voting scheme was complex.  To be nominated for office, candidates for
statewide office were required to receive a majority of both the popular and unit votes.
If no candidate received both, a second run-off primary was required between the can-
didate who received the most popular votes and the one who received the most unit
votes.  The candidate with the highest number of unit votes would prevail.  Id. at 372.
251
Id. at 372-73.
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toral college allocation.”252  The Supreme Court found the analogy to
the Electoral College to be “inapposite” because it was “the result of
specific historical concerns.”253  Irrespective of the fact that equal pro-
tection principles do not disqualify the Electoral College system, the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause rendered Georgia’s ana-
log to the Electoral College system unconstitutional.  Regardless of
whether the Court’s proffered distinction is persuasive or not, the
Electoral College system accordingly stands as yet another example of
constitutional principles applying differently to the federal and state
governments.254
c.  Population-based apportionment
Tailoring is also manifested in the differences between states’ du-
ties regarding intrastate districting and Congress’s duties vis-à-vis in-
terstate districting.  State legislatures are responsible for drawing con-
gressional districts for the House of Representatives (intrastate
districting).  Congress is responsible for determining the number of
representatives that each state has (interstate districting).  Intrastate
districts drawn by state legislatures are subject to a strict requirement
that they be of equal populations.255  The relevant constitutional lan-
guage is Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, which requires that representa-
tives be chosen “by the people of the several States.”  The Court has
construed this to “require the States to pursue equality in representa-
tion,”256 which in turn has been interpreted as dictating that states
make “‘a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality’
252
Id. at 378 (quoting Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1962)
(three-judge panel)).
253
Id.
254
The Court declared that
all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote . . . wherever their
home may be in [a] geographical unit.  This is required by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The concept of “we the people”
under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality
among those who meet the basic qualifications.  The idea that every voter is
equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor of one
of several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions.
Id. at 379-80.  This logic would suggest that the Electoral College violates equal protec-
tion, and the Court in Gray offered no explanation as to why these principles do not
apply to the Electoral College.
255 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 459-60 (1992).
256
Id. at 461; see also id. at 459 (referring to the principle of “equal representation
for equal numbers of people” (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964))).
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within each State.”257  Population deviations across intrastate districts
of as little as one percent have been struck down as violating this con-
stitutional requirement of equality.258
The Court in United States Department of Commerce v. Montana259 was
confronted with the question whether Congress is held to the same
standards in interstate districting to which states are subject in intra-
state districting.  The precise textual question was whether the Article
I, Section 2, Clause 3 requirement that representatives be apportioned
among the several states “according to their respective Numbers”
“embod[ies] the same principle of equality” that applies to the
states.260  A majority of a three-judge district court panel had decided
that Congress’s interstate districting determinations were subject to
the same requirements as the states’ intradistricting decisions, mean-
ing that “the only population variances that are acceptable are those
that ‘are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute
equality, or for which justification is shown.’”261
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opin-
ion, concluding that Congress’s apportionment method “commands
far more deference than a state districting decision.”262  The doctrinal
variation across the federal and state governments accordingly occurs
at Step 3, such that 3.F ≠ 3.S.263  These variations are particularly strik-
ing in light of the fact that the Court derived the districting duties in-
cumbent on both the federal and state governments from the same
section of the Constitution:  Article I, Section 2.
Once again, the Court pointed to institutional differences be-
tween the states and the federal government to explain why doctrinal
variations were appropriate.  Though intrastate and interstate district-
257
Id. at 463 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969)) (em-
phasis omitted).
258
See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a state
congressional apportionment plan where the population difference between the larg-
est and smallest districts was less than one percent because it was not the result of a
good-faith effort to achieve population equality).
259
503 U.S. 442 (1992).
260
Id. at 461.
261
Id. at 446 (quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531).
262
Id. at 464.
263
While it is difficult to discern the precise standard to which the Court subjects
Congress’s interstate districting decisions, see id. at 464-66, it clearly is far less searching
than what the states are subject to.  See id. at 459-61.  The mere fact that the federal and
state governments are subject to varying constitutional standards—that is, that the
principle of “equal representation” is Tailored as between them—is all that matters in
terms of displaying instances of Tailoring in contemporary constitutional law.
2005] TAILORING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 1579
ing both are directed at creating equality in representation, the Court
ruled that equality means different things across the different institu-
tional contexts of interstate and intrastate districting.  At the level of
intrastate districting, the requirement of numerical equality is a
straightforward concept.  Drawing district lines so districts contain
equal populations is a task that does not require any tradeoffs because
it is driven by a single criterion.  The Court concluded that “equality”
is a more complex notion at the interstate level.  Because the Consti-
tution itself requires that each state have at least one representative
and forbids the creation of congressional districts that cross state
lines,264 it almost always is impossible to ensure that congressional dis-
tricts across all states are of equal size.  Because of these limitations,
there are multiple, mutually incompatible conceptions of “equality”
that an interstate districting scheme could seek to realize.  For that
reason, concluded the Court, equality in respect of the federal gov-
ernment’s interstate districting obligation is an indeterminate con-
cept.
The facts in the Montana case illustrate this.  If Montana had pre-
vailed in the litigation and had been awarded an additional congres-
sional district, then the State of Washington would have lost one seat.
Bringing Montana closer to the “ideal” district—the nation’s popula-
tion of voters divided by 435 yielded the “ideal” district size of equal
population districts across the country—would have pushed Washing-
ton’s eight congressional districts away from the ideal.265  Which would
have been the preferable outcome from the perspective of equality?
The Court concluded that there is no uncontroversial conception of
equality that can determine which interstate districting plan is more
equal, and that great deference accordingly should be given to the
federal government’s determination.266
264
See id. at 447-48.
265
Under the 1990 census utilized in Montana, the size of the ideal district was
572,466.  Id. at 445.  Under the interstate districting scheme challenged in that case,
Montana’s population of 803,655 composed one congressional district and the State of
Washington had nine districts that averaged 543,105.  Id. at 460-61.  If Montana had
prevailed, Montana would have had two districts with an average population of
401,838, and Washington would have had eight districts averaging 610,993.  Id.  In
other words, if Montana had prevailed, its districts’ deviations from the ideal district
would have gone from 231,189 above the ideal to 170,628 below the ideal, whereas
Washington’s deviation would have gone from 29,361 below the ideal district to 38,527
above the ideal across its eight remaining congressional districts.  “[B]ringing Montana
closer to the ideal” district accordingly would have pushed Washington’s congressional
districts “away from that ideal.”  Id. at 461-62.
266
See id. at 464 (holding that “precise mathematical equality” is an illusory goal
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C.  Statutory Examples
This Part of the Article has aimed to show that, notwithstanding
One-Size-Fits-All’s predominance, pockets of American constitutional
law already reflect sensitivity to the different levels of government.  An
examination of contemporary law’s responsiveness to different levels
of government would be remiss if it failed to refer to the many in-
stances where statutory law distinguishes among the different levels of
government.  For example, although states are exempt from the fed-
eral antitrust law,267 municipalities are not.268  Similarly, states may not
be sued under section 1983,269 but municipalities may be.270  Though
not direct precedent for constitutional Tailoring, the statutory exam-
ples are further evidence that doctrinal sensitivity to the different lev-
els of government is not absent from American jurisprudence.
IV.  THE PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR TAILORING:  THAT DIFFERENT LEVELS
OF GOVERNMENT MAY BE RELEVANTLY DIFFERENT
After having argued in Part II that there is no convincing rationale
to support a categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach, and having shown
for interstate districting and that Congress’s “apparently good-faith choice of a method
of apportionment . . . commands far more deference than a state districting decision”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  What is significant for present purposes is that
the Court deemed it necessary to provide an explanation for why the federal and state
governments should be treated differently, not whether the explanation ultimately is
compelling.  I myself am skeptical of the Court’s decision in Montana.  While notions
of equality are more complex in interstate districting than intrastate districting, one
such notion stands out from the rest as most consistent across both contexts.  The driv-
ing principle behind the intrastate districting cases is that the weight of each individ-
ual’s vote should be as equal as possible.  See id. at 459 (noting the principle of “equal
representation for equal numbers of people” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This is an individual-focused conception of equality that disregards the group to which
individuals belong.  Applied to the interstate districting context, it would mean that
districting should be performed in such a manner that, consistent with the limitations
that each state have at least one representative and that no district cross state lines, the
population variances across congressional districts nationwide are minimized.  Such an
approach would reflect an individual-focused conception of equality that disregards
the significance of group affiliation (such as what state a person is a citizen of).
267 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943) (“We find nothing in the lan-
guage of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to re-
strain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.”).
268
See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978)
(“[A]rguments for implying an exclusion for local governments from the antitrust laws
must be rejected.”).
269
See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a
State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”).
270
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
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in Part III that numerous Justices have embraced Tailoring and that
several contemporary doctrines are instances of Tailoring, this Part
provides a formal analysis of the differences among the different levels
of government that may justify Tailoring.  It does not delve into the
specifics of which constitutional provisions should be Tailored and
what the resulting context-sensitive doctrines should look like.  Part IV
instead makes a generic argument that Tailoring is a sensible option
to consider as a prima facie matter.  It generates only a prima facie
case for Tailoring, not a definitive case, because there are countervail-
ing costs associated with Tailoring, which are identified in Part V.
The basis for the prima facie case, however, is surprisingly robust.
It turns out that a broad array of approaches to ordering social life,
which typically generate divergent policy prescriptions, concurs that
Tailoring may be sound some of the time.  Furthermore, though these
different methodologies do not generate identical conclusions as to
which constitutional guarantees should be Tailored and what the vari-
ant doctrines should be, there is considerable overlap in the consid-
erations they deem relevant to determining when Tailoring is appro-
priate.
Drawing on these competing methodologies, Part IV identifies five
broad respects in which different levels of government might be suffi-
ciently different to justify Tailoring:  (A) the differing political mal-
functions to which each level is susceptible; (B) the distinctive conse-
quences that attend each level’s geographical scope; (C) the divergent
exit costs across the different levels of government and, correspond-
ingly, the varying extent to which efficient and diverse public goods
can be generated through a competition among polities; (D) the vary-
ing number of people necessary to garner a majority and thereby
translate their preferences into law; and (E) each polity’s distinctive
functions and responsibilities.  The analysis suggests that sometimes
the central government ought to be accorded more leeway to regulate
than the lower-level governments, and vice versa.
To be clear, Part IV does not argue that any one of the competing
approaches to ordering social life is preferable.  The different meth-
odologies rest on different conceptions of personhood and/or con-
ceptions of the appropriate role of government, and choosing among
them is an eminently political enterprise.  Deciding whether or not to
expand Tailoring accordingly would appear to turn on antelegal
commitments that cannot be decided by the Constitution alone.
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A.  Different Governmental Malfunctions
Several influential schools of constitutional theory conceptualize
constitutional law largely as a tool for correcting governmental mal-
functions.  Many of these analysts have focused on failures in the
democratic political process at the legislative level.271  Others have
noted that many constitutional principles—primarily those concern-
ing criminal process—aim to keep the executive branch in check by
means of prophylactic rules.272  The discussion below shows that the
presence and extent of the political failures to which constitutional
doctrine is addressed frequently is a function of the level of govern-
ment that is acting.  From the perspective of malfunction-remedying
approaches to constitutionalism, it accordingly would follow that Tai-
loring is a sensible approach to consider.
1.  Malfunctions in the Representative Process
With the exception of the “direct democracy” of initiatives and
referendums, polities at all levels of government273 in the United States
are representative democracies.  This system can operate successfully
only if elected governmental officials are able to satisfactorily repre-
sent the interests of the people.  Many theories that understand con-
stitutional law as a remedy for governmental malfunctions have fo-
cused on malfunctions relating to representation.  It is useful to break
these into three types of representation failures:  (a) the absence of
representation; (b) under-representation; and (c) overrepresentation.
Careful thought suggests that many of these failures are a function of
a polity’s size.  This provides a prima facie basis under a malfunction-
remedying approach to the Constitution for concluding that constitu-
tional doctrines that remedy failures in the representation process
may be amenable to Tailoring.
271
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 190, at 100-01 (arguing for a “representation-
reinforcing orientation” of judicial review, which “devot[es] itself . . . to policing the
mechanisms by which the system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will
actually be present”); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS:  THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 56 (2001) (analyzing “the demand for judicial protec-
tion against political malfunction”).
272 See infra Part IV.A.2.
273
One further caveat is in order:  not all tribal governments function as represen-
tative democracies.
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a.  Absence of representation
Consider first the absence of representation.  A well-known exam-
ple is political spillover effects, a type of externality.  Such spillover ef-
fects are found where a policy pursued by one polity has negative ef-
fects on persons in other polities.  The democratic malfunction is that
parties who are negatively impacted have limited opportunities to
shape the policies that affect them because they are not members of
the political community adopting the policy and accordingly cannot
vote.274  Constitutional law corrects the problem of negative political
externalities by constraining polities from imposing such costs on po-
litical outsiders.  Many of these constitutional limitations come from
the Dormant Commerce Clause and Article IV’s Privileges and Im-
munities Clause.275  For example, the Dormant Commerce Clause al-
most categorically disallows states from discriminating against out-of-
staters276 and sharply limits states’ powers to legislate extraterritori-
ally,277 while the Privileges and Immunities Clause allows one state to
treat citizens from other states differently from its own citizens only
for “substantial reason[s].”278
The political malfunction regarding spillover effects disappears,
however, when all affected parties are members of the political com-
munity that enacts the law, for there are no unrepresented parties in
respect of whom there can be spillovers.  The problem of political
spillover effects consequently disappears when the Congress acts.279
274
In Ely’s terminology, such political outsiders must rely on insiders to “virtually
represent” their interests.  ELY, supra note 190, at 82-87.  Such virtual representation
will not be adequate if the insiders’ interests systematically diverge from those of the
outsiders.  Of course, political outsiders typically can lobby and contribute money to
the political campaigns of politicians in whose jurisdictions they do not reside in an
effort to have their preferences accounted for.
275
Another limitation comes from the legislative jurisdiction limitations imposed
by the Due Process Clause.  See Rosen, supra note 227, at 871.
276
See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 144 (1986) (subjecting such state
regulations to strict scrutiny).
277
See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989) (discussing the propo-
sitions that restrict states’ power to regulate commerce outside their borders).  For a
full discussion of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s limitations on extraterritorialism,
see Rosen, supra note 227, at 919-30.
278
Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998) (quoting Su-
preme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985)).  For a full discussion of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, see Rosen, supra note 227, at 897-909.
279
This is true at least as far as spillover effects being imposed on U.S. citizens are
concerned.  There of course may be spillover effects that are felt outside the United
States.  Various principles of international law, including the principles of legislative
jurisdiction, deal with these types of political externalities.
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This helps to justify why the constitutional principles of nondiscrimi-
nation grounded in the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause that counteract the political malfunction of
spillover effects have not been “reverse-incorporated” against the fed-
eral government.280  Accordingly, although one state cannot discrimi-
nate on the basis of citizenship by refusing to allow garbage from an-
other state to be disposed of in its landfills,281 Congress can authorize
the states to discriminate against other states’ garbage.282  In short, the
very existence of this particular political failure is a function of the size
of the polity.  Consequently, the nature of the Constitution’s limita-
tions varies in this context depending upon which level of government
is acting.  In this Article’s parlance, the constitutional principles of an-
tidiscrimination and antiextraterritoriality are Tailored.
Similar concerns for spillover effects have led a recent commenta-
tor to argue that local regulations should be subject to stricter scrutiny
than state or federal regulations across a wide range of constitutional
property rights.283  Professor William Fischel argues that many consti-
tutional principles function as “intertemporal commitments” by gov-
ernments.284  Such commitments encourage citizens to engage in ac-
tivities they otherwise would not due to fear that the government will
take the fruits of their labor.  Government commitment to keep prom-
ises, such as respecting private property, accordingly encourages in-
vestment and development today that will yield benefits tomorrow.285
280
The Dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to Congress.  See Taylor, 477
U.S. at 138 (“It is well established that Congress may authorize the States to engage in
regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid.”).  No case, to my
knowledge, has even contemplated that the Privileges and Immunities Clause’s princi-
ples apply to the federal government.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause grants no rights to a citizen as against her
own state because state residents “at least have a chance to remedy at the polls any dis-
crimination against them.  Out-of-state citizens have no similar opportunity . . . .”
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 (1984);
see generally Rosen, supra note 227, at 900-03 (discussing cases that establish this princi-
ple).
281
See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (holding that a state
statute prohibiting the importation of out-of-state waste violated the Commerce
Clause).
282
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1992) (holding that Con-
gress may grant states the right to refuse to accept another state’s radioactive waste,
something that states could not have done on their own without congressional
authorization).
283
See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS:  LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS (1995).
284
Id. at 139.
285
See id. at 126-31.
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Fischel argues that smaller governments are more apt to break
their promises, and that they accordingly require heightened judicial
review:
Left to their own devices, the smaller republics would discount the wel-
fare of underrepresented outsiders.  Local insiders can use regulation in
a way that subverts the Constitution’s clear commands not to take prop-
erty without compensation.  The larger republics are less subject to that
temptation because the burden of regulation is more likely to fall on
properly represented insiders and their progeny.
286
The burden of a smaller government’s promise-breaking is more likely
to fall on unrepresented outsiders because the costs of government
promise-breaking today arise only in the future (insofar as current
promise-breaking discourages investment today, which will have con-
sequences later), and much of the future population that will suffer is
not currently located in smaller jurisdictions on account of the great
“mobility of the population.”287  At larger levels of government, by con-
trast, democratic processes provide a better check on governmental
promise-breaking because the costs of promise-breaking are more
likely to fall on the people, or the descendants of those, who currently
reside in the polity.  In short, Fischel argues that larger governments
require less active constitutional oversight by the judiciary because
they are less capable of imposing promise-breaking costs on unrepre-
sented outsiders.288
Fischel applies his theory to takings doctrine, which currently is
One-Size-Fits-All, and concludes that the law should be altered so that
smaller polities are subject to greater scrutiny than larger polities.289
There is another area of constitutional law Fischel does not mention
in this regard that is consistent with his theory.290  The Contract
286
Id. at 139.
287
Id. at 131.
288
See id. (providing “an economic-federalism rationale for judicial review” such
that “[i]n order to run a system in which there are many governments, there must be
some external control over opportunistic defaults by one unit whose costs are shifted
to others or to the nation as a whole”); id. at 132 (discussing a variety of nonjudicial
constraints on the federal government and states that limit various types of malfea-
sance, but noting that “in the context of local government takings, sometimes courts
are the only serious constraint”).
289
Id. at 133-34.
290
Fischel’s Contract Clause analysis focuses only on the decision of Home Building
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), and mistakenly treats the Contract
Clause as wholly devoid of substantive bite.  See FISCHEL, supra note 283, at 130-31 (cit-
ing Blaisdell’s “abandonment” of the Contract Clause as evidence that “even our most
prominent and independent court cannot be depended on to enforce
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Clause, which by its terms applies only to states, is an antiretroactivity
principle that proscribes legislative impairment of contracts.  Al-
though there is no analogous constitutional language that addresses
the federal government, the Supreme Court long has held that the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes antiretroactivity limi-
tations on the federal government as well.291  It is well established,
however, that these antiretroactivity limitations are not identical.292
The Court has offered virtually no justification for the disparate
treatment of the federal and state governments as regards retroactiv-
ity.293  Fischel’s theory provides a plausible answer:  the Court appro-
priately subjects retroactive federal legislation to lower-level scrutiny
than is given to state legislation294 because the federal government is
less apt to break its promises than are the states.  When Congress acts,
there are fewer unrepresented outsiders upon whom the externality of
promise-breaking could fall by virtue of the fact that Congress repre-
intergenerational commitments”).  In fact, the Court has relied on the Contract Clause
in striking down two state statutes since Blaisdell was decided.  See Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250 (1978) (striking down as a violation of the Contract
Clause a Minnesota statute that had a retroactive effect on a private employer); U.S.
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 32 (1977) (holding that the Contract Clause “pro-
hibits the retroactive repeal” of a covenant by state statute).
291
See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730
(1984) (noting that federal retroactive legislation must comport with due process, but
upholding such legislation under rational review).
292
As the Court noted in Pension Benefit:
[I]t is suggested that we apply constitutional principles that have been devel-
oped under the Contract Clause when reviewing this federal legislation.  We
have never held, however, that the principles embodied in the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause are coextensive with prohibitions existing against
state impairments of pre-existing contracts.  Indeed, to the extent that recent
decisions of the Court have addressed the issue, we have contrasted the limita-
tions imposed on States by the Contract Clause with the less searching stan-
dards imposed on economic legislation by the Due Process Clauses.
Id. at 732-33 (internal citations omitted); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchi-
son, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 472 n.25 (1985) (“When the Court re-
views state economic legislation the inquiry will not necessarily be the same . . . . [A]
less searching inquiry occurs in the review of federal economic legislation.”).
293
The Court has explained that “[i]t could not justifiably be claimed that the
Contract Clause applies, either by its own terms or by convincing historical evidence,
to actions of the National Government.”  Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 732 n.9.  The prob-
lem with this justification is that the absence of text and history, see supra note 102, has
not kept the Court from incorporating the Bill of Rights’s guarantees against the
states.  See Dorf, supra note 26, at 968 (“Judges and constitutional scholars almost uni-
versally agree that . . . the Fourteenth Amendment makes most of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states and their subdivisions.”).
294
See Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 732-33 (applying to federal legislation the “less
searching standards imposed on economic legislation by the Due Process Clause”).
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sents the interests of a larger bloc of citizens than do either states or
municipalities.
b.  Underrepresentation
Consider next the problem of systematic “underrepresentation” of
discrete and insular minorities that was famously identified by John
Hart Ely.  Ely argued that the heightened scrutiny the Court affords to
suspect classifications is a proper doctrinal response to political fail-
ures where governmental officials systematically disregard the interests
of a “discrete and insular” minority for two reasons.  First, “widespread
hostility” may “distort[] reality” such that legislators will be unable to
see the “overlapping interests that can bind them into a majority on a
given issue.”295  As a result, the “wheeling and dealing by which the
various minorities that make up our society typically interact to pro-
tect their interests” may “prove recurrently unavailing.”296  Second,
even where there is not such hostility, there might be “subtle[] self-
aggrandizing biases of the majority”297 that “distort[]” their perspec-
tives298 and result in legislation that is based on problematic stereo-
types and generalizations.  Ely argued that contemporary constitu-
tional doctrine, which upholds “suspect” classifications only when the
state can “come up with a goal of substantial weight” and “show that
the classification fits that goal with virtual perfection,”299 is a sensible
way to identify legislation that is the product of the political malfunc-
tions of hostility or distorted perspectives.300
Importantly, the risk of both types of political malfunctions turns
on the size and make-up of the polity that is acting.  For instance,
though there might be “widespread hostility” across the country
against a particular group, there might be a majority of that group in
a particular subfederal polity.  If so, the very predicate for heightened
scrutiny would be absent when such a subfederal polity acts.  Similarly,
the self-aggrandizing perceptions that distort the perspective of the
majority when the Congress acts, and that appropriately invite the
doctrine of suspect classifications and heightened scrutiny under Ely’s
approach, would not be present if the government that enacted a ra-
295
ELY, supra note 190, at 153-54.
296
Id. at 151.
297
Id. at 161.
298
Id. at 160.
299
Id. at 146.
300
Id. at 147-48.
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cial classification (for instance) were a subfederal polity in which the
majority of citizens and representatives belonged to the racial group
that constitutes a minority on the national political stage.301
Ely’s analysis accordingly suggests, at least as a prima facie matter,
that whether a given classification constitutes a suspect class that ap-
propriately triggers heightened scrutiny may depend on which level of
government has acted.  What constitutes a “minority” at the national
level, which the majority might either treat with hostility or systemati-
cally misperceive, may not be a minority at the subfederal level.  If the
predicate for political malfunction is absent, it follows that the consti-
tutional doctrine that seeks to remedy the malfunction is inapposite.
So, for example, a racial classification might appropriately be subject
to heightened scrutiny if enacted by the federal or a state government
but only to rational basis scrutiny if enacted by an African-American
majority local government.302  More generally, Ely’s analysis gives rise
to the possibility of Tailoring at the levels of 3 and 4, such that
3.F ≠ 3.S, and/or
4.F ≠ 4.S.
It also suggests that not all subfederal governments that are situ-
ated at the same hierarchical level should be treated the same.  A
white majority in a municipality, for instance, may be relevantly differ-
ent for present purposes from an African-American majority in a mu-
nicipality.303
c.  Overrepresentation
Finally, consider the malfunction that I dub “overrepresentation.”
This refers to a political decision that reflects the desires of the nu-
301
See id. at 168-69 (discussing the risk of judges and legislators making “self-
aggrandizing generalizations”).  Under Ely’s analysis, there might be relevant differ-
ences among different polities for purposes of suspect classifications even if the racial
group did not constitute a numerical majority in the subfederal polity.  Ely notes that
hostility and stereotyping are likely to be diminished as “social intercourse” among
groups increases, and it is quite possible that the amount of intergroup social interac-
tion might vary across polities.  Id. at 161.
302
Lower-level scrutiny would not necessarily be appropriate, however, if the clas-
sification burdened the white racial minority in the local government.  Cf. City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (adopting strict scrutiny where
ordinance favored African Americans and a majority of the seats on the city council
were held by African Americans).
303
But see infra notes 491-500 and accompanying text (discussing the drawbacks of
“horizontal” Tailoring of constitutional principles across polities situated at the same
level in the federal structure).
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merical majority that does not take adequate account of the numerical
minority’s interests.  James Madison famously referred to this as the
problem of “factions” in Federalist No. 10.304  Though contemporary
readers schooled in public choice theory may naturally conceptualize
“factions” as numerical minorities that can successfully influence gov-
ernmental action due to their intense desires—that is, as “interest
groups”305—this is not what Madison appeared to have had in mind.306
As Neil Komesar has pointed out, Madison seemed to be of the view in
Federalist No. 10 that numerical minorities are not dangerous:  “If a fac-
tion consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican
principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by
regular vote.”307  The problem of factions, instead, arises when the fac-
tion is part of the majority:  “When a majority is included in a faction,
the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sac-
rifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the
rights of other citizens.”308  Komesar has usefully dubbed this political
malfunction the problem of “majoritarian bias.”309
Determining what qualifies as majoritarian bias is tricky insofar as
it is not simple to explain why a system of rule by numerical majority
constitutes a political malfunction.310  After all, the right to rule in ac-
cordance with the majority’s desire is a cornerstone of our democratic
government.311  Determining if and when majoritarianism is problem-
304
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
305
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 68 (1985) (equating Madison’s faction with interest groups); Jonathan R. Macey,
Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model:  An Application to
Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 484 (1988) (same).
306
See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 217-21 (1994) (contending that Madison and
the other Federalist Framers sought to protect against “majoritarian rent” seekers).
307
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 304, at 80.
308
Id.
309
KOMESAR, supra note 306, at 53-97.
310
For an illuminating discussion of the normative shortcomings of majority rule,
see Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion:  A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2001).
311
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW, 139-41 (1990) (noting the principle of “self-government,
which means that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule, if they wish, sim-
ply because they are majorities”); ELY, supra note 190, at 7 (observing that “whatever
the explanation, and granting the qualifications, rule in accord with the consent of a
majority of those governed is the core of the American governmental system”).  On the
other hand, others have argued that many elements of the Constitution reflect a rejec-
tion of pure democracy.  See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 15-20 (2d ed. 2003) (noting and bemoaning this idea);
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atic rests on contestable value judgments that are exogenous to demo-
cratic theory and about which people are deeply divided.312  In short,
identifying why and when laws that reflect the will of the majority con-
stitute a failure of the political process is a deeply political question,
and resolving it is beyond the scope of this Article.  Regardless of how
the political malfunction of overrepresentation is normatively
grounded, however, the discussion immediately below shows that the
extent of this political failure (for those who identify it as such) will
likely be a function of the polity’s size.  The logic that inclines these
people to conceptualize constitutionalism as a remedy for the political
malfunction of majoritarianism accordingly should lead them to a
prima facie conclusion that Tailoring is a doctrinal option that ought
to be considered.
i.  The Federalist No. 10
First consider Madison.  He proposed that the problem of factions
is tamed, if not solved, to the extent a polity “[e]xtend[s] the
sphere.”313  By this, Madison meant extending the borders of the rele-
vant political unit and accordingly enlarging it:
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and inter-
ests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a com-
mon motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength and to act in unison with each other.
314
To be sure, the discussion in Federalist No. 10 was not intended to
give guidance to courts, but instead sought to explain the benefit of “a
Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 128 (2003) (re-
flecting on the danger of majoritarian rule).  For present purposes I will leave aside
the question of supermajority and supramajority rules.
312 For instance, although it readily can be shown that rule by a pure numerical
majority can lead to inefficient outcomes, see KOMESAR, supra note 271, at 64-67, it is
not axiomatic that obtaining efficient outcomes is the end goal of democratic lawmak-
ing.  Similarly, although many might think it unfair for a numerical minority’s interests
to be systematically disregarded in a solely majoritarian-regarding political process, see
id. at 65, any such fairness principle also is exogenous to democratic theory.  Indeed,
Neil Komesar forthrightly acknowledges that determining whether majoritiarian influ-
ences constitute a political malfunction in any given instance of governmental action
turns on normative considerations.  Id. at 64; see also KOMESAR, supra note 306, at 76-80
(concluding that the chosen “social goal” determines whether legislation appropriately
reflects the desires of the majority or problematically reflects majoritarian bias).
313
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 304, at 83.
314
Id.
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large over a small republic.”315  Supreme Court Justices, however, have
understood Madison’s insight to have implications in respect of con-
stitutional principles that remedy political malfunctions.  Thus it is
these very passages from Federalist No. 10 that Justice Scalia quoted in
his concurring opinion in the Croson decision, and that Justice Stevens
cited in his dissent in Adarand, to support the proposition that the
dangers of racial discrimination are greater at lower levels of govern-
ment than at higher levels.316  The lower likelihood of factionalism at
the higher level of government was the predicate for these Justices’
conclusion that congressional enactments of benign racial classifica-
tions should be subject to a lower level of judicial scrutiny than racial
classifications created by states or localities.317
The Justices’ arguments based on Federalist No. 10 can be usefully
restated as follows:  the content of the constitutional principle of
equal protection appropriately varies across polities of different size
when the political malfunction that equal protection seeks to remedy
is a function of the polity’s size, and “factionalism” is one such politi-
cal malfunction.  This logic can be generalized:  to the extent a consti-
tutional principle remedies the political malfunction of majoritarian-
ism, there is a prima facie basis for concluding that the principle
should be Tailored depending upon the level of government whose
activity is being reviewed.
ii.  Komesar’s “two-force” model of politics
Professor Neil Komesar has propounded a rich theory of politics
that builds on public choice’s interest group theory.  Komesar identi-
fies political malfunctions and construes various constitutional princi-
ples as remedies for certain types of political malfunctions.  His ac-
count suggests that the nature and extent of political failure is a
function of the level of government that has acted.  It follows that
constitutional doctrines also may vary in accordance with the level of
government that has acted.
Komesar identifies two types of political malfunctions:  “majori-
tarian” and “minoritarian” bias.318  Minoritarian bias refers to the legis-
lative distortions recognized by interest group politics:  the ability of
315
Id.
316
See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Adarand and Croson).
317
See supra Part III.B.1.  As discussed above, Justice Scalia abandoned this analysis
in Adarand when he embraced the principle of congruence.  See id.
318
KOMESAR, supra note 271, at 60-70.
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groups with small numbers but high stakes to organize and success-
fully lobby for laws that benefit them, at the expense of a diffuse ma-
jority that fails to press its interests due to the transaction costs of or-
ganizing a large group, free-rider problems, and relatively low per
capita stakes.319  Majoritarian bias, as discussed above, is the converse
situation of numerical majorities winning laws that advance their in-
terests at the expense of minorities.320  Komesar astutely notes that de-
termining whether any given policy is an instance of legitimate gov-
ernmental response to majority desires (“majoritarian influence,”
which is not a political malfunction) or illegitimate invasion of minor-
ity interests at the behest of the majority (the political malfunction of
“majoritarian bias”) turns on the normative metric used to evaluate
the governmental action.321  The same need for a normative baseline
besets efforts to distinguish minoritarian influence from minoritarian
bias.322  Though the line between welcome influence and dysfunc-
tional bias thus is bound to be deeply contested, Komesar is probably
right when he states that there is a “pervasive, though amorphous, in-
tuition that both simply counting noses without considering the de-
gree or extent of impacts [majoritarianism] and simply ministering to
the desires of the active few [minoritarianism] can sometimes lead to
severe injustice.”323
For present purposes we need not establish what normative base-
line is appropriate.  What matters instead is that we have an under-
standing of the dynamics of majoritarian and minoritarian influence
on the political process.  Under Komesar’s account, the nature and
extent of each type of influence systematically varies on the basis of
which level of government is acting.  This suggests that there is a
prima facie basis for concluding that multilevel constitutional doc-
trines may vary in their application depending on which level of gov-
ernment is acting.
319
KOMESAR, supra note 306, at 54-58; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Public Choice Revisited, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1718 (1998) (book review) (noting that
“the free-riding problem is inversely related to the size of the group”).
320
See supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
321
KOMESAR, supra note 306, at 80; see also id. at 56 n.5 (“Whether the influence of
either the few or the many is disproportionate depends on the social goal in ques-
tion.”).
322
See id. at 80 (noting that “the normative implications” of the model he has de-
veloped, including “characterizations like majoritarian or minoritarian bias,” may de-
pend on “the choice of a goal”).
323
Id. at 81.
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Under Komesar’s analysis, whether majoritarian or minoritarian
influence prevails in a given situation is a function of the costs and
benefits of participating in the political process that are faced by the
majority and minority.324  The costs are a function of the size and
complexity of the political process (which is a function of the number
of legislators, “frequency of election, size and scope of the legislative
agenda, and the rules of the legislature”),325 the complexity of the sub-
stantive issue, and the cost of organizing the group (which is a func-
tion of the group size and the information costs of educating the
group members).326  The relevant benefits of participation are the per
capita stakes and the distribution of the potential benefits.327  The
costs and benefits typically will vary depending upon the size of the
group that shares a common interest.  All other things being equal, it
is easier to organize smaller groups than larger groups because it is
cheaper to educate smaller groups of people and less expensive to
form and police agreements among smaller groups.328  If the benefits
exceed the costs for the minority but not the majority, then minority
influence is likely to prevail over majority influence.  If the benefits
exceed the costs for both the majority and minority, then majority in-
fluence is likely to prevail.329
Importantly, the costs of political participation systematically vary
across different levels of government.330  Information and agency costs
typically increase at higher levels of government.  Compare, for in-
stance, government participation costs at the local versus the federal
level.  Effective political participation is far cheaper at the local level
because lobbying costs are smaller (there are far fewer politicians that
must be lobbied, and the lobbying costs per politician are likely to be
far less expensive insofar as it is cheaper to walk into their offices than
324
See id. at 30.  For a similar analysis of the political economy of land use laws, see
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS:  A PROPERTY RIGHTS AP-
PROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 209, 211-21 (1985), arguing that majori-
tarian bias is the more common form of political malfunction at the suburban level,
and that minoritarian bias is the more likely problem at higher levels of government.
325
KOMESAR, supra note 306, at 73.
326
See KOMESAR, supra note 271, at 62-63 (using these factors to show “why the few
are active and the many are dormant”).
327
KOMESAR, supra note 306, at 68 (calling these “the most important factors” in
“describing political behavior”).
328
Id. at 69.
329
See id. at 226 (“As a general matter, an active majority can overwhelm an active
minority.”).
330
See KOMESAR, supra note 271, at 62 (noting that the likelihood of majoritarian
or minoritarian bias is likely to “vary across political issues and political jurisdictions”).
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to fly to Washington); it is “easier to discipline unwanted action at the
ballot box”331 (because it is easier to hold small numbers of represen-
tatives politically accountable); and the costs of politically organizing a
group of people who feel similarly about a given political issue are
smaller since the size of the group is smaller at the local level.332
Moreover, the information costs associated with attaining sufficient
mastery of the substantive issue so that one can effectively influence
politics typically are smaller at the local level, where the issues are less
complex and the more immediate personal stakes tend to mean that
citizens already have a stock of “general information” that diminishes
the costs of obtaining information about even relatively complex mat-
ters.333  These factors may help explain the robust cross-country, em-
pirical findings of prominent political theorist Robert Dahl and social
scientist Edward Tufte that citizen effectiveness and participation are
far greater at local levels than at the national level.334  In any event,
Dahl and Tufte’s work provides empirical support for Komesar’s pre-
dictions in regard to varying political participation across different
levels of government.
The implication of the preceding analysis is that majoritarian in-
fluence is far more likely to prevail over the interests of numerical mi-
norities in smaller governmental units than in larger units.  Because
the costs of political participation are smaller in smaller governmental
units, majorities can be expected to participate, and hence exert de-
terminative influence by virtue of their numbers, even when per cap-
ita stakes are relatively small.  Conversely, minoritarian influence is
more likely to prevail in larger governmental units, where the costs of
political participation are high, per capita benefits frequently are low,
and free-rider obstacles may hinder if not wholly bar effective political
organization by the majority, leaving only small groups with high per
capita interests to politically organize and affect policy.  To be sure,
what is significant under Komesar’s analysis is not the legal status of
331
Id. at 63.
332
This analysis simplifies matters somewhat.  There are some mediating institu-
tions (such as public interest groups) that represent “common” interests.  Such groups,
however, tend to operate mostly at the federal level.  Moreover, many “common” in-
terests are not represented by any such mediating institutions.
333
See KOMESAR, supra note 271, at 63 (noting that a citizen’s stock of information
is “determined by culture, formal education, and the coverage of the press and me-
dia”).
334
See ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 65 (1973)
(“The effects of unit size on participation and effectiveness are . . . important within
countries.”).
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the polity but its physical size; for instance, majoritarian influence is
more likely to prevail in a rural county than a large metropolitan city.
Nonetheless, generalizations certainly can be made with respect to
federal, state, and local governments.  For example, minoritarian in-
fluence is more likely to prevail at the federal level than at subfederal
levels.335
Understanding the nature of the political malfunction is impor-
tant to constitutional analysis under Komesar’s approach because he
suggests that many constitutional principles are remedies for particu-
lar types of political malfunctions.  The Anti-Federalists were con-
cerned with curbing minoritarian bias,336 but the Constitution that was
adopted ultimately reflected the Federalists’ concern with controlling
majoritarian bias.337  In keeping with the Constitution’s general anti-
majoritarianism tendency, Komesar suggests that the Takings Clause is
best understood as a protection against majoritarian bias.338  Indeed,
Komesar argues that the Takings Clause’s requirement of just com-
pensation is structured in a manner that “corrects majoritarian bias,
not minoritarian bias.”339  How so?  The requirement of just compen-
sation imposes a cost on all taxpayers—the majority—hence eliminat-
ing the majority’s incentive to take from the minority.  Compensation
would not, however, discourage minoritarian bias because the pro rata
tax increase small groups would bear by virtue of the Takings Clause’s
compensation requirement is smaller than the benefits they could
reap by the taking.340  Indeed, a judicially administered compensation
requirement itself creates new opportunities for minoritarian bias in-
sofar as the judicial process is complex and costly.341  This suggests that
335
Komesar notes, of course, that political issues sometimes generate sufficient
public interest so that majoritarian interests are reflected in federal legislation.
KOMESAR, supra note 306, at 54.  Indeed, this observation propels Komesar to augment
the interest group model of politics, which previously focused solely on minoritarian
bias.  See id. (explaining that his theory accounts for both minoritarian and majori-
tarian influences).
336
See id. at 219-20 (noting that, to this end, the Anti-Federalists sought “rotation
in office, shorter terms, the possibility of recall, and easier impeachment” for the indi-
rectly elected senators).
337 See id. at 220 (observing that the Anti-Federalists’ proposals were not adopted
“because the dominant Federalists feared majoritarian bias more than they feared mi-
noritarian bias”).
338
Id. at 244.
339
KOMESAR, supra note 271, at 95.
340
See id. at 95-97 (arguing that in a system biased toward minoritarianism, “the
availability of compensation may itself create negative-sum, rent-seeking government
action”).
341
See id. at 98 (arguing that under Epstein’s “massive compensation program, the
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if the Takings Clause were utilized to correct minoritarian bias, it not
only would fail in its mission but perversely would make matters
worse.342  Komesar accordingly argues that the takings doctrine should
be understood as a remedy for majoritarian bias, and that courts ap-
plying the takings doctrine should review local regulations more
strictly than federal regulations because majoritarian bias is far more
likely to occur at lower levels of government.343
*          *          *
To briefly conclude, the analyses of Madison, Fischel, and Kome-
sar converge on the following principle:  constitutional principles de-
signed to correct political malfunctions should vary in their applica-
tion if the malfunctions they aim to remedy vary systematically from
one level of government to another.
2.  Prophylactic Rules
It is widely thought that many constitutional doctrines, particu-
larly those relating to criminal procedure,344 are prophylactic rules de-
signed to insure against constitutional violations by governmental ac-
tors, particularly members of the executive branch such as police and
prosecutors, when they implement government policy.345  Prophylactic
possibility that just compensation will aggravate minoritarian bias seems significant”).
342
See id. (arguing that Epstein’s one-force model “threatens to increase malfunc-
tion”).
343
See id. (citing approvingly Fischel’s proposal because it is limited to local land
use regulations, which are “more likely to be subject to majoritarian bias”).
344
Prophylactic rules are not limited, however, to criminal procedure.  For a dis-
cussion of prophylactic rules in the context of speech and equal protection, see David
A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 195-207 (1988).
345
For a sampling of such scholarship, see Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in
Criminal Procedure:  A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100 (1985); Su-
san R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental
Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1037-44 (2001); Brian
K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights:  The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules,
66 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1999); Strauss, supra note 344, at 190.  But see Evan H.
Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2
(2001) (arguing that “there is no difference in kind, or meaningful difference in de-
gree, between Miranda’s so-called prophylactic rule and the run-of-the-mill judicial
doctrines routinely constructed by the Court”).  Professor Caminker’s argument can
be viewed as an extension of the point made by Professor Strauss in 1988.
Consistent with this Article’s methodology of identifying competing approaches to
ordering social life without deciding among them, I need not here take sides on the
issue of whether constitutional doctrine generated by the Supreme Court is by nature
prophylactic in character.  Regardless of whether prophylactic rules are occasional,
ubiquitous, or omnipresent, the same question arises as to the appropriate scope of a
doctrine’s ban on activities that in and of themselves are  constitutional.  As argued
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rules prohibit behaviors that in themselves are not unconstitutional,
or require behaviors that in themselves are not constitutionally man-
dated, for the sake of ensuring that actual constitutional violations do
not occur.  Prophylactic rules hence “overprotect[] the constitutional
clause at issue.”346  The Miranda warnings long were understood as
paradigmatic prophylactic requirements.347
The Court has not articulated a coherent theory regarding pro-
phylactic rules.348  This has led to a sizable amount of scholarly discus-
sion of the subject.349  The first generation of scholarship identified
the phenomenon of prophylactic rules and debated their legitimacy.350
The scholarly consensus today is that the Court has the power to fash-
ion such rules.351  The second generation of scholarship has consid-
ered the appropriate scope of prophylactic rules.352  Although not
much has been written yet on this subject, several commentators’
analyses, as well as good sense, suggest that the scope of a given pro-
phylactic rule may appropriately vary depending upon the level of
government to which the rule is to be applied.
a.  The need to overprotect constitutional rights
Klein, for example, has argued that prophylactic rules are appro-
priate when “the Court finds that it cannot otherwise protect a par-
ticular constitutional clause,” but notes that “[a]lthough in such situa-
tions some prophylactic rule is necessary, no particular rule is
below, Tailoring is prima facie sensible to the extent that either the likelihood of mis-
behavior, or the costs of overprotecting, vary across the different levels of government.
346
Klein, supra note 345, at 1033.
347
The Court’s opinion in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), however,
muddied the waters with regard to the status of the Miranda warnings.  For a fine dis-
cussion, see Klein, supra note 345, at 1071-76.
348
In fact, the Court has not spoken with one voice as to whether, in its view, pro-
phylactic rules are legitimate.
349
See, for example, the sources referenced above in note 345.
350
See, e.g., Grano, supra note 345, at 163 (arguing that prophylactic rules are be-
yond the appropriate scope of powers of Article III courts); Strauss, supra note 344, at
206-09 (noting the “ubiquity” of prophylactic rules in an effort to establish their le-
gitimacy).
351
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 345, at 1035 (“[G]enerating constitutional prophylac-
tic rules and incidental rights to protect constitutional values is a beneficial and neces-
sary function of the judiciary.”).  Not all Justices agree.  Justices Scalia and Thomas ap-
pear to be of the view that prophylactic rules are beyond the Court’s proper powers.
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (asserting that the
Court’s issuance of prophylactic restrictions constitutes “an immense and frightening
antidemocratic power” that “does not exist”).
352
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 345, at 1031; Landsberg, supra note 345, at 963-76.
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required—only one that is ‘effective.’”353  Klein accordingly concludes
that prophylactic rules can be modified “as changed circumstances
and new data generated by social scientists mandate.”354  Furthermore,
the Court can “change the rules by accepting alternate rules provided
by Congress, state legislators, federal and state law enforcement agen-
cies and state judges, who may have better knowledge of the circum-
stances encountered or facts on the ground.”355  Indeed, Klein shows
several instances where the Court has adopted a prophylactic rule and
then “signal[ed]”356 to other federal or state actors that they could
adopt alternative strategies for protecting the core constitutional right
that the Court’s prophylactic rule protected.357  In some instances
states and the federal executive have responded, “attempt[ing] to in-
stitute substitute procedures” for the prophylactic rule laid down by
the Court.358  Not surprisingly, these responses were neither coordi-
nated nor identical, resulting in the federal executive branch and the
different states adopting different procedures.359
Klein’s reasoning suggests that it might be appropriate to Tailor
prophylactic rules to the different levels of government to which the
rules apply.  On her account, prophylactic rules are pragmatic at-
tempts to guard constitutional rights, and a prophylactic rule’s scope
is determined by whatever the “circumstances” require so that the rule
is “effective” in accomplishing its protective goal.  The question be-
comes whether the circumstances that call for prophylactic rules
might systematically vary across the different levels of government.
Might there, for example, be consistent differences across workers at
the different levels of government with regard to such variables as
training, skill, accountability to the public, and so forth?  If so, the
risks of constitutional violation accordingly may vary across the differ-
ent levels of government.
The answer ultimately is empirical in nature, and it might well
vary across subject matter.  There seems to be little reason, however,
to conclusively presume identicality as among the different levels of
353
Klein, supra note 345, at 1060.
354
Id.
355
Id.
356
Id. at 1054.
357
See id. at 1054-59 (providing examples of how the Court has encouraged Con-
gress and the states to fashion their own prophylactic rules and discussing their suc-
cess).
358
Id. at 1055.
359
Id.
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government across all relevant variables, as the contemporary doctrine
of One-Size-Fits-All does.  In the end, considerations of administrabil-
ity might lead to the conclusion that the Court should not draft one
set of prophylactic rules for federal actors and a different set for state
actors.  But it should be understood that such an election to adopt a
One-Size-Fits-All approach to prophylactic rules is driven by pragmat-
ics rather than conceptual necessity.  Legalists accordingly should be
open to the possibility that there may be sufficient differences across
levels of government in some circumstances to justify Tailoring.
b.  The costs of overprotection
Whereas Klein’s analysis focuses primarily on what is necessary to
protect the constitutional right, it also might be wise to take account
of the potential costs of overprotection.360  Landsberg suggestively in-
vokes the concept of “proportionality,”361 which the Court has utilized
to limit Congress’s powers to enact prophylactic legislation pursuant
to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,362 as a
guide.  Though proportionality is notoriously difficult to specify, the
concept that serves as its foundation is instructive in the present con-
text.  One factor relevant to a proportionality analysis is, as under Pro-
fessor Klein’s approach, the likelihood of constitutional violation ab-
sent some prophylactic rule.  Proportionality also bids the analyst to
consider the costs of overprotection imposed by the prophylactic
rule.363  Overprotection costs refer to the liberty sacrifices that attend
proscribing (or requiring) behaviors that themselves are not constitu-
tionally proscribed (or required) for the sake of protecting against
constitutional violations, as well as the consequences of those pro-
scribed or required behaviors.  For instance, the exclusionary remedy
is a prophylactic rule whose overprotection costs include withholding
360
Consideration of such costs is not wholly absent from Klein’s analysis, see, e.g.,
id. at 1033 (prophylactic rules must be “more effective” than no rule in guarding
against constitutional violations and “involve only acceptable costs”), but they receive
little direct attention throughout the article.
361
Landsberg, supra note 345, at 966-67.
362
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end.”).
363
See Strauss, supra note 344, at 193 n.12 (“The error costs would be the costs of
violating or overprotecting constitutional rights, discounted by the respective prob-
abilities of those errors; the administrative costs would be the costs to the courts, par-
ties, witnesses, etc. of operating under the rule in question.”).
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relevant evidence during prosecution and possibly keeping dangerous
persons on the street instead of in prison.
In assessing whether a given prophylactic rule was appropriate in
scope, a proportionality analysis thus would take account of the prob-
ability of a constitutional violation, the cost of any such violation, and
the overprotection costs.  I do not mean to suggest that these various
considerations can be reduced to a common metric and readily bal-
anced; surely the “costs” of a constitutional violation and the “costs” of
overprotection are incommensurable.364  I simply mean that a propor-
tionality analysis would take account of the costs of overprotection in
the same way that courts typically take account of incommensurable
considerations when they decide cases.365
Common sense suggests that some overprotection costs may sys-
tematically vary depending upon which level of government is acting.
Such costs are a function of what the government is attempting to ac-
complish.  A prophylactic rule might hinder the government’s ability
to accomplish a particular task, and the rule’s overprotection cost will
be a function of the value of that task.  Tailoring is implicated to the
extent that different levels of government may be responsible for dif-
ferent tasks that have dissimilar values.  As discussed above, Justice
Jackson and Justice Harlan made exactly this point.366  To provide a
concrete example, compare specialized federal agencies and local
governments.  Imagine a federal agency responsible exclusively for
preventing and investigating terrorism.  The overprotection costs of a
prophylactic rule that interfered with the agency’s discharge of its
duty would not be identical to the overprotection costs of the same
rule in respect of local law enforcement’s solving of petty crimes.367
364
See Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 110, 110 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997) [hereinaf-
ter INCOMMENSURABILITY] (“Incommensurability is the absence of a common meas-
ure.”).
365
See Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1367, 1374 (2001) (“Judges routinely seek to accomplish the impossi-
ble—to commensurate incommensurable values.  That they attempt to do so with
regularity says something important about the problems of incommensurability,
namely that such problems do not foreclose reasoned deliberation and choice.”).  For
an enlightening discussion of how decision makers can decide among incommensura-
ble options, see Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in IN-
COMMENSURABILITY, supra note 364, at 151, 151-69 (focusing on individual decision
making under circumstances of incommensurability).
366
See supra Part III.A.
367
Time and circumstances will determine which cost is greater.  Compare Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114
HARV. L. REV. 842, 847-48 (2001), which criticizes contemporary doctrine on the basis
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The point is that there is no good reason to conclusively assume
that overprotection costs are identical across different levels of gov-
ernment.  To the extent they are not, a proportionality analysis sup-
ports the Tailoring of prophylactic rules.  Once again, administrability
concerns might suggest that it is not wise to create different prophy-
lactic rules for different levels of government.  Such a conclusion
should be recognized, however, for what it is:  a pragmatic determina-
tion, and not a judgment of what the Constitution requires as an a
priori matter.  Indeed, the notion that federal authorities can be sub-
jected to different prophylactic rules than state and local authorities
might be particularly relevant in our post-9/11 world.  There is a prin-
cipled basis for concluding that a federal antiterrorism agency popu-
lated by highly trained experts could be subject to less stringent pro-
phylactic limitations than local police departments, owing to the
federal agents’ higher training and the greater overprotection costs
resulting from the agency’s responsibility.
B.  Different Geographical Scope
Another difference among the various levels of government is the
geographical scope to which their regulations and other activities ap-
ply.  For example, Congress’s statutes apply nationwide, whereas Chi-
cago’s ordinances for the most part apply only within the territorial
borders of Chicago.368  It is conceivable that the varying geographical
scope of different levels of government could be constitutionally sig-
nificant such that Tailoring is appropriate.
1.  Varying Risks and Benefits
The risks and benefits of a regulation are frequently a function of
its geographical scope.  With regard to risks, consider a regulation
banning a particular book on the ground that it is obscene.  One con-
that while “the Fourth Amendment treats one crime just like another . . .  one crime is
not just like another.  The Fourth Amendment forbids ‘unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.’  Reasonableness here, as elsewhere in law, requires a balance of gains and
losses, benefits and costs.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  Stuntz notes that the benefits of
capturing a murderer are “strikingly different” from those of jailing persons who sell
marijuana from their homes.  Id.
368 A caveat is in order:  polities have the power to regulate extraterritorially to a
certain degree.  See generally Rosen, supra note 227, at 877-91, 945-55 (discussing the
state interest in preventing out-of-state activities from subverting state policies, as well
as the problems that arise from our system of concurrent jurisdiction).  In general,
however, the statement in the text above is correct.
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stitutional concern of such a regulation is that it interferes with the
marketplace of ideas or art.  The quantum of the constitutionally
problematic interference is smaller if the regulation is the product of
a municipality rather than the federal government, because a nation-
wide proscription interferes with these interests more than a city-wide
prohibition does.  This was Justice Harlan’s point in his dissent in Roth
v. United States:369
[I]t seems to me that no overwhelming danger to our freedom to ex-
periment and to gratify our tastes in literature is likely to result from the
suppression of a borderline book in one of the States, so long as there is
no uniform nation-wide suppression of the book, and so long as other
States are free to experiment with the same or bolder books.
370
Justice Harlan’s statement contains both a positive and an evalua-
tive statement.  As to the former, it seems undeniable that there is a
difference in point of fact between the consequences that attend a local
proscription and a nationwide ban.  As to the evaluative question of
whether this difference in fact ought to be of legal significance, I do
not intend here to argue that Justice Harlan’s judgment was correct.
A legal doctrine that categorically ignores such differences, however,
cannot plausibly be said to be self-evidently correct, for the conse-
quences of these differences may go to the heart of what the constitu-
tional principle aims to guard.  When this is the case, logic suggests
that there must be an argument proffered as to why regulations ema-
nating from two differently situated polities ought to be treated iden-
tically by constitutional doctrine.  Justice Harlan’s dissent provides a
reasoned explanation as to why they should not.  The Roth majority,
however, did not find it necessary to explain why it adopted a One-
Size-Fits-All approach.371  One need not concur with Justice Harlan’s
ultimate evaluation to agree that a categorical and unexplained One-
Size-Fits-All approach is problematic in view of the undeniable differ-
369
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
370
Id. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  It is possible, of course, that a patchwork of
regulations could lead to de facto nationwide banning if national retailers decided not
to stock works that were prohibited in any of the markets in which they did business.
On the other hand, there remain independent vendors in most locales, and a decision
by Barnes & Noble or Amazon.com not to stock such works would possibly serve only
to deepen the independent vendors’ market appeal.
371
See id. at 479-94.  Much of the analysis in Roth presumes the identicality of con-
stitutional standards as they apply to the states and to the federal government.  See, e.g.,
id. at 482 (looking to the “guaranties of freedom of expression” in effect in the states
that ratified the Constitution to shed light on the meaning of the First Amendment);
id. at 488 (speaking of the need to bar “federal and state intrusion into” the “funda-
mental freedoms of speech and press”).
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ences that attend the varying geographical scopes of federal and state
regulation.
Next consider the linkage between benefits and geographical
scope.  Think about regulations of hate speech.  In the view of most,
hate speech primarily injures the members of the denigrated group
about which the speech concerns.  Now compare a federal and mu-
nicipal prohibition against Nazi marches.  In the case of a federal ban
on such Nazi activity, the benefits would be diffuse because there
would be potential victims in only a fraction of the places to which the
proscription would apply.  The benefits would be far more concen-
trated if the regulation were adopted by a municipality populated by a
significant percentage of Holocaust survivors.372  These differences as
regards the distribution of benefits frequently can be relevant under
contemporary doctrine.  For example, although it would not be rele-
vant under today’s hate speech doctrine,373 the presence of a heavily
concentrated population with particular needs might be relevant to
establish a “compelling” governmental interest in other contexts.
Conversely, widely dispersed benefits may suggest that a regulation
has not been narrowly tailored.
2.  Varying Expressive Consequences
The “social meaning” of a constitutional rule frequently turns on
the level of government to which it applies.  For expressive theorists,
who believe that social meaning is often an important determinant of
constitutional doctrine,374 the level of government that is acting ac-
cordingly may be a constitutionally significant consideration.375
372
This hypothetical calls to mind, of course, the efforts of the National Socialist
Party of America (an offshoot of the American Nazi Party) to march in Skokie, Illinois,
a predominantly Jewish suburb then populated by a large number of Holocaust survi-
vors.  See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
373
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (1992) (applying a cate-
gorical test that did not rely on heightened scrutiny analysis).  This is not the place to
consider to what extent the case of Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360-63 (2003), may
signal a reworking of the Court’s hate speech jurisprudence.
374
See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 233, at 1551 (arguing that “constitu-
tional practice is pervasively more oriented toward expressive considerations than is
generally recognized”).  As is true with all the approaches to social ordering explored
in this Article, expressivism is not without its critics.  See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expres-
sive Theories of Law:  A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
375
Much of the discussion that follows in this subsection draws on my analysis in
Rosen, supra note 25.
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Expressivists believe it necessary to identify the “social meaning”
of legal doctrine,376 by which they mean the messages that are ex-
pressed by law and that are “recognizable” by citizens.377  Expressivists
are of the view that social meaning is an important determinant of
constitutional doctrine as a purely descriptive matter.  Expressivists be-
lieve this to be a good thing, though they justify this normative con-
clusion on different grounds.  Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes
are of the view that legal doctrine appropriately takes account of social
meaning because expressing messages invariably is part of what law
does.  That is to say, understanding a law’s expressive component is
necessary to fully understand law.378  While Anderson and Pildes de-
liberately try to disassociate expressivism from efforts to identify laws’
“direct cultural effects,”379 apparently due to a concern that courts are
not capable of making such “speculative” judgments,380 other noted
theorists are interested in the ways that law’s social meaning socializes
citizens.  Robert Cooter, for example, speaks of two expressive uses of
law, one of which is “[c]hanging individual values.”381  Similarly, Cass
Sunstein argues that law inevitably and properly is involved in “norm
management,” and in “expressing social values” and the “social
norms” that constitute the political community.382
To understand the possible link between governmental level and
social meaning, consider the Establishment Clause.  It is not difficult
376
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, supra note 111, at 750 ((“[W]hether rights are vio-
lated depends not on material burdens to individual interests but on the social mean-
ing of state action.”).
377
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 233, at 1520-27.  Elizabeth Anderson and Rich-
ard Pildes, among the most important of the expressivist theorists, argue that the social
meanings “do not actually have to be recognized by the community” but only “have to
be recognizable by it, if people were to exercise enough interpretive self-scrutiny.”  Id. at
1525.  For more about their understanding of expression, see Rosen, supra note 25, at
682-84.  For a brief discussion about competing schools of expressivist thought, see id.
at 683-84.
378
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 233, at 1530-31.
379
Id. at 1560.
380
Id.
381
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 (1998).
The other expressive function Cooter mentions is “[c]reating focal points” that lead to
a new equilibrium for a given system of social norms.  Id.  By this, Cooter means law’s
ability to switch behavior without altering the individual’s tastes.  Id. at 595.  Examples
include prohibiting smoking in airports and requiring dog owners to clean up after
their pets.  Id.  It is likely that altering behavior in this way ultimately leads to a change
in societal values, as well.
382
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907, 910
(1996); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996) (examining how law effectuates changes in social norms).
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to show that social meaning varies depending upon which level of
government—federal, state, or local—is barred from doing the “estab-
lishing.”  A constitutional rule prohibiting a national church pre-
cludes the federal government from proclaiming that this is a Chris-
tian country.  A rule that also disallows the establishment of state or
local churches, as our current doctrine does,383 expresses wholesale
disapproval of the intermixing of secular and religious authority.  By
contrast, a rule prohibiting a national church but not limiting subfed-
eral polities—as was the case from the Founding up to the incorpora-
tion of the Establishment Clause against the states384—could be said to
express neutrality on the issue of intermixing insofar as such a rule
disallows a single, nationwide orthodoxy but permits divergent ap-
proaches to flourish at subfederal levels.  Indeed, one could not plau-
sibly have described the American political tradition as expressing
categorical opposition to the intermixing of religious and political
authority during our country’s first century inasmuch as there were
established churches in six states,385 and state and local governments
in many cases paid salaries for clergy.386
For an expressivist, the fact that a constitutional limitation’s social
meaning might vary depending on the level of government to which
the limitation is applied is a prima facie basis for concluding that the
constitutional principle may apply differently to the different levels of
government, i.e., that it may be appropriate to size the constitutional
guarantee.  Whether or not a principle should be Tailored ultimately
turns on normative considerations.  What follows below in Sections C
through E is an examination of how a variety of normative approaches
answers the question of whether Tailoring is proper.  Though these
varying approaches to ordering social life generate divergent policy
prescriptions, they all suggest that Tailoring might sometimes be ap-
propriate.
383
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“[G]overnment may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way
which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’” (second al-
teration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984))); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (“Government in our democracy, state and na-
tional, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.” (empha-
sis added)).
384
Depending on one’s view, this occurred either upon the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s adoption or in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
385
Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U.
L. REV. 1113, 1132 (1988).
386
PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 10 (2002).
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C.  Different Exit Costs
Exit costs are another systemic difference among the various levels
of government that may have constitutional relevance for purposes of
Tailoring.  Common sense suggests that it is easier, both financially
and emotionally, to leave smaller polities than larger ones.  As will be
shown, the empirical data supports this.  As exit costs diminish, it is
increasingly realistic to make two related assumptions:  (1) that citi-
zens make active choices where to live, and (2) that polities compete
among themselves for citizens.  This is deemed to be beneficial by sev-
eral approaches to ordering social life.  Economists (and their law and
economics cousins) argue that such competition among polities leads
to greater efficiencies and greater diversity than does a less competi-
tive system.  Easy exit also is a precondition of the “framework for
utopias” described by libertarian political theorist Robert Nozick.387
What connection do reduced exit costs and the normative com-
mitments that view them favorably have to constitutional interpreta-
tion?  The answer is this:  once it is realized that Tailoring is a doc-
trinal option that is not precluded by the Constitution itself—the
point made in Parts I and II of this Article—whether to Tailor invaria-
bly becomes a question that turns on the constitutional interpreter’s
prelegal commitments.  Under either a law and economics or
Nozickean approach, the nature and extent of exit costs are relevant
to determining the powers and limits of any given level of govern-
ment.  It would follow that a systemic difference in respect of exit costs
would be doctrinally relevant to the interpretation of constitutional
principles that concern the powers and limits of the different levels of
government.  It is in this respect that exit costs are doctrinally relevant
to Tailoring constitutional principles.
1.  Smaller Polities Have Smaller Exit Costs
The term “exit costs”388 refers to the cost of leaving one polity for
another.  In general, it is easier to exit smaller polities than larger
polities.  Moving from a large polity to a new jurisdiction on average
will require a move of a greater distance than will a move from a
smaller polity to a new jurisdiction.  Moving costs generally increase
387
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 312 (1974).  As will be shown
below in Part IV.D, exit also plays a prominent role in John Rawls’s political thought,
though it does not assume the centrality that it plays in the approaches adopted by
economists and Nozick.
388
See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970).
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with the distance of the move.  Many of the nonfinancial costs of mov-
ing also tend to increase with distance moved.  Short moves need not
disrupt networks of friends, family, and job in the way that long-
distant moves typically do.  Short moves do not necessitate the loca-
tion of new doctors, dentists, shopping, and other resources in the way
that longer-distance moves do.
Data concerning mobility support the hypothesis that exit costs
are smaller for shorter moves.  To begin, it is worthwhile to note that
the evidence shows that Americans move a great deal.  Between March
1999 and March 2000, for instance, 43.4 million Americans moved.389
This amounts to 16.1% of the entire population.390  This is not un-
usual.  From 1990 to 2000, the percentage of the population that has
moved on a yearly basis has ranged from 15.9% to 17.3%.391  Interest-
ingly, the likelihood of moving is inversely proportional to income.
Between March 1999 and March 2000, “[p]eople living in households
in lower-income categories were more likely to move than those in
higher-income categories:  21 percent for incomes under $25,000,
compared with 12 percent for incomes over $100,000,” and “[t]hose
with income below the poverty level were more likely to have moved
(28 percent) than those with income 150 percent above the poverty
level or higher (14 percent).”392
Now consider the distribution with respect to distance moved.  Be-
tween March 1999 and March 2000, approximately 56% of the moves
were local, meaning within the same county, and an additional 20%
were between counties in the same state.393  About 19% were moves to
a different state.394  Approximately 4% of all moves were from outside
the country.395  Unfortunately, census figures do not distinguish be-
tween those intra-county moves that are intra-municipality and those
that are inter-municipality.  Working with similar data from a few years
before, however, one noted commentator wrote that “a conservative
389
See JASON SCHACHTER, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, PUB. NO. P20-538, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY:  MARCH 1999 TO MARCH 2000,
at 1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-538.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2005).
390
Id. at 2.
391
Id.
392
Id. at 4-5.
393
Id. at 1.
394
Id.
395
Id.
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estimate is that approximately 20% of the population will move to a
different political jurisdiction in a five-year period.”396
In short, Americans are quite mobile.  Most moves are short-
distance; the mobility rate diminishes with distance moved.  This sup-
ports the hypothesis that Americans exercise “exit” from their home
jurisdictions with significant regularity.  This is also consistent with the
hypothesis that exit from smaller jurisdictions is cheaper than exit
from larger jurisdictions, though it admittedly does not establish a
causal link between exit costs and distance of move.
2.  Law and Economics
Economists have long conceptualized the federal political struc-
ture as affording the possibility of a competition among subfederal ju-
risdictions.  In a seminal article, economist Charles Tiebout theorized
that local governments compete for citizens by offering different
packages of public goods.397  Competition generates differences across
jurisdictions along two dimensions under this approach.  The first is
efficiency:  jurisdictions will be pressed to deliver their public goods in
a cost-efficient way, or people will move away to reside in another ju-
risdiction that offers the same public goods for less money.  Second,
jurisdictions will try to differentiate themselves by offering different
packages of public goods, which will appeal to different types of citi-
zens.  This competition among jurisdictions is normatively desirable in
Tiebout’s view for two reasons.  First, ceteris paribus, the efficient provi-
sion of goods is preferable to less efficient provision.398  Second,
greater numbers of options increase consumer welfare:  those who
value public good A can locate themselves in a jurisdiction that pro-
vides it; and those who do not value public good A can live in a polity
that does not provide it so that they will not have to pay for something
they do not value.399
Like all economic models, Tiebout’s was based on specified ideal
conditions that are not fully reflected in the real world.400  Tiebout’s
396
Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:  Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 518 n.210 (1991).
397
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
398
See id. at 421 (noting that “changes in the costs of one of the public services will
cause changes in the quantity produced”).
399
See id. at 418-22 (explaining the economic costs of mobility).
400
Tiebout assumed that (1) consumers had full knowledge about different loca-
tions, (2) people were fully and costlessly mobile, (3) they lived on dividend income,
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model has been criticized on the basis that the real world’s deviations
from the model’s assumptions fatally undermine the model’s utility.401
Two points merit mention.  First, notwithstanding the fact that the
real world is far more complex than the conditions idealized in Tie-
bout’s model, there is a substantial body of empirical data that “pro-
vide substantial proof that local jurisdictions do compete for resi-
dents”402 and “support[] the core Tiebout proposition that
jurisdictions compete for residents by attempting to offer desirable
public service/tax packages.”403
so employment opportunities were not a factor, (4) there were a large number of
communities, (5) the different communities did not impose externalities, (6) for every
package of community services, there was an optimal community size for the provision
of those goods, and (7) communities will seek to attract new residents only where
those communities are below the optimum size.  Id. at 419.  For a slightly modified re-
statement of Tiebout’s conditions and a clear explanation, see Robert P. Inman &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
CHOICE 73-106 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
401
Some have argued that even if the model’s assumptions sufficiently represent
the real world, modeling public policy in economic terms is normatively problematic.
See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING:  BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 168-73 (1999) (criticizing Tiebout’s “consumer-oriented vision of city services”
and the public goods theory of cities); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE
L.J. 617, 636-41 (2002) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS
(2001)) (detailing Fischel’s criticism of Tiebout’s preference hypothesis); Richard
Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1828 (2003) (criticizing
Tiebout’s assumption of perfect mobility).  I’ll not explore the second criticism here;
this Article attempts to show how competing normative approaches would analyze Tai-
loring, not to criticize or defend the competing approaches.
402 Been, supra note 396, at 515.  According to Been:
Evidence whether communities compete for residents primarily stems from
the efforts of scores of economists and political scientists to test the accuracy
of Tiebout’s theory that citizens’ opportunities to “vote with their feet” will re-
sult in the efficient provision of public goods by local governments.  Those
studies provide substantial proof that local jurisdictions do compete for resi-
dents.
Id. at 514-15 (footnote omitted).
403
Id. at 527-28.  Been surveys multiple empirical studies and concludes that
data about the extent to which differences in public service expenditures and
taxes are capitalized into house values, data about the relationship between
migration patterns and fiscal characteristics of communities, and data about
the increasing homogeneity of communities all support the proposition that
consumers consider a community’s public service and tax packages when they
choose where to live. . . . [T]he fact that consumers shop for a public service
and tax package is strong evidence supporting the core Tiebout proposition
that jurisdictions compete for residents by attempting to offer desirable public
service/tax packages.
Id.
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The second point relates directly to Tailoring.  One of the Tie-
bout model’s assumptions is the absence of exit costs.  Although there
obviously are exit costs in the real world, the quantity of costs is a
function of the size of the polity from which a person exits.  This is
crucial for Tiebout’s analysis, since remaining or exiting is the
mechanism by which “voter-consumers” choose a bundle of public
goods.404  Such choice is what induces polities to spend efficiently and
to differentiate themselves in respect of the public goods they offer.  If
exit is not a realistic possibility, these “market” checks on polities are
lost.  It follows that the potential benefits identified by Tiebout likely
are a function of exit costs and, correspondingly, the size of the polity
under consideration.  For instance, localities will be subject to the
market pressure of citizen-consumers more than will the United States
since smaller exit costs mean that inter-city moves are more likely than
international relocations.
These insights have implications for economic analyses of consti-
tutional law.  Under a law and economics methodology, constitutional
principles are construed to generate welfare-enhancing results.405
Tieboutian analysis is relevant to the interpretation of constitutional
principles that bear on the powers of the different levels of govern-
ment.  Welfare is enhanced by permitting a competition among juris-
dictions in circumstances where voter-consumers realistically can ex-
ercise an exit option.  There is no a priori reason to exclude policies
that implicate constitutional principles from the mix of public goods
with respect to which polities can compete.  Competition cannot be
expected to occur, however, where exit is not a realistic option.
Taken together, this analysis suggests that the systemic differences in
exit costs across different levels of government are a prima facie basis
for Tailoring constitutional principles to different levels of govern-
ment.  Generally speaking, there is less need for judicially enforced
404
Professor William A. Fischel’s new book builds on Tiebout’s model, but offers
an important modification of it.  Fischel replaces Tiebout’s assumption of perfect mo-
bility with the assumption that local governments must be able to restrict new immi-
grants so as to keep each polity scarce.  See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS:  HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION,
SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES 51-57 (2001) (explaining how local gov-
ernments employ zoning practices to constrain the depletion of resources).  This does
not undermine the point made above in the text, however, concerning exit costs.
Though the demands of scarcity mean for Fischel that not everyone who wishes to en-
ter a given locale will be able to, local governments will be subjected to market pres-
sures only if exit is possible.
405
See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 1-13 (2000) (arguing
that constitutions create political incentives that enhance liberty and prosperity).
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constitutional protections at lower levels of government, where exit
costs are lower.406  As Robert Cooter recently put it:
In general, escaping jurisdiction by a less comprehensive government is
easier than escaping jurisdiction by a more comprehensive government.
Differences in the cost of exit from different levels of government justify
different degrees of vigilance by courts in protecting individual liber-
ties. . . . The “exit principle” implies the “federalism of individual rights,”
by which I mean that courts should tolerate more interference with indi-
vidual liberty when the effects are localized.
407
In short, under a Tieboutian analysis, there are two reasons why
constitutional principles should be Tailored so that the policies of
smaller polities are more deferentially reviewed than regulations from
larger polities.  First, the threat of exit tames polities’ policy choice;
and the threat of exit is more viable at smaller levels of government,
where exit costs are smaller.  Second, greater deference to lower levels
of government allows for a broader range of regulations at lower levels
of government.  Citizens accordingly have more options to select
among, thereby increasing the welfare of voter-consumers.
To be sure, Cooter’s application of Tieboutian principles to con-
stitutional law leaves unanswered many important questions.  For ex-
ample, should every constitutional guarantee be amenable to Tailor-
ing?  Are there any firm floors below which a constitutional protection
could not be Tailored?  If so, what justifies them?  The absence of
ready replies to these questions means that they require more serious
thought, not necessarily that no good answers can be supplied.  It is
not surprising that such basic questions remain open, for there has
been virtually no scholarly attention paid to Tailoring until now.408
Consistent with this Article’s limited focus, I will not attempt to answer
406
But consider Komesar and Fischel, two economists who, at least in the takings
context, advocate more active judicial review of smaller polities.  See FISCHEL, supra
note 283, at 131-35 (explaining that there is a greater need for judicial review in small
local governments); KOMESAR, supra note 271, at 116 (calling for more active judicial
review as a means of controlling majoritarian bias).
407
COOTER, supra note 405, at 323.
408
Indeed, a lack of satisfactory responses to foundational questions seems to be
endemic to the field of constitutional law even with regard to issues that have received
vast scholarly attention.  For instance, judges and scholars are still deeply divided over
what modes of interpreting the Constitution are legitimate.  More fundamentally still,
scholars to this day discuss the justification for, and implications of, being bound by
constitutional text that was drafted and enacted by people of another era, see, e.g.,
David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J.
1717 (2003), and debate the justification for the principle of majority rule, see, e.g., Pe-
ters, supra note 310, at 2.
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these particular questions here, particularly since any analysis is likely
to be specific to the constitutional protection at issue.409  What matters
for present purposes is that the economic approach generates a prima
facie case for Tailoring constitutional principles.  This suggests the
wisdom behind modifying a doctrine so that it can be receptive to
such arguments, should they prove to be compelling.  This analysis
accordingly supports the hypothesis that One-Size-Fits-All should be
downgraded from a categorical requirement to a rebuttable presump-
tion.
3.  Robert Nozick’s “Framework for Utopias”
Exit also is a precondition for the social vision of the libertarian
political philosopher Robert Nozick.  Applying Nozickean analysis to
our contemporary constitutional order, the systemic differences across
different levels of polities with respect to exit suggest that limitations
on governmental power ought to vary in accordance with the level of
government that is acting.
Nozick famously argued that the ideal state would establish a
“framework for utopias”410 within which communities could do almost
anything they wanted, subject to only a few caveats.411  Nozick’s vision
takes the form of a federal political structure within which the “cen-
tral” state apparatus has few regulatory powers but the substate regula-
409
Consider, for instance, Cooter’s analysis of free speech protections.  Cooter
provides an economic justification for the constitutional protection of speech.  Speech
is likely to be undersupplied on account of its beneficial externalities, and efficiency
demands broad distribution because it is a nonrivalrous good, whose benefits include
the transmission of ideas and the stimulation of innovation.  COOTER, supra note 405,
at 311.  Cooter argues that speech’s constitutional protection should increase to the
extent there are increasing beneficial externalities and that regulation increases mo-
nopoly power.  Id. at 312.  This justification opens the door to Tailoring because the
determination of whether speech imposes any externalities, and if so whether they are
beneficial or negative, turns on cultural values that might vary from group to group.  If
there are different cultural evaluations of speech that correspond to different groups
that are situated in discrete geographical locations that coincide with political jurisdic-
tions, then an approach designed to maximize preferences would suggest that Tailor-
ing is desirable.  Whether or not one agrees with this analysis, the relevant point is that
the analysis is specific to the particular constitutional guarantee with regard to speech,
and does not shed any light on, for instance, the appropriate scope of the Contract
Clause.
410
NOZICK, supra note 387, at 312.
411
See id. at 320-23 (explaining that communities operating under Nozick’s
framework may still be restricted from engaging in unjustifiable practices such as “pa-
ternalistic intervention into peoples’ lives”).
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tory entities (“associations”412 and “communities”413 in his terminology)
may extensively supervise their members’ behaviors, if they so
choose.414  His solution is driven by two assumptions:  first, that there
are such great differences across individuals that it is impossible that
any single “utopia” would be best for all of them;415 second, that it is
impossible to specify the character of complex social systems in an a
priori fashion, but that the development of a society only can occur in
an evolutionary process.416
Nozick’s solution requires a competition among communities to
attract adherents.417  The competition accomplishes two things.  First,
it permits experimentation and step-by-step refinement.418  Second, it
412
See id. at 299 (defining “association” as “a world in which all the rational inhabi-
tants may leave for any other world they can imagine (in which all the rational inhabi-
tants may leave for any other world they can imagine in which . . .)”).
413
See id. at 307, 309 (using the appellation “community” to describe what Nozick
previously defines as “associations”).
414
See id. at 320-21, which states:
[T]hough there is great liberty to choose among communities, many particu-
lar communities internally may have many restrictions unjustifiable on liber-
tarian grounds:  that is, restrictions which libertairans [sic] would condemn if
they were enforced by a central state apparatus.  For example, paternalistic in-
tervention into people’s lives, restrictions on the range of books which may
circulate in the community, limitations on the kinds of sexual behavior, and
so on.
Below I discuss the question of whether any polity can function in place of the “com-
munities” (and “associations”) that Nozick speaks of, or whether “communities” (and
“associations”) necessarily must be nonpolitical entities.  See infra note 426 and accom-
panying text.
415
Nozick poses the following question:
Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Taylor, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Merton, Yogi
Berra, Allen Ginsburg, Harry Wolfson, Thoreau, Casey Stengel, The Luba-
vitcher Rebbe, Picasso, Moses, Einstein, Hugh Heffner [sic], Socrates, Henry
Ford, Lenny Bruce, Baba Ram Dass, Gandhi, Sir Edmund Hillary, Raymond
Lubitz, Buddha, Frank Sinatra, Columbus, Freud, Norman Mailer, Ayn Rand,
Baron Rothschild, Ted Williams, Thomas Edison, H. L. Mencken, Thomas Jef-
ferson, Ralph Ellison, Bobby Fischer, Emma Goldman, Peter Kropotkin, you,
and your parents.  Is there really one kind of life which is best for each of these
people?  Imagine all of them living in any utiopia you’ve ever seen described
in detail. . . .
The idea that there is one best composite answer . . ., one best society for
everyone to live in, seems to me to be an incredible one.
NOZICK, supra note 387, at 310-11.
416
See id. at 313-15 (arguing that social development must occur by means of “fil-
ter devices” rather than “design devices”).
417
See id. at 302 (noting the parallels between his approach and “the economists’
model of a competitive market” in which there are “[m]any associations competing for
my membership”).
418
See id. at 315-19.
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allows there to be different communities that satisfy the needs of dif-
ferent people, thereby increasing overall welfare.419  One of the crucial
requirements for the framework to succeed is that people can “freely
leav[e] their own community to join another.”420  As shown above, exit
is instrumentally necessary for there to be a competition among juris-
dictions under a Tieboutian analysis.421  Even more than this, exit is a
foundational precondition under Nozick’s libertarian political phi-
losophy.  The core of Nozick’s approach is that “you choose what you
will, with the sole constraint being that others may do the same for
themselves and refuse to stay in the world you have” created.422  This
condition—that “you” can choose the world you want to live in and
others can either remain or “refuse to stay”—is satisfied only if exit is a
real option.
To what extent can Nozick’s approach inform the interpretation
of our Constitution?  Determining the practical applications of
Nozickean theory to our system of government is tricky.  Nozick’s
analysis does not take as a given our Constitution (or any other gov-
ernmental institutions, for that matter).423  Indeed, his approach, if
adopted in its entirety, would require a radical retooling of many as-
pects of our governmental system.424  Nonetheless, Nozick’s framework
still may have policy implications for an analyst wishing to work from
within the United States’s existing governmental institutions and
structure.425
I submit that the following is a faithful application of Nozick’s
analysis to contemporary American constitutional doctrine.  The
framework for utopias, under which each association under the
419
See id. at 309 (“[I]f there is a diverse range of communities, then (putting it
roughly) more persons will be able to come closer to how they wish to live, than if
there is only one kind of community.”).
420
Id. at 307; see also id. at 299.
421
See supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text.
422
NOZICK, supra note 387, at 302.
423
Instead, Nozick’s analysis proceeds as a thought-experiment that starts with no
assumptions concerning current institutions, the size of government, and so forth.  See
id. at 297-306 (outlining Nozick’s general framework for utopias).
424
For instance, the central government would have far fewer powers than does
today’s federal government.  See id. at 333 (concluding that only a “minimal state is
morally legitimate” because “any more extensive state would (will) violate the rights of
individuals”).  Below I discuss what Nozick’s analysis implies about subfederal polities.
425
American legal scholars certainly appear to believe this to be true.  A recent
Westlaw search of references to Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia uncovered more
than 1200 citations.  Westlaw search (Nozick /3 Anarchy) conducted on January 20,
2005, in Journals and Law Reviews library (1263 citations).
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minimal central government may extensively regulate its members,
requires low exit costs from association to association.  Small subfed-
eral polities, with respect to which exit costs are minimal, may be
rough contemporary substitutes for Nozick’s “associations.”426  Under
this approach, states would be too large to qualify as associations, but
many municipalities likely would qualify, as would smaller forms of lo-
cal government such as villages.  Nozick’s analysis thus suggests that
qualifying small polities should be granted more extensive regulatory
powers than large polities.  Under our contemporary constitutional
order—where the Constitution’s constraints have been incorporated
against the subfederal polities—Nozick’s analysis accordingly suggests
that constitutional principles should be Tailored, such that qualifying
small polities be permitted more regulatory powers than larger poli-
ties.
D.  Different “We’s” and Democratic Theory
Another systemic difference across different levels of government
that might justify Tailoring is the number and identity of the polity’s
citizens.  Each polity is constituted by a different “we.”  The varying
number and identity of citizens that are represented in a particular
polity can have significant consequences in respect of democratic the-
ory.  A limitation on one level of government accordingly might have
very different democratic effects when it is applied to another level.
426
Indeed, there might not be very much difference at all between small polities
and Nozickean associations.  Associations are permitted to redistribute wealth and ex-
ert other coercive powers over a person for as long as she remains a member.  See id. at
321.  The social dynamics of “face-to-face communities” provide a justification for why
such communities appropriately have regulatory powers over those persons who situate
themselves within the community even as against an individual’s desire not to be regu-
lated.  In face-to-face communities, “one cannot avoid being directly confronted with
what one finds to be offensive [in another person’s actions].  How one lives in one’s
immediate environment is affected.”  Id. at 322.  The inevitability of externalities in
face-to-face communities accordingly gives rise to communal power to regulate all
those who locate themselves within the community.  Such coercive power within a
fixed territory is one of the core characteristics of a “state” for Nozick.  See id. at 22-25
(distinguishing a private “protective association” from a “state” on the ground that a
state has coercive power over all citizens whereas a protective association has power
only in respect of those individuals who decide to pay for its protection, and thus may
be unable to exercise power over all people in a given geographical location).
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1.  Outsiders’ Extraterritorial Interference Versus
Insiders’ Self-Regulation
A cornerstone of democratic theory is that, with only limited ex-
ceptions, a political community has the right to create laws that bind
the entire community if a majority of its members (or its representa-
tives) desires the law.427  This is paradigmatic democratic self-
governance by the political community.  Conversely, it is violative of
basic democratic principles for outsiders of the political community to
dictate laws to the community.  Such regulations may be thought of as
extraterritorial in nature, and are just a step away from the “taxation
without representation” that so vexed our country’s forefathers.  It fol-
lows that a particular regulation could constitute either democratic
self-governance or its converse, depending upon which polity enacted
it.  Stated differently, the determinant of a regulation’s consistency
with democratic ideals sometimes may be a function of which polity
acted, not the content of the regulation itself.  A constitutional prin-
ciple that aims at securing democratic principles against interference
by outsiders—and there are some, as we shall see below—accordingly
would have to be cognizant of which level of government acted.  In
fact, One-Size-Fits-All would be absolutely unsuitable for such a consti-
tutional principle.
The crucial step in determining whether a particular regulation
constitutes acceptable democratic self-governance or problematic ex-
traterritorial governance is defining the relevant political community.
After all, a regulation that comes from “outsiders” when the political
community is conceptualized as being small can be viewed as an ex-
emplar of self-governance if the relevant political community is more
broadly characterized so as to encompass the (former) outsiders.
Determining what is the relevant political community is compli-
cated in the United States’s federal system because each person simul-
taneously belongs to multiple political communities—federal and, for
most people, state and local political communities as well.428  In the
end, identifying the relevant political community for purposes of de-
termining if a particular regulation instantiates democratic self-
427
For a sophisticated contrary view, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 11-31 (2004).
428
Most people, but not everybody.  For example, citizens of Puerto Rico are citi-
zens of the United States but do not belong to a state.  Also, many people live in unin-
corporated parts of states.  Similarly, Native Americans who live on reservations are
citizens of the United States and the state in which the reservation is located, but are
not citizens of any local governments.
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governance or its antithesis inevitably is highly context-dependent.
Constitutional doctrine that reflects the concern of protecting the in-
tegrity of democratic politics, however, must directly confront the
question of what constitutes the relevant political community if the
doctrine is to be coherent.  Sometimes the context is clear enough,
such that asking the question leads to a straightforward answer.  Even
when it does not, the question of defining the relevant political com-
munity is crucial; identifying the relevant political community is the
tough question that must be answered, and it is better to confront the
real question when tackling difficult constitutional issues.
In this regard, consider the U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton case
discussed above.429  In striking down an amendment to the Arkansas
constitution that was adopted by a ballot initiative, the majority opin-
ion unthinkingly imported a “fundamental” democratic principle that
the Court had developed in the federal context.  The majority’s One-
Size-Fits-All analysis overlooked the crucial question of what consti-
tuted the relevant political community, undermining the cogency of
its argument.
The Court had held in the earlier case of Powell v. McCormack430
that additional qualifications imposed by Congress, which would have
prevented Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. from taking his seat, thwarted the
desires of the majority of voters in New York’s Eighteenth Congres-
sional District, who had elected him.431  In so doing, Congress’s addi-
tional qualifications violated the “fundamental principle of our repre-
sentative democracy” that “the people should choose whom they
please to govern them”432 and accordingly were unconstitutional.  The
Thornton Court concluded that Powell’s principle—that additional
qualifications undermined fundamental democratic principles—
equally applied to conditions (such as term limits) that were imposed
by the states,433 and struck down Arkansas’ amendment on that basis.434
The problem with the Thornton Court’s reasoning is that it failed
to consider who constituted the relevant “people” whose choice had
to be respected under fundamental principles of democracy.  The
429
514 U.S. 779 (1995); see supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
430
395 U.S. 486 (1969).
431
Id. at 550.
432
Id. at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
433
See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 820 (“[T]he source of the qualification is of little mo-
ment in assessing the qualification’s restrictive impact.”).
434
Id.  The Court noted that this argument based on fundamental democratic
principles was the “most important[]” factor in its decision.  Id. at 806.
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democratic principle’s application in the Powell case was sensible; the
relevant political community whose preferences merited respect
clearly was the community defined by the Eighteenth Congressional
District, and people outside of that community (members of Con-
gress, who by necessity did not live in Powell’s district) were interfer-
ing with the District’s choice.  However, treating Powell’s principle in a
One-Size-Fits-All manner, as the Court did in Thornton, actually viti-
ated the Powell principle.  Powell impliedly held that the relevant po-
litical community with regard to choosing representatives is the con-
gressional district.  Because a majority of voters in every Arkansas
congressional district had approved the term limits amendment, ap-
plying the term limit would have implemented, rather than under-
mined, the choice of the relevant political community.435
In short, the Powell principle relates to a problem of extraterritori-
ality—outsiders’ interference with a political community’s choice—
and not to the substance of the regulation.  It is not the additional re-
strictions on who can be elected to Congress that were problematic
from the perspective of representative democracy, but rather who im-
posed them.  One-Size-Fits-All is flatly illogical in respect of this type of
constitutional principle.  Rather, any such constitutional principle
that seeks to protect fundamental democratic principles of this sort
necessarily must be Tailored.
435
This does not mean that the ultimate holding in Thornton was wrong, but only
that the Court’s “most important[]” justification, id. at 806, was ineffectual.  There are
plausible arguments outside of “fundamental democratic principles” that could have
been propounded to strike down Arkansas’ amendment.  Indeed, understanding the
centrality of defining the relevant political community makes clear that an argument
based on democratic principles was possible.  The claim would be that the relevant po-
litical community for purposes of laying down the criteria for congresspersons is the
national political community.  Justice Kennedy made this very point in his concurring
opinion.  See id. at 838-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stressing the “federal character of
congressional elections” and that the “federal right to vote . . . in a congressional elec-
tion” belongs “to the voter in his or her capacity as a citizen of the United States”).
Any such argument, however, would confront several challenges.  First, one would
have to explain why congressional qualifications are properly determined by the na-
tional political community.  In addition to requiring a normative justification, any such
claim is in tension with the Powell’s holding that the congressional district is the rele-
vant political community for purposes of selecting congresspersons.  Second, this ar-
gument is inconsistent with Powell insofar as it implies that Congress is the appropriate
forum for creating additional qualifications—a principle that Powell squarely rejected.
In a forthcoming piece, I apply Tailoring to Thornton.  I conclude that Arkansas’
term limits amendment was properly struck down, but that not all state term limits vio-
late the Constitution.  I also explain what characteristics a term limits provision must
have to be constitutional.  Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional Law:
Three Applications of the Jurisprudence of Tailoring, 21 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2005).
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2.  Limiting the Dilemmas of Majoritarianism
Another systemic difference across different levels of government
that implicates democratic theory and accordingly might justify Tailor-
ing is the number of voters in the polity.  The federal polity encom-
passes the most voters, whereas states, municipalities, towns, and vil-
lages generally have ever-diminishing numbers of voters.  To simplify
a bit, in a political system characterized by majority rule, the number
of voters determines the number of persons that constitutes the ma-
jority that can translate its will into law.436  Insofar as democracy is
“rule by the people,” the number of voters in a given polity deter-
mines the relevant “we” that can rule itself by choosing policies that
more than half its members desire.
The size and makeup of the “we” determines whether idiosyn-
cratic groups can be guaranteed that their political wills can be trans-
lated into law in some polity.  For example, there were no more than a
few thousand members of the Rajneesh religious group in the 1980s,
and it is virtually inconceivable that their idiosyncratic political desires
ever would have been shared by a majority of American citizens.  By
creating the municipality of Rajneeshpuram,437 where all citizens were
adherents of the Rajneesh creed, the Rajneesh created a “we” that
guaranteed that their particular zoning and other needs could be-
come law in some polity.
The realization that there are a multiplicity of possible “we’s”
complicates democratic theory.  Even if one accepts the proposition
that it is fair that numerical majorities can politically coerce numerical
minorities—a proposition that is not at all self-evident438—how is it to
be determined what group constitutes the appropriate “we” from
436
This statement makes two major simplifications.  It (1) presumes direct rather
than representative democracy, and (2) ignores coalition-building and logrolling
across issues that can allow numerical minorities to obtain particular laws they might
want.  These simplifying assumptions do not, however, undermine my point concern-
ing the legitimacy of majoritarianism.
437
See Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208, 1210-11 (D. Or. 1984)
(detailing the facts surrounding the creation of Rajneeshpuram).  For a detailed dis-
cussion of this, see Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Resi-
dential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country:  A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV.
1053, 1082-86 (1998).
438
For a good discussion of the problem of majority rule, see Peters, supra note
310, at 1-7.  Jurgen Habermas, Frank Michelman, and Joshua Cohen try to solve this
difficulty by arguing that legitimate democratic institutions permit people to under-
stand themselves as the authors of the laws that bind them, see id. at 3-7, but this ap-
proach is unavailing to the extent that there exist in society discrete subgroups that
have packages of interests that systematically vary from the majority’s desires.
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which to search for the “majority’s” will?  If the group is too large, the
desires of numerical minorities will be systematically submerged to the
wants of majorities.  If it is too small, there are risks of balkanization,
inefficiencies owing to duplicative governmental institutions, and the
coordination problems that attend large numbers of actors (in this
case, polities).  It seems unlikely that there is a single, a priori solution
to this question of how to define the relevant “we.”439
Determining the relevant “we” and asking how large a political
community should be could merely be different formulations of the
same inquiry.  If so, determining the relevant “we” would comport
with the efforts of many democratic theorists who have asked how
small democracies must be in order to function properly.440  On the
other hand, there are important differences between the classical
theorists and the problem mentioned above.  For one, the classical
theorists who were concerned with size did not think about societies as
consisting of heterogeneous groups and interests.441  Furthermore, the
classical democratic theorists assumed that citizens could belong to
439
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 97-99 (1982)
(noting the “dilemma” of “a more exclusive versus a more inclusive demos” and con-
cluding that there is no determinate theoretical solution as to how large a democratic
polity should be).
440 Plato calculated the optimal number of citizens at just over five thousand, while
Aristotle thought a polity must be large enough so the polity is self-sufficient but small
enough so that its citizens could “know one another’s characters.”  DAHL & TUFTE, su-
pra note 334, at 5.  Rousseau and Montesquieu also devoted considerable attention to
the connection between size and democracy.  Id. at 6-8.  These theorists’ concerns with
size did not grow out of a concern for accommodating a heterogeneous population.
Rather, they thought that small size was a precondition for the successful operation of
democratic polities.  For example, under classical Greek political thought:
A democratic polity must have so few citizens that all of them could meet fre-
quently in the popular assembly to listen, to vote, perhaps even to speak.
Smallness, it was thought, enhanced the opportunities for participation in and
control of the government in many ways.  For example, in a small polity every
citizen stood a very good chance of being chosen by lot at least once in his
lifetime to sit on one of the important administrative bodies.  Smallness made
it possible for every citizen to know every other, to estimate his qualities, to
understand his problems, to develop friendly feelings toward him, to analyze
and discuss with comprehension the problems facing the polity.
Id. at 5.  To put the matter in the modern language of economics, democratic politics
was thought to work better in smaller polities because agency and information costs
are smaller in such political units.  See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 400, at 74-75
(discussing the benefits of small polities).
441
See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM:  EX-
AMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 50 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (“[E]quality
of esteem requires a tight unity of purpose that seems to be incompatible with any dif-
ferentiation [of roles].”).
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only a single polity.442  This is not the case under the federal political
structures of today, where citizens simultaneously belong to multiple
political communities.
In fact, the federal political structure holds out the promise of
blunting the problem of how to define the relevant “we.”  The key is
that citizens belong to numerous “we’s,” and they can freely choose
what small polity “we” they wish to be part of.  The problem is solved,
however, only if the smaller-level polities have sufficient political pow-
ers to satisfy their citizens’ needs.443  Tailoring constitutional guaran-
tees, it turns out, is a method of ensuring that such polities enjoy nei-
ther too much nor too little political power.
The discussion below draws upon two schools of contemporary
political theory to show the connection between defining the relevant
“we” and Tailoring.  The first subsection discusses the arguments of
multiculturalist liberal theorists Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor,
who contend that liberal values call for granting to certain groups ex-
tensive powers of self-governance that larger polities do not enjoy.444
Insofar as Tailoring constitutional principles is a doctrinal mechanism
by which such empowerment of select polities can occur, these theo-
rists’ arguments are prima facie justifications for Tailoring.  The sec-
ond subsection suggests that foundational liberal commitments cap-
tured in John Rawls’s account are best realized by taking advantage of
the opportunities inherent in the federal political structure’s multiple
levels of government for permitting citizens flexibility in defining the
political “we” to which they wish to belong.  This provides yet another
prima facie basis for Tailoring constitutional principles.
a.  Multiculturalist liberal theorists
In separate works, philosophers Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor
have argued that the foundational liberal principle of equality re-
quires government to take account of the systematic differences
among people that account for the discrete “groups” or “cultures” that
may be found in a single country.445  True equality, they argue, re-
442
This is true of all the political theorists referred to above.  See supra note 440.
443
It also turns on the possibility of exit.
444
See infra Part IV.D.2.a.
445
As is true with all the approaches to social ordering canvassed here, Taylor’s
and Kymlicka’s are rejected by many, including, for example, BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE
AND EQUALITY:  AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001).  For a par-
tial response, see Jeremy Waldron, One Law for All?  The Logic of Cultural Accommodation,
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2002).
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quires that such identifiable groups be treated in ways that are fitted
to their idiosyncratic needs.  Subjecting groups that systematically dif-
fer from the majority to the same laws that apply to the majority does
not take account of the groups’ differentness and accordingly violates
the principle of equal treatment.446  In fact, the argument goes, apply-
ing one law to all is actually discriminatory:  because the majority’s
approach almost invariably reflects the majority’s culture, applying it
to nonmajority groups accordingly forces them to adopt the majority’s
values.447
The solutions that Taylor and Kymlicka propose take advantage of
federalist systems’ capacities to vary the relevant “we.”  The solutions
also support the notion that Tailoring might be desirable.  First con-
sider Taylor.  His analysis builds on the fact that the minority groups
he believes merit differential treatment are situated in geographically
discrete territories; the Quebeckers live in Quebec and Canada’s abo-
riginal people primarily live in discrete geographical areas.  Taylor
explicitly contemplates “the possibility for variation in [the] interpre-
tation” of the Canadian constitution and the Canadian Charter of
Rights “in different parts of the country.”448  He argues that “the stan-
dard schedules of rights might apply differently in one cultural con-
446
See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP:  A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS 108-15 (1995) (“[G]roup-differentiated rights . . . can help . . . by
alleviating the vulnerability of minority cultures to majority decisions”); Taylor, supra
note 441, at 39 (“[W]e give due acknowledgment only to what is universally present—
everyone has an identity—through recognizing what is peculiar to each.  The universal
demand [of equality] powers an acknowledgment of specificity. . . . [Nondiscrimina-
tion requires] that we make [the ways in which citizens differ] the basis of differential
treatment.”).  For a concise summary of Kymlicka’s argument, see Mark D. Rosen, “Il-
liberal” Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American Constitutionalism, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 803, 808-09 (2002).  Jeremy Waldron has recently made a similar point.  See
Waldron, supra note 445, at 7 (noting that, when “the policy behind [a] statute is in
large part itself cultural,” “it surely should be open to the possibility that the same be-
havior . . . might have a quite different cultural meaning to those” from another cul-
ture, such that “an intelligent application of the rule-of-law ideal seems to militate
against the idea of a single rule applying to everyone”).
447
See KYMLICKA, supra note 446, at 108 (“Government decisions on languages, in-
ternal boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing,
accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic and na-
tional groups.  The state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby
disadvantages others.”); Taylor, supra note 441, at 43 (“[T]he supposedly neutral set of
difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one
hegemonic culture.  As it turns out, then, only the minority or suppressed cultures are
being forced to take alien form.”).
448
Taylor, supra note 441, at 53; see also id. at 61 (supporting the notion that there
exist “some variations in the kinds of law we deem [constitutionally] permissible from
one cultural context to another”).
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text than they do in another, that their application might have to take
account of different collective goals.”449  Tailoring is a doctrinal
mechanism that can accomplish this insofar as it can accommodate
variations of what is constitutionally required across states or munici-
palities.
Similarly, Kymlicka argues for “self-government rights” that “de-
volve powers to smaller political units, so that a national minority can-
not be outvoted or outbid by the majority on decisions that are of par-
ticular importance to their culture.”450  For Kymlicka, equality requires
that “members of the minority have the same opportunity to live and
work in their own culture as members of the majority.”451  Kymlicka
argues that the self-governing rights “may well involve exempting the
national minority from federal bills of rights and judicial review.”452  If
Kymlicka supports exemption, it stands to reason that he also would
endorse the differential application of shared broad principles that
Tailoring could provide.  After all, Kymlicka is concerned that ac-
commodating minority communities not undermine the mutual soli-
darity that is necessary to maintain a stable liberal democracy,453 and
449
Id. at 52.  Elsewhere, however, Taylor argues that
[o]ne has to distinguish the fundamental liberties, those that should never be
infringed and therefore ought to be unassailably entrenched, on one hand,
from privileges and immunities that are important, but that can be revoked or
restricted for reasons of public policy—although one would need a strong
reason to do this—on the other.
Id. at 59; see also id. at 61 (calling for “the invariant defense of certain rights” as distinct
from “the broad range of immunities and presumptions of uniform treatment that
have sprung up in modern cultures of judicial review”).  Taylor is regrettably vague
about what falls into the category of categorical “fundamental” rights and what is a re-
buttable privilege or immunity.  Pildes’s theory provides a basis for critiquing Taylor’s
notion of categorical fundamental rights, see supra Part I.C.1.
450
KYMLICKA, supra note 446, at 37-38.
451
Id. at 109.
452
Id. at 168.  To be clear, Kymlicka does not suggest that this outcome is desirable
from a liberal perspective.  Rather, “[l]iberals in the majority group have to learn to
live with this, just as they must live with illiberal laws in other countries.”  Id.  In fact,
Kymlicka argues that “any theory which does not accord substantial civil rights to the
members of minority cultures is seriously deficient from a liberal point of view.”  Id. at
164; see also id. at 165 (arguing that a deficiency “does not mean that liberals can im-
pose their principles on groups that do not share them”).  He is particularly critical of
any internal limitations imposed by minority groups on their members that “limit the
freedom of individual members within the group to revise traditional practices.”  Id. at
153.  Kymlicka also argues that such things as gender-based membership definitions
violate liberal principles.  Id. at 165.  For an argument that liberalism should accom-
modate some illiberal practices such as these on the part of illiberal minority commu-
nities, see Rosen, supra note 446, at 819-31.
453
See KYMLICKA, supra note 446, at 173-92 (arguing that accommodating minority
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solidarity is more likely under a regime of differential application of
shared principles than wholesale exemption from those principles.454
Even if one were convinced by Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s argu-
ments,455 it is not clear that there are any groups in the United States
today that would qualify as deserving beneficiaries of the special ac-
commodations they advocate.  Kymlicka argues that only “national
minorities”—those “distinct and potentially self-governing societies
incorporated into a larger state” at some point in history—are entitled
to the rights of self-governance that can secure them the chance to
survive, but not groups that have voluntarily immigrated or groups
that have been historically marginalized.456  Taylor’s argument would
appear to justify differential treatment for a broader array of groups,
but it too seems to be tied to historical cultures.457  One could ques-
tion whether these Canadian theorists have adopted overly strict crite-
ria for identifying deserving beneficiaries, perhaps owing to the
prominence of the Quebec and aboriginal paradigms that figure in
their minds.458  In any event, their analysis still is relevant even if their
criteria are not altered.  Even if there currently are not deserving
beneficiaries within the United States, Taylor and Kymlicka provide
justifications for accommodating peoples who might become part of
the American political community in the future, and Tailoring is a
doctrinal mechanism by which these theorists’ normative claims can
be operationalized in the event there were deserving beneficiaries.  
These are useful insights.  Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s arguments sug-
gest that Tailoring could be normatively desirable at some point in the
future, even if it presently is not.  Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s analyses
rights is consistent with maintaining the solidarity necessary to preserve liberal demo-
cratic governments).
454 The only caveat is that the regime of differential application must allow the
minority community sufficient room to self-govern so that it does not “promote aliena-
tion and secessionist movements.”  Id. at 185.  For a discussion of one such successful
regime of differential application of shared principles in the United States, see Rosen,
supra note 31, at 511-84.
455
For some who are not, see supra note 445.
456
KYMLICKA, supra note 446, at 19.  Native Americans, as well as natives of Puerto
Rico and Guam, have been accommodated by creating special polities that do not con-
stitute “states” or “municipalities.”  Id. at 29.  The question of whether these groups
have been granted appropriate rights of self-governance lies beyond the scope of this
Article.
457
See Taylor, supra note 441, at 66 (justifying the protection of cultures in part on
the basis that “all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some con-
siderable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings”).
458
For such an argument in relation to Kymlicka, see Rosen, supra note 446, at
822-24.
2005] TAILORING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 1625
thus underscore the desirability of not understanding One-Size-Fits-All
as a categorical imperative of American constitutional doctrine.
b.  Rawlsian political liberalism
The claim that Tailoring is sensible from the perspectives of Kym-
licka and Taylor is not difficult to establish because both these multi-
culturalist theorists explicitly argue that select groups should be given
extensive self-governance powers.  The claim that Rawls also would be
open to Tailoring is not as straightforward.  Rawls explicitly concludes
that government cannot decide “basic questions of justice as [a] per-
son’s, or [an] association’s, comprehensive doctrine directs,”459 and
this would seem to foreclose the possibility of granting select groups
with distinctive cultures extensive powers of self-governance if, as Tay-
lor and Kymlicka suggest, the very point of so doing is to enable the
groups to rule themselves in accordance with their distinctive cultural
norms and values.
Elsewhere I have critiqued at length this conclusion of Rawls.460  I
tried to show that foundational Rawlsian premises are more fully
achieved by taking account of the flexibility inherent in the federal
political structure,461 which Rawls appears to ignore.462  The gist of my
argument is that people in an original position, not knowing whether
they represented liberals (who do not want the state to take positions
on contested visions of the good life) or perfectionists (who think that
government must actively promote a vision of the good life if people
are to fully self-actualize), would choose to create a federal political
structure where liberals could situate themselves in liberal polities and
perfectionists could live in perfectionist polities, subject to two caveats:
that people in either polity could freely exit, and that no polity could
undertake activities that threaten the well-orderedness of general so-
459
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 62 (rev. ed. 1996); see also id. at 196-97
(“Suppose that a particular religion, and the conception of the good belonging to it,
can survive only if it controls the machinery of the state . . . . This religion will cease to
exist in the well-ordered society of political liberalism.”).
460
See Rosen, supra note 437, at 1106-24.
461
I argue that Rawls’s first principle of justice is best achieved by a political struc-
ture that permits perfectionists a place where they can self-actualize, id. at 1090-93, and
that Rawls’s conclusion that perfectionists cannot be accommodated is based on a
problematically contested theory of personhood and fails to achieve the strong form of
neutrality that accommodation provides, id. at 1120-25.
462
See id. at 1108-10 (arguing that “Rawls’s conclusion that political liberalism
cannot accommodate political perfectionists is attributable to his neglect of subfederal
sovereigns”).
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ciety.463  People would not select the political structure Rawls sug-
gests—where no perfectionist polities can exist—since that would be
tantamount to saying that a person in the original position, despite
knowing that she might represent a perfectionist, would choose a po-
litical structure in which she would be unable to self-actualize if she
were a perfectionist, even though she could have chosen a structure
allowing self-actualization regardless of her ultimate identity.464  Such
an assertion violates the logic of the original position.
In short, my claim is that Rawls problematically overlooks federal-
ism.  As a result, he envisions a political framework that is less just
than is possible, as measured by his own criteria.465  Because my con-
clusions differ from Rawls’s in some very important respects, I refer to
my analysis as being “Rawlsian,” by which I mean that it is inspired by
Rawls’s principles.  I cannot, and do not, claim that my approach is a
straightforward application of his theory.  I do profess, however, that
my approach is the best instantiation of his theory.466
All this Rawlsian analysis is relevant to constitutional analysis be-
cause the Rawlsian method is particularly suited to identifying demo-
cratic constitutional institutions.  Rawlsian analysis is social contrac-
tarian—aimed at identifying the powers that persons willingly would
cede to a government of their creation by means of the original posi-
tion—and democratic authority requires, at least, that the government
structure be one to which citizens hypothetically could be said to have
consented.467
463
Id. at 1091-1106.
464
The full argument can be found in Rosen, supra note 437, at 1089-1125.  Pro-
fessor Seth Kreimer has critiqued this argument of mine in Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the
Sand:  The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 1010-1013
(2002), and I have responded to his criticisms in Rosen, supra note 227, at 965-68
n.455.
465
Stated differently, federalism’s capability of allowing multiple “we’s” to govern
themselves as they largely wish allows for the creation of a political structure that
achieves a stronger form of neutrality—that “the state is not to do anything that makes
it more likely that individuals accept any particular conception rather than another
unless steps are taken to cancel, or to compensate for, the effects of policies that do
this,” RAWLS, supra note 459, at 193—than Rawls imagines is possible.  For an in-depth
discussion of this point, see Rosen, supra note 437, at 1124-25.
466
See Rosen, supra note 437, at 1089-1106 (offering a self-governance framework
inspired by the “foundational liberal objectives” espoused by Rawls, but that takes full
account of federalism’s potential benefits).
467
For a similar view, see Robert C. Post, Democratic Constitutionalism and Cultural
Heterogeneity, 25 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 185, 185 (2000) (“The enterprise of democratic
constitutionalism rests upon the premise of collective agency.  If we ask who makes a
democratic constitution, the answer must be given in the first person plural. . . . The
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Tailoring constitutional guarantees in subfederal polities (most
likely substate polities) where deserving perfectionists live can opera-
tionalize the above Rawlsian conclusion.  Constitutional guarantees
can be Tailored to afford deserving political perfectionists greater
leeway to govern themselves, subject to the above-mentioned con-
straints of exit and well-orderedness.  Tailoring is suited to maintain-
ing the social unity that is required to satisfy well-orderedness; unity is
provided by the common constitutional principles that would govern
both the perfectionists and others.  Varying applications of the princi-
ples, which would afford perfectionists greater leeway to run their
lives, need not undermine the commonality that joint allegiance to
common principles affords, though there surely would be limits on
the degree of variation that could be tolerated.468  Once again, this Ar-
ticle is not the place to delve into the specifics of which constitutional
principles could be Tailored, and what the doctrines would look like,
under a Rawlsian approach.469  What matters for present purposes is
that a Rawlsian analysis provides prima facie support for Tailoring.
E.  Different Functions and Responsibilities
A final respect in which the different levels of government differ is
with regard to their functions and responsibilities.  As shown above,
one of the areas of contemporary doctrine where Tailoring is found—
the equal protection jurisprudence that governs “special-purpose
units” of government—has been justified by the Supreme Court on
this very basis.470  Special-purpose units of government may have prop-
erty-based franchise while “general” governments may not because the
former “affect[] definable groups of constituents more than other
constituents” by virtue of their unique functions.471
More generally, each level of government’s distinctive functions
would be relevant to constitutional doctrines that either in practice or
collective agency of the people constitutes a ‘demos’ capable of ‘bestowing . . . demo-
cratic authority on a polity.’” (quoting J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution?
Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219, 238 (1995)).
468
See Rosen, supra note 27, at 1007 n.317 (considering limits to the degree to
which shared principles can be differentially understood without undermining unity).
469
I provide such an analysis of the Establishment Clause in Rosen, supra note 25,
at 669-716.
470
See supra Part III.B.2.
471
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 363 (1981) (quoting Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474, 484 (1968)).
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effect employ a balancing test.472  The governmental interest at stake
by constitutionally proscribing the regulation of a field would be
greater for the level of government primarily or exclusively responsi-
ble for that subject matter.  This was one of the arguments relied
upon by Justices Jackson and Harlan473 for giving states greater leeway
to regulate speech.  Justice Harlan wrote as follows:
The Constitution differentiates between those areas of human conduct
subject to the regulation of the States and those subject to the powers of
the Federal Government.  The substantive powers of the two govern-
ments, in many instances, are distinct.  And in every case where we are
called upon to balance the interest in free expression against other in-
terests, it seems to me important that we should keep in the forefront
the question of whether those other interests are state or federal.  Since
under our constitutional scheme the two are not necessarily equivalent,
the balancing process must needs often produce different results.
Whether a particular limitation on speech or press is to be upheld be-
cause it subserves a paramount governmental interest must, to a large
extent, I think, depend on whether that government has, under the
Constitution, a direct substantive interest, that is, the power to act, in the
particular area involved.
474
In another case, a majority of the Court identified a subject matter
that was the federal government’s unique responsibility—setting cus-
toms policy—and suggested that this might give rise to a unique due
process doctrine.  The Court stated that “the two protections [the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses] are not al-
ways coextensive.  Not only does the language of the two Amendments
differ, but more importantly, there may be overriding national interests
which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an in-
dividual State.”475
This reason for Tailoring—that the different levels of government
have divergent responsibilities—may fall on receptive ears in today’s
Court.  Contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence, for example,
turns on distinguishing what is “truly national” from what is “truly lo-
472
This is a more generalized form of the argument with regard to the varying
costs of prophylactic measured discussed above.  See supra Part IV.A.2.  Like all other
aspects of this Article’s analysis, this argument is premised on a contestable under-
standing of the role and content of constitutional doctrine.
473
See discussion supra Part III.A.
474
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-04 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting in
part).
475
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (footnote omitted) (em-
phasis added).
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cal.”476  While many of the subject areas identified by the Court as fal-
ling into the latter category might not be so readily characterized as
such—for instance, the federal government long has played an impor-
tant role in family law477—some fields almost certainly fall primarily if
not exclusively to federal competence.478  Alternatively, even if it is not
possible to identify many (or any) subjects that are the exclusive do-
main of any single level of government, there might be broad agree-
ment that certain subjects are primarily the responsibility of one or
the other level of government.  This might suffice to have effects on
the “balancing” of the government’s interest against the countervail-
ing concern protected by a particular constitutional guarantee.
V.  COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS
This final part analyzes three possible downsides to Tailoring.  It
shows that they are considerations that weigh against Tailoring when
taking account of Tailoring’s benefits and costs, but that they are not
reasons for categorically rejecting Tailoring.  That Tailoring cannot
be categorically rejected is not surprising in light of the twin facts that
constitutional law currently contains some examples of Tailoring and
that many Justices have advocated expanding the instances of Tailor-
ing.479
A.  Administrability and Judicial Discretion
Two related disadvantages of Tailoring were discussed earlier in
relation to selective incorporation’s eclipse of Fundamental Fairness:
compared to the contemporary One-Size-Fits-All regime, Tailoring
would increase the room for judicial discretion and would be more
476
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000).
477
See generally Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787
(1995) (addressing the federal government’s increasingly important role in enforcing
family law); Judith Resnik, ‘Naturally’ Without Gender:  Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991) (discussing the increasing number of family law
issues governed by federal law).
478
Foreign relations comes to mind, though even this is not uncontroversial.  See
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (arguing that cus-
tomary international law at most rises to the level of state common law, but not federal
common law).  For contrary views, see Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998), and Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense
About Customary International Law:  A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997).
479
See supra Part III.B.
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difficult to administer.480  The concern is that Tailoring would leave
the subfederal polities in the dark as to what their constitutional obli-
gations are.  Not only would the doctrines developed in the federal
context not necessarily apply to the states, but there might be doc-
trinal variations as between the states and municipalities, and even
across municipalities.  The United States Supreme Court hears only
about one hundred cases a year, and relieving the subfederal polities
of the obligation to abide by already-developed constitutional doc-
trines in effect would leave them to their own devices.
Two factors suggest that although these are very real countervail-
ing considerations against Tailoring, they are not categorical reasons
to reject Tailoring.  First, as a purely descriptive matter, our country’s
constitutional jurisprudence does not systematically adopt the sim-
plest of all possible legal rules so as to maximize adminstrability and
minimize judicial discretion.  Many constitutional doctrines are com-
plex.  The administrability difficulties they create presumably are justi-
fied by the benefits that accrue from adopting them instead of a sim-
ple rule; complexity frequently is needed, and doctrinally adopted,
because of the complex mix of considerations that the doctrine must
mediate.  The question accordingly becomes whether Tailoring is a
doctrinal complication that is worth its costs.  Given the wide array of
potential benefits of Tailoring examined in Part IV, it would be sur-
prising to conclude that any and all such benefits would be out-
weighed by administrative and discretion-augmenting costs.  Whether
any of the systemic differences between the various levels of govern-
ment are adequate bases to support Tailoring accordingly can only be
answered by considering the costs and benefits that would attend the
Tailoring of each particular constitutional guarantee.
A second reason why these administrative and discretion-
augmenting concerns are real costs but not categorical reasons to re-
ject Tailoring is that similar costs are borne all the time outside the
context of Tailoring.  Due to its small size, the Supreme Court is inca-
pable of passing judgment on the vast majority of federal law—consti-
tutional, statutory, and regulatory—that is created.  Yet virtually no
one takes this as an argument that Congress categorically must legis-
late less or that administrative agencies must make fewer rules.481
Rather, it is understood that large and increasing quantities of law are
480
See supra Part II.C.
481
This, in no small measure, is because federal law is reviewed not only by the
Supreme Court, but also by lower federal courts and state courts.  Courts aside from
the Supreme Court similarly would have reviewing authority under a Tailoring regime.
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a concomitant of a large and complex society that must be tolerated,
even if such a quantity of regulations invariably makes the legal system
more complicated to administer and increases judicial discretion.
Consistency accordingly suggests that Tailoring’s administrative and
discretion-augmenting burdens at most are costs that weigh against
Tailoring, but that they are not legitimate bases for rejecting Tailoring
as a per se matter.
An additional reason to reject the view that administrability and
discretion costs render Tailoring categorically undesirable is that the
costs themselves are not fixed but are a function of how Tailoring is
operationalized.  Tailoring could be effectuated in a manner that sig-
nificantly reduces these costs.  One variable is the weight of the pre-
sumption that is attached to One-Size-Fits-All.  The stronger the pre-
sumption, the fewer are the discretion and administrability costs.
Second, it could be decided to altogether forgo Tailoring as between
certain polities.  For example, the costs relating to discretion and ad-
ministrability would be reduced by not Tailoring as between states and
municipalities or across municipalities (what might be called “hori-
zontal Tailoring” across polities situated at the same level in the fed-
eral structure).  The diminished benefits of Tailoring in this limited
fashion might be worth it, as a pragmatic matter.
Regardless of the quantum of the costs, the question arises as to
how they are to be balanced against the potential benefits of Tailoring
identified in Part IV.  The answer is that choosing between them is an
eminently “political” process that is not reducible to a purely rational
process, but instead is a process that simultaneously reflects and helps
constitute the very character of our national political community.
This is so because none of the potential benefits of Tailoring is com-
mensurable with the costs of Tailoring.  For example, it is not possible
to translate both the benefit of accommodating the needs of certain
minority communities (a benefit according to Kymlicka and Taylor)482
and the costs of increasing discretion and complicating administrabil-
ity into numbers that can be compared on a common scale.  Trading
off among incommensurable goods hence is not a process that can be
undertaken by a perfectly rational machine executing an algorithm,
but involves subjective value choices that reflect and shape the charac-
ter of the decision maker.483  Choosing between One-Size-Fits-All and
482
See supra Part IV.D.2.a.
483
See Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments be Enforced?, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 783, 820-23 (2004) (explaining this at length); Millgram, supra note 365, at
151-69 (examining the process of an individual’s decision making under circumstances
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Tailoring thus reflects a doubly subjective, political process:  deciding
which if any of the potential benefits of Tailoring are to constitute ac-
tual benefits for purposes of constitutional doctrine, and then deter-
mining how such benefits are to be traded off against the costs relat-
ing to judicial discretion and administrability.
B.  The Nature of Our Political Union
A profound potential challenge is that Tailoring would risk un-
dermining our Constitution and tearing asunder our national political
union.  The very point of the Constitution, it might be argued, is to
ensure the uniform protection of rights everywhere in the country.
Such uniformity is what defines our national character.  Moreover, it
might be claimed, uniformity is a prerequisite for citizens’ respect for
the Constitution.484
These may be concerns that weigh against Tailoring, but they are
not legitimate grounds for categorically rejecting Tailoring.  Let us
start the analysis by considering Tailoring across the federal and state
governments (“vertical Tailoring”).  There are several reasons why it is
unlikely that the health of American constitutionalism rests on the
federal and state governments being subject to identical constitutional
constraints.  First, it is incontrovertible that prior to the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights limited only the federal
government, not the states.  Even after adoption of the Civil Rights
Amendments, constitutional limitations continued to vary as between
the federal and subfederal governments under the regime of Funda-
mental Fairness.485  It was not until the 1960s, when the Court adopted
the doctrine of selective incorporation, that constitutional guarantees
were systematically applied in identical measure to the federal and
subfederal polities.486  Even if one prefers selective incorporation to
the doctrines that preceded it, it is hard to argue that American con-
stitutionalism is contingent on a type of uniformity that was absent
during the majority of this country’s existence.487  The conclusion that
where choice must be made among incommensurable options); Scharffs, supra note
365, at 1379 (“[V]alues are plural, sometimes conflict, and cannot always be reconciled
or simultaneously realized.”).
484
Cf. Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review:  Congressional
Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 941 (1982) (explaining the
importance of there being a singular interpretation of constitutional principles).
485
See supra Part I.B.1.
486
See supra Part I.B.
487
Given the very different constitutional limitations to which the federal and state
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American constitutionalism is not dependent on such uniformity is
definitively established by the fact that there are several contemporary
examples of vertical Tailoring, such as the equal protection doctrine
that permits property-based franchise in certain local governments,488
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,489 and area-based and popula-
tion-based apportionment doctrines.490
The more difficult challenge arises as to Tailoring across states or
across municipalities.  A regime under which the U.S. Constitution
permitted New York to bar its citizens from doing act X in New York
but did not permit New Jersey to similarly regulate its citizens un-
doubtedly would strike many as strange.  Nonetheless, is horizontal
Tailoring categorically incompatible with American constitutionalism?
No.  This is proven by the fact that some horizontal Tailoring already
exists.  Consider the community standards doctrine.  Obscene materi-
als receive no First Amendment protection and accordingly can be
freely regulated,491 but what qualifies as obscene is determined on a
place-by-place basis.492  The community standards doctrine thus “per-
mit[s] differing levels of obscenity regulation in such diverse commu-
nities as Kerrville and Houston, Texas,”493 with the result that “material
may be proscribed in one community but not in another” as a matter
of constitutional law.494  Less analogous, but still instructive, are the
unique constitutional doctrines that apply in military enclaves.  For
example, although the Bill of Rights applies on military bases,495 it is
governments historically have been subject, it would seem that there is no necessary
link between constitutional uniformity across the federal and state governments, on
the one hand, and constitutionalism or our nation’s political union, on the other.  The
historical record might be dismissed by the argument that having applied uniform
standards is akin to letting the genie out of the bottle, and that reversing the status quo
would do damage to constitutionalism at this point in time.  But why should this be so?
It seems more likely that reversing course would be damaging not as a categorical mat-
ter, but only if there were not good reasons for doing so.
488
See supra Part III.B.2.
489
See supra Part III.B.4.
490
See supra Part III.B.5.
491
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
492
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974) (rejecting the re-
quirement of nationwide standards for judging obscenity).  For a more extensive dis-
cussion of the community standards doctrine, see Mark D. Rosen, The Radical Possibility
of Limited Community-Based Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 927,
995-97 (2002).
493
Hoover v. Byrd, 801 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1986).
494
United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 551 n.1 (6th Cir. 1981).
495
See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (holding that Congress
may not “disregard the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs”).
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black-letter law that “the different character of the military community
and of the military mission requires a different application of [consti-
tutional] protections.”496  Thus, there can be prior restraints497 and
bans on private citizens’ political speech498 in military enclaves that
would not be permitted in states or municipalities.  The community
standards doctrine and military law strongly suggest that horizontal
Tailoring is not categorically incompatible with our constitutional or-
der, for they are contemporary doctrines under which the identical
activity may be constitutionally protected in one place (for instance,
certain adult magazines in San Francisco) but not in others (the same
adult magazines in a more conservative community such as Salt Lake
City).
These doctrines, however, are exceptional.  What would happen
to our constitutional order if what was constitutionally permissible
more commonly varied from location to location, as might happen
under Tailoring?  There does not seem to be anything inherent in
constitutionalism that requires, as an a priori matter, that such geog-
raphy-sensitive constitutional doctrines be exceptional rather than
mainstream.  Constitutional rights that are “rights, simpliciter” by their
nature are not geography-sensitive, whereas “rights-against-rules” may
generate doctrines that are geography-sensitive to the extent that
conditions that are doctrinally relevant vary from place to place,499 and
I know of no basis for concluding that constitutionalism by its nature
requires that “rights, simpliciter” outnumber the “rights-against-rules.”
Indeed, as a descriptive matter, it seems to be the case that most con-
stitutional rights are of the “rights-against-rules” variety.
The fact that jurisprudence does not preclude the mainstreaming
of geography-sensitive constitutional doctrines does not mean that
such a modification would be without effects on our constitutional
order.  Most importantly, it likely would change citizens’ views of con-
stitutional law.  Change in and of itself is not a bad thing, however, so
496
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amend-
ment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regu-
lations designed for civilian society.”).
497
See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980) (upholding an Air Force regula-
tion requiring service members to obtain approval from commanders before circulat-
ing petitions on Air Force bases).
498
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (“The respondents . . . had no
generalized constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets at Fort
Dix . . . .”).
499
See supra Part II.B.
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it must be asked:  how would citizens’ views change, and would such a
change be beneficial or harmful?
Answering these questions first requires an understanding of what
attitudes likely inform citizens’ current expectation that constitutional
doctrines are uniform nationwide.  A crucial component, I imagine, is
a widespread belief that constitutional rights by necessity are “rights,
simpliciter.”  Once it is understood that many are not—and Tailoring, it
should be recalled, is an option only vis-à-vis those constitutional
rights that are “rights-against-rules” rather than “rights, simpliciter”500—
citizens’ receptivity to horizontal Tailoring is far more likely.  Why?
Since a constitutional right of the “rights-against-rules” variety means
that what the Constitution permits to be regulated is highly context-
sensitive, the expectation of nationwide uniformity across all polities
of a similar type with regard to constitutional protections that are
“rights-against-rules” reflects an unrebuttable presumption that all
such polities are identical for constitutional purposes.  This unrebut-
table presumption of identicality, which horizontal Tailoring rejects,501
is a less firm foundation for uniform rights than is the “rights, simplici-
ter” conception of constitutional rights, under which nonuniform con-
stitutional rights are conceptually incoherent.
What underlies the unrebuttable presumption of identicality that
grounds the expectation of nationwide uniformity of “rights-against-
rules”?  The most plausible candidate is the belief that it is the very na-
tionwide uniform application of constitutional rules that helps to con-
stitute our country as a unified polity.  While this is a plausible con-
ception of national identity, it by no means is the only possibility.  Our
country is extraordinarily heterogeneous, and several of the ap-
proaches explored in Part IV in essence reflect the view that our coun-
try’s very real diversity is better managed by offering a menu of op-
tions, including possible variations of what regulations are
constitutionally permitted across polities of the same level.502  In short,
the unrebuttable presumption of identicality does not reflect some
500
See supra Part II.B.
501
For instance, if heightened scrutiny for racial classifications reflects a concern
that minorities’ interests are not adequately represented in the legislative process due
to widespread hostility, then racial classifications created in black-majority municipali-
ties ought to be subject to different scrutiny than classifications enacted in white-
majority municipalities.  See supra note 302 and accompanying text.  Under this Ely ap-
proach to constitutional rights, different municipalities might sufficiently differ from
one another to merit differential constitutional treatment.
502
This is true, for example, of the multiculturalist theorists, Nozick, my reading
of Rawls, and the law and economics theorist Robert Cooter.
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deep and intrinsic need of constitutionalism, but instead mirrors only
one of several competing conceptions of our country’s national iden-
tity and the Constitution’s relationship to that identity.  Whether hori-
zontal Tailoring is desirable or not thus turns on normative commit-
ments, not the nature of constitutionalism.
It follows that the change in citizens’ views of constitutional law
that would accompany the mainstreaming of geography-sensitive con-
stitutional doctrine turns on contestable normative commitments.
This is an issue that I cannot hope to resolve in this Article.  It is
enough for present purposes to identify the contestable foundations
on which One-Size-Fits-All rests.  Finally, it is important to recognize
that even if the unrebuttable presumption of identicality were forth-
rightly adopted as reflecting the preferable conception of our national
identity, this would not lead to the rejection of Tailoring generally,
but only of horizontal Tailoring.
CONCLUSION
Although Supreme Court cases typically read as if constitutional
principles self-evidently are One-Size-Fits-All, this is not so.  Several
contemporary constitutional doctrines fit the paradigm of Tailoring,
and many Justices have advocated that other constitutional principles
be Tailored.  Jurisprudentially, One-Size-Fits-All is not an intrinsic part
of American constitutionalism.  Though there are real costs that
would attend the Tailoring of constitutional principles, they constitute
pragmatic concerns, not bases for categorically rejecting Tailoring.
The pragmatic analysis that appropriately informs the choice between
One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring necessarily must take account of Tai-
loring’s many potential benefits.  These benefits result from the fact
that the different levels of government systematically vary in important
ways.  Consequently, a constitutional limitation as applied to one level
of government may have very different repercussions when applied to
another.  Whether any of Tailoring’s potential benefits is to count as
an actual benefit, however, is a function of the decision maker’s po-
litical preferences.  Determining how any such benefits are to be
traded off against Tailoring’s costs requires yet another subjective, po-
litical choice since Tailoring’s costs and benefits are incommensura-
ble.
In the end, then, a choice must be made between One-Size-Fits-All
and Tailoring, and the decision invariably will be guided by contest-
able normative commitments.  This Article has not sought to engage
in the debate as to which normative commitment is superior, but has
2005] TAILORING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 1637
aimed to highlight the nonaxiomatic and contestable assumptions
that lie behind the One-Size-Fits-All approach, which is the doctrinal
status quo.  The choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring
should not be made on the basis of a misperception of constitutional
necessity.  Given Tailoring’s many potential benefits it seems wise to
soften the categorical presumption of One-Size-Fits-All to a rebuttable
presumption, so that the merits of One-Size-Fits-All versus Tailoring
can be examined in the incremental manner that is the common law’s
wisdom.
